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Abstract
This thesis focuses on using (computational) argumentation theory to model
common-sense reasoning with preferences. Common-sense reasoning entails
dealing with incomplete, uncertain and conflicting information. Argumen-
tation as a branch of Artificial Intelligence (AI) provides means to reason
with such information in a formal way. An important aspect of common-
sense reasoning is reasoning with preference information. As such, dealing
with preferences is an important phenomenon in argumentation. Through
our research, we aim to contribute to the understanding of preference infor-
mation treatment in argumentation and common-sense reasoning, as well
as AI at large.
Our objective is to equip a well established structured argumentation
formalism—Assumption-Based Argumentation (ABA)—with a new prefer-
ence handling mechanism. To this end, we propose an extension of ABA,
called ABA+, where preferences are accounted for by reversing attacks.
This yields a novel way of dealing with preference information in struc-
tured argumentation. We also advance a new property concerning contra-
position of rules, called Weak Contraposition, applicable to ABA+, and,
potentially, to generic approaches to rule-based reasoning with preferences.
We argue that ABA+ (with and without Weak Contraposition) exhibits
various desirable formal properties concerning argumentation and/or pref-
erence handling. We analyse ABA+ in the context of other formalisms of
argumentation with preferences and contend advantages of ABA+.
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1 Introduction
Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (KR) is the field of Artificial In-
telligence (AI) dedicated to representing information about the world and
automating various forms of reasoning, such as reasoning with rules, ab-
duction, reasoning under uncertainty, etc. (see e.g. [BL04]). Among other
topics, KR concerns common-sense reasoning—the human ability to effort-
lessly make alterable decisions based on incomplete, uncertain and con-
flicting information (see e.g. [Mue14]). The selection of words ‘alterable’,
‘incomplete’, ‘uncertain’ and ‘conflicting’ is not accidental here: when we—
humans—do not know something relevant (incomplete information) and/or
are to a certain degree unsure of our knowledge (uncertain information), our
decisions may need to be revised if and when new relevant information is
obtained; likewise, the knowledge that we possess may be either conflicting
to begin with, or become conflicting after attaining new information. On
top of these features, common-sense reasoning often proceeds with the help
of preference information, which can, for example, ease the qualification of
uncertainty or help to discriminate among alternative (conflicting) choices.
During the process of reasoning, we aim to account for the information that
we have, including our preferences, and as an outcome of the reasoning
process, we try to produce a justifiable decision.
Arguably, in everyday life we tackle enormous amounts of common-sense
reasoning problems, seemingly without troubling ourselves much with the
fact that our knowledge is ‘imperfect’, as described above. What is more,
we make decisions in everyday situations not only by and for ourselves,
but also interactively in groups of people where, for instance, there is a
common problem and consensus has to be reached. Conceivably, whether
reasoning individually or collectively, we engage in argumentation. That is,
we construct arguments based on the information at hand, for and against
certain statements or choices. Just like information, the arguments thus
produced are often conflicting. Our reasoning then amounts to evaluating
9
the conflicts while taking preferences into account, and selecting the accept-
able arguments that justify a particular decision. The possibility to alter
our choices stems from the ability to form new arguments and reassess the
overall picture.
Formalising the process of argumentation informally described above is
one of the main goals of computational argumentation (as overviewed in
e.g. [BCD07, RS09, BGH+14]), a branch of KR. This formalisation entails
finding suitable ways to represent knowledge that includes incomplete and
uncertain information, and coming up with appropriate argumentative rea-
soning methods which yield outcomes that either match human common-
sense or are rational in some sense. Our research focuses on one particu-
lar part of such formalisation endeavour, namely, dealing adequately with
the preference information involved. While there are many proposals—
each with its merits—on how to account for preferences in the process
of argument construction and evaluation (see Section 1.2.2), we maintain
that there is still much space for improvement. A main contribution of
this thesis is advancing the state-of-the-art of one established computa-
tional argumentation formalism, Assumption-Based Argumentation (ABA)
[BDKT97, DKT06, DMT07, DKT09, Ton13, Ton14, CT16a], by enabling it
to deal with preference information in a novel and appealing way, the result
of which is the formalism ABA+. In the process, we analyse our proposal
against features of common-sense reasoning with preferences. In particular,
we establish desirable properties that ABA+ possesses and that, we believe,
should be exhibited by computational argumentation formalisms aiming to
model common-sense reasoning. Our work thus offers advancements as well
as evaluation criteria applicable to other computational argumentation for-
malisms.
In the remainder of this chapter, we first (Section 1.1) discuss the roots of
common-sense reasoning and issues relating to its formalisation, especially
with respect to computational argumentation. We then (Section 1.2) discuss
preference treatment in common-sense reasoning, with a special emphasis
on computational argumentation formalisms. We summarise the thesis con-
tributions in Section 1.3 and provide a brief summary of the structure of
the thesis in Section 1.4. In Section 1.5, we list the publications and draft
papers that resulted as part of the research conducted towards writing this
thesis.
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1.1 Common-Sense Reasoning
Generally, common-sense reasoning overlaps with a huge array of fields in
AI, including, for example, natural language understanding, computer vi-
sion and robotics, among others. (A wealth of examples of common-sense
reasoning problems can be found in e.g. [Mue14].) In our research, we are
interested in the KR problems concerning common-sense reasoning. More
specifically, the agenda involves symbolically representing the knowledge
about the problem at hand and reasoning about that problem via its repre-
sentation. For a simple illustration of what we are aiming at, consider the
following situation.
Example 1.1 (Referendum). At a party, Zed is having a discussion about
the outcome of a possible referendum in the Netherlands on whether to
remain in the EU. Two of his interlocutors, Ann and Bob, have diverging
views on the outcome of the referendum. Ann claims that the Dutch would
vote to leave, whereas Bob maintains that they would vote to stay. What
inferences could or should Zed draw about the outcome of the referendum
in question?
The idea behind formalising such a common-sense reasoning problem is to
represent Zed’s knowledge and the inferences that follow from this knowl-
edge. This entails representing the core information that there are two
agents, Ann and Bob, and that they express conflicting opinions. Reason-
ing from Zed’s perspective then amounts to, in the absence of any other
information, deciding whether and what conclusions can be made about the
outcome of the referendum. For instance, Zed could be credulous and choose
to maintain as possible either of the two positions—leaving and staying—
with equal likelihood. Or, Zed could be sceptical and refuse to draw any
conclusions about the referendum.
From the early beginnings of the field (see e.g. [MH69]), common-sense
reasoning problems have been formalised using logic-based (or rule-based)
systems. This involved, given a problem, specifying a knowledge base in
terms of logical formulas (and/or rules) and drawing inferences from there.
It was soon understood that this is hardly achievable through classical logic,
due to at least two of its intertwined features that are at odds with common-
sense reasoning [BNT08b, SA14]: one is that classical logic is monotonic,
and the other is that it does not allow to discriminate among models.
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For one thing, monotonicity of classical logic means that the set of in-
ferences obtained from a knowledge base using classical logic can only be
enlarged after augmenting the knowledge base. However, common-sense
reasoning is defeasible, in the sense that in light of new information added
to the knowledge base, previously drawn inferences/conclusions can, and
likely need to, be retracted, something which cannot happen in classical
logic. For illustration, in Example 1.1, Zed may, to begin with, believe that
the referendum will not take place at all, but would have to revise his beliefs
upon learning that one is announced.
This non-monotonicity aspect of common-sense reasoning relates to draw-
ing inferences from possibly incomplete sets of premises (also known as the
qualification problem [MH69]; see also e.g. [Boc04]). This assumes, for in-
stance, that some of the prerequisites of a rule can by default be presumed
to hold, thus drawing the conclusion of the rule. If, however, exceptional cir-
cumstances arise and the premise in question turns out to be falsified, then
the rule is no longer applicable and its conclusions should be withdrawn.
More generally, the main idea of common-sense reasoning pertains to
reasoning under circumstances that are the most normal, having in mind
that abnormalities may occur, but are less likely. Thus, beliefs (or models)
describing the normal circumstances are singled-out, until new information
that circumstances are not normal is obtained, whence different beliefs are
used to reason about the world. Classical logic, however, treats all its models
equally, whether they represent normal or abnormal circumstances.
Another typical aspect of common-sense reasoning problems is the pres-
ence of conflicting information, which is especially accentuated in the con-
text of monotonicity: in light of new information, new conclusions may have
to be drawn, while the possibly conflicting old ones cannot be retracted, thus
yielding inconsistency. Classical logic is ill suited to deal with conflicting
information, because when inconsistencies arise, a classical knowledge base
trivialises (and one is left with no models of the world).
These and other issues (such as the frame problem [MH69], that pertains
to deciding and modelling which facts about the world stay unchanged when
reasoning is performed) concerning formalisation of common-sense reasoning
lead to the development of the so-called non-monotonic logics, and non-
monotonic reasoning (NMR) in general.
12
1.1.1 Non-Monotonic Reasoning (NMR)
NMR (see e.g. [Ant97, BNT08a, SA14] for overviews) deals with logics
and formal theories which violate monotonicity. Some NMR formalisms,
such as Non-Monotonic Logics I and II [McD80, McD82], Circumscription
[McC80, Lif86], Autoepistemic Logic [Moo84, Moo85], Default Logic [Rei80]
and Theorist [Poo88], extend classical logics to formalise common-sense rea-
soning. For instance, Non-Monotonic Logics I, II and Autoepistemic Logic
combine classical logic with modal operators; Circumscription works by dis-
criminating among classical models by way of minimising (with respect to
set inclusion) certain predicates; Default Logic extends classical logic with a
new type of defeasible rules, known as defaults, and uses them to construct
classically consistent sets of formulas.
One strand of NMR formalisms lies in the area of Logic Programming
(LP). Employing negation as failure [Cla78], LP allows for reasoning non-
monotonically and lends itself to implement NMR formalisms such as Event
Calculus [KS86, MS99]. Answer Set Programming (ASP) [GL91], a form
of LP, is a well established NMR formalism, used for search and plan-
ning problems (see e.g. [DNK97]), among others. Alongside, Abductive LP
[EK89, KKT92] has been developed and shown to model forms of default
reasoning (e.g. Default Logic, Theorist) [KKT92].
The multitude of NMR formalisms (also see e.g. Inheritance Networks
[HTT90] for yet another type of formalism), each with its own merits and
drawbacks, called for some unifying approach that would abstract away
from the particular details of various formalisms, and would emphasise the
bigger picture. A way towards such an approach was paved by the works on
abductive reasoning, e.g. [EK89, KKT92], and on the argumentative reading
of defeasible reasoning, e.g. [LS89, Pol92, SL92]. The result was a formal
theory of argumentation, now generally called computational argumentation
(also known as formal argumentation, and in the KR literature often simply
referred to as argumentation, the name we adopt in this work too.)
1.1.2 Argumentation
Argumentation is a perspicuous reasoning method that allows for an array
of knowledge representation choices, ranging from very abstract to very de-
tailed and concrete. As such, argumentation is commonly classified into two
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types: abstract argumentation (AA), as proposed by Dung in his seminal
paper [Dun95b]; and structured argumentation, as overviewed in [BGH+14],
[RS09, Part II]. Even though accounts of (most) structured argumentation
formalisms were developed later than AA, structured argumentation in a
way predates AA, as witnessed by the works of e.g. Pollock [Pol92] and
Simari and Loui [SL92] (also see e.g. [Pra12]). And indeed, in [Dun95b],
Dung himself was explicitly interested in AA instantiated with structured
formulas. We now give a semi-formal account of the two classes of argu-
mentation formalisms, starting with AA for simplicity (detailed technical
accounts will be given in Chapter 2).
In AA, information is stored as a directed graph (Args, ), called AA
framework, with Args a set of arguments, representing individual pieces of
information, and a binary attack relation  over Args. Information repre-
sented by the arguments may be incomplete and/or uncertain. The attack
relation models information conflicts: whenever A conflicts with B, for two
arguments A and B, then this is represented as an attack from A to B, de-
noted A B. It is up to the user to decide how the arguments and conflicts
are obtained and what they represent. For instance, in the Referendum
example (Example 1.1), Zed could form two conflicting arguments A and B,
based on believing Ann and Bob, respectively: the AA representation of the
problem would be (Args, ) such that Args = {A,B} and A B, B A.
Whereas in AA the internal structure of arguments is unspecified, struc-
tured argumentation allows for more granularity in defining arguments and
attacks. Usually, a formal language for representing knowledge is assumed,
and arguments are constructed as deductions from premises to conclu-
sions, with attacks constructively defined. One particular example of a
structured argumentation formalism is ABA [BDKT97, DMT07, Ton14].
There, knowledge is represented through a deductive system (L,R) con-
sisting of a formal language L and (a set of) inference rules R, while a
set A ⊆ L of distinguished sentences, called assumptions, represents un-
certain and/or incomplete information. Assumptions are also responsible
for information conflicts: attacks arise among sets of assumptions when-
ever one set of assumptions deduces (via rules) the so-called contrary of
some assumption in another set, where contraries are given by a total
mapping ¯¯ : A → L. As an illustration, in the Referendum example,
the language could be L = {α, β, leave, stay}, with (a set of) assumptions
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A = {α, β}, where α and β stand for believing in Ann and Bob, respec-
tively. Then the (set of) rules R = {leave ← α, stay ← β} would
render Zed’s representation of the statements of his interlocutors: for in-
stance, leave ← α represents that believing in Ann leads to believing that
the Dutch would vote to leave. The contraries, given by α = stay and
β = leave, would then model conflicting information: given the rules, leave
can be deduced from {α} and stay can be deduced from {β}, thus re-
sulting in a mutual attack between {α} and {β}. Arguably, in contrast
to AA, structured argumentation formalisms, such as ABA, allow for a
more fine-grained representation of reasoning problems, which is also closer
to the representation methods employed by other NMR formalisms (for
instance, an LP/ASP representation of the problem could involve rules
leave ← α, stay ← β, α ← not β, β ← not α, where not stands for
negation as failure).
Assuming a representation of a problem, reasoning in both abstract and
structured argumentation is performed by selecting sets, called extensions,
of collectively acceptable arguments or assumptions. Acceptability condi-
tions are determined by the chosen semantics, which specify what require-
ments have to be met in order to declare a set of arguments or assumptions
acceptable (see e.g. [BG09, BCG11] for overviews of argumentation seman-
tics for AA). For instance, the stable semantics requires that for a set of
(say) arguments to be a stable extension, no two arguments in it can at-
tack one another, and any argument not in the set has to be attacked by
some argument in the set. To exemplify, in the AA formalisation of the
Referendum example, namely (Args, ) with Args = {A,B} and A  B,
B  A, both sets {A} and {B} are stable extensions. Notice that the non-
monotonic behaviour of argumentation is manifested through semantics: if
new information is obtained and, for instance, Args is expanded with a new
argument C such that C A, then only {B,C} is a stable extension of the
new AA framework, and so A is no longer acceptable.
With respect to, in particular, stable semantics, argumentation has been
particularly successful at capturing various NMR formalisms and thus pro-
viding them with a common argumentative interpretation (see e.g. [Dun95b,
BDKT97, MP13, TL14, YMR16]). In terms of LP, some forms of ASP have
also been shown to be instances of argumentation under stable semantics
(see e.g. [Dun95b, BDKT97]). Other argumentation semantics too have
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been employed in capturing as well as advancing NMR formalisms. For
instance, in addition to the stable semantics, the grounded semantics was
used to capture Inheritance Networks in argumentation [DS95]; also, LP has
been provided with argumentative foundations (see e.g. [Dun95a]). More
generally, a correspondence has been established between LP with its vari-
ous semantics and argumentation with its own semantics (see e.g. [BTK93,
Dun95b, BDKT97]).
Alongside providing a framework for NMR, argumentation has been shown
to model various reasoning paradigms, such as forms of decision making (see
e.g. [AP09]) and modes of reasoning performed by agents (see e.g. [KM03,
RS09]), among others. One particularly important aspect of argumentation
is its dialectical nature. Indeed, argumentation can be seen as a dialogical
exchange of arguments seeking to establish the acceptability of an argu-
ment/statement/position. To this end, argumentation formalisms define the
space of arguments that can be moved and model the conflicts among those
arguments. If desired, structured argumentation formalisms provide the
building blocks of arguments and attacks. Argument game proof theories
(see e.g. [DKT06, MC09, GW09, MP09, FT14]) yield means to establish di-
alectically whether an argument/statement is acceptable (or justified). The
Referendum example, where Zed tries to arbitrate in an exchange of con-
flicting opinions, serves to illustrate the dialectical nature of argumentation.
Given a wide range of reasoning paradigms encompassed by argumenta-
tion, argumentation formalisms have to account for various aspects regard-
ing those reasoning paradigms that they aim at modelling. Preferences is
one particular such aspect, discussed next.
1.2 Preferences
Preferences are daily phenomena helping to, for example, qualify the uncer-
tainty of information or discriminate among alternatives.
Example 1.2 (Referendum with Preferences). Recall the Referendum ex-
ample (Example 1.1). Suppose Zed knows that Ann likes big claims based
on dubious assumptions, so he trusts Bob more than Ann. Whether Zed is
credulous or sceptical, this preference information should conceivably lead
Zed to accepting Bob’s argument, rather than Ann’s.
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Due to their prevalence and characteristics, accounting for preferences
has been an important topic in AI at large (see e.g. [DHKP11, Kac11]) and
in KR particularly (see e.g. [DSTW04, BNT08b, PTV15] for overviews).
For example, preference representation is a salient issue in common-sense
reasoning. Consider our ABA representation of the Referendum example
(Section 1.1.2). Zed’s preference to trust Bob over Ann could presumably be
expressed in multiple ways. For one, a preference could be formed relating
the assumptions α and β, which represent Zed believing in Ann and Bob,
respectively. This seems like a natural way to qualify the uncertainty of
information. However, another way would be to form a preference over the
rules. For instance, the rule stay ← β could be given preference over the
rule leave← α; this would relate the specific information pertaining to the
claims about the referendum, while allowing to specify different preferences
regarding any other claims. Further still, in a different context, Zed could
possess a preference toward a certain outcome to begin with, irrespective of
the arguments put forward. For instance, Zed may wish the Dutch to vote
to stay, whence a preference of stay over leave could be formed. Reasoning
would then amount to finding assumptions that lead to the satisfaction of
the preferred outcomes (or goals). Generally, preferences are widespread in
NMR formalisms, manifesting themselves in various forms.
1.2.1 NMR with Preferences
One form of preference information in early NMR formalisms was that of
specificity (see e.g. [Poo85, SL92]). The idea of specificity is, roughly, that
given two possible conflicting inferences based on the same initial informa-
tion but using different inference rules, one should prefer the rule which is
more specific to the given information. This has been proposed in the con-
text of Default Logic by Poole in [Poo85], further developed in [SL92, BH95],
and recently generalised to general rule-based systems in [WS14]. A con-
ceptually related idea of minimisation of predicates was introduced in Cir-
cumscription [Lif85, McC86]. It works by ensuring that the so-called abnor-
mality predicates are set-wise as small as possible, thus yielding situations
which are the most normal, and therefore preferred. This was generalised
by Shoham [Sho87], and subsequently in [KLM90, DW91], to the so-called
preferential models, where a preference relation is given over classical mod-
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els of sets of formulas, and the preferences are accounted for by choosing
the minimal (with respect to that preference relation) models.
Instead of a model theoretic view, other formalisms have taken a more
syntactic approach to preferences, one where preferences are expressed over,
say, rules, and, in a situation of conflicting rules, hinder the application
of the less preferred rules. For example, various forms of Default Logic
with preferences over default rules have been developed (e.g. [Bre94, Bre95,
BH95, DS97, Rin98, BE00, DS00]); preferences have been incorporated into
autoepistemic logic too (e.g. [Kon88, Rin94]); new rule-based NMR for-
malisms dealing with preferences, such as Preferred Subtheories [Bre89],
System Z [Pea90], Causal Theories [Gef90], have also appeared. Still fur-
ther, numerous approaches to LP with preferences have been proposed,
e.g. [Bre96, SI96, ZF97, BE99] to name a few. (Overviews of NMR for-
malisms with preferences can be found in e.g. [DSTW04, BNT08b, PTV15].)
As witnessed by the multitude of NMR formalisms with preferences, a
principal issue in common-sense reasoning is the lack of consensus on how
preferences should be accounted for. As discussed in [DSTW04, PTV15],
different formalisms employ diverging intuitions, and as a consequence, con-
ceptually different formal techniques to deal with preference information.
The same can be said regarding argumentation with preferences.
1.2.2 Argumentation with Preferences
Suppose that, as specified in Example 1.2, Zed has a preference in trusting
Bob over Ann. Then, conceivably, if preferences are to be taken into account
in our formalisation of the Referendum example in AA (Section 1.1.2), {B}
should be a unique, say, stable extension. Similarly, given the ABA repre-
sentation of the problem (Section 1.1.2), among the two mutually attacking
sets of assumptions {α} and {β}, only the latter should be acceptable.
Whereas simple examples such as this one are less controversial, in general
there is a lack of agreement on how preferences should be dealt with in argu-
mentation: there exist many AA-based approaches supplied with preference
handling mechanisms, e.g. [AC02, BC03, KvdT08, Mod09, BCGG11, AV14];
as well as numerous structured argumentation formalisms accounting for
preferences, such as ASPIC+ [ABC+06, CA07, Pra10, MP10, MP13, MP14],
Deductive Argumentation [BH01, BH09, GH11, BH14], Defeasible Logic
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Programming (DeLP) [SGCS03, GS04, GDS09, GS14], among others. This
variety encompasses diverging perceptions of preference information, and
consequently different ways to represent and use preferences.
In AA-based approaches, preferences can, for example, be taken to be ob-
jective, and given on what we call the argument level, i.e. as a binary relation
over arguments, as in e.g. [AC02, AV09, AV11, AV14, Kac10]. However,
preferences can also be given over values that arguments promote, and need
not be objective, but specific to audiences, as in Value-based Argumenta-
tion Frameworks (VAFs) [BC03, BCA09]. The two approaches could also
be combined, as in e.g. [KvdT08, KL10]. Another possibility is to express
preferences in AA by allowing arguments to attack not only arguments, but
also attack attacks [Mod09], and, more generally, by having recursive attack
relations, as in e.g. [BCGG11].
Structured argumentation formalisms also vary in their approaches to
preferences. For example, DeLP assumes preferences on what we call the
object level, i.e. over the rules that are used to construct arguments, and
employs modular criteria, such as specificity [SL92, SGCS03], to compare
arguments through their rules. Instead, Deductive Argumentation expresses
preferences directly on the argument level, via a modular binary preference
relation over arguments constructed from the underlying logic. ASPIC+
too allows for modular binary preference relations over arguments, but in
contrast, also accommodates preferences over rules and premises (that are
used to construct arguments) and provides methods to lift preferences from
the object level to the argument level. (See e.g. [DSTW04] for a discussion
on object-level versus meta-level preferences.) In general, whether and how
preferences are employed to (i) provide means of comparison among sets of
arguments and/or other objects and (ii) modify the attack relation, varies
from formalism to formalism.
Amid all the differences, however, a common trend regarding the inter-
action of arguments, attacks and preferences can be discerned. Specifically,
the majority of argumentation formalisms eventually use preferences, to a
greater or lesser extent, on the argument level to modify the attack relation
in the following way: attacks from (strictly) less preferred arguments are
discarded. That is, if A ∈ Args is (strictly) less preferred than B ∈ Args
(meaning e.g. less certain, less desirable, weaker), in symbols, A ≺ B, then
the attack A B fails (see e.g. [SL92, PS99, AC02, BC03, KvdT08, Mod09,
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Kac10, BCGG11, BES+13, BH14, CMO14, GS14, Dun16b]). Such discard-
ing of attacks results in the so-called defeat relations, denoted by ↪→, where
A defeats B just in case A attacks B and A is not (strictly) less preferred than
B (i.e. A ↪→ B just in case A  B and A ⊀ B). This generates an altered
AA framework (Args, ↪→) on which the standard AA semantics (without
preferences) is applied to obtain reasoning outcomes.
This use of preference information in argumentation to modify the at-
tack relation and generate a new argumentation framework adheres to a
standpoint towards dealing with preferences that is fundamentally different
from the one followed in the majority of NMR formalisms [Wak15, p. 252].
Indeed, particularly in ‘model theoretic’ NMR formalisms (such as Circum-
scription and preferential models) and approaches to LP with preferences,
the overarching idea of what preferences should be used for stands out. This
uniform idea is that preference information is to be used to select the most
preferable models or answer sets from those that are available to begin with
(i.e. prior to accounting for preferences). In argumentation, this would cor-
respond to the use of preferences on the extension level to compare and
select among extensions. Some argumentation formalisms, notably [AV14]
in the setting of AA and [Wak15] in the context of LP-based structured
argumentation, do take this approach to preferences.
We, however, maintain that employing preferences in argumentation to
select among extensions of the underlying frameworks without preferences
is conceptually wrong. This is primarily due to the dialectical nature of ar-
gumentation. We believe that this dialectical nature necessitates a certain
dynamic of exchanging and reasoning with information. In contrast, dealing
with preferences on the extension level does not lend itself to a dialogical set-
ting, but rather binds information to act more as a constraint, as in e.g. LP
with preferences. Therefore, we maintain that using preferences to select
among extensions is at odds with the dialectical nature of argumentation.
Consequently, in contrast to preferences determining the desirable reasoning
outcomes obtained in a given constrained space, we take that preferences
in argumentation should help to locally resolve conflicts stemming from de-
feasible information. Hence, in this thesis, we follow the tradition of the
majority of argumentation formalisms that employ preferences to modify
the attack relation.
That said, we want to stress that, as argued in e.g. [Kac11, MP13,
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AV14], there is a major problem with discarding attacks due to preferences.
Namely, discarding attacks may result in loss of information about conflicts:
if A  B fails due to preference A ≺ B, then the intended conflict between
the two arguments is lost in the resulting defeat relation ↪→. This in turn
leads to the possibility of deeming attacking arguments to be collectively
acceptable: for instance, if {A,B} is contained in an acceptable extension,
then the extension in question represents an incoherent viewpoint.
To circumvent such issues, solutions in both abstract and structured ar-
gumentation have been proposed. For instance, in AA, the attack relation
could be made symmetric to begin with, so that discarding attacks pre-
serves mutual incompatibility of arguments (see e.g. [Kac10]). However,
on the one hand, having the attack relation symmetric is both restrictive
and undesirable from the point of view of knowledge representation (see
e.g. [Mod09, Pra12, MP13]). On the other hand, even with symmetric
attack relations, frameworks instantiated with classical logics may yield un-
desirable (i.e. inconsistent) outcomes (see e.g. [MP13, AV14]).
Another proposal in the AA setting to avoid the problem of not preserv-
ing conflicts is Preference-based Argumentation Frameworks (PAFs) [AV14].
The idea there is that of reversing, instead of discarding, attacks: whenever
A B and A ≺ B, then the defeat relation is generated so that A 6↪→ B, but
B ↪→ A instead. While in the AA setting this approach conceivably works
well, it may yield undesirable outcomes in structured argumentation, as dis-
cussed in e.g. [MP13]. Essentially, such undesirable outcomes result from
reversing attacks between arguments but failing to reverse attacks between
either their sub-arguments or arguments based on the same assumptions
(see Example 2.7 in Section 2.3.3 and Example 6.2 in Section 6.1.1 for il-
lustrations). The lesson to be drawn is that dealing with preferences in
structured argumentation requires taking into account the structure of ar-
guments, for otherwise undesirable results may be obtained. (This point is
raised and discussed at length in e.g. [MP13].)
To avoid the problem of extensions representing incoherent viewpoints
in structured argumentation, one can directly require extensions after ac-
counting for preferences to be conflict-free with respect to the original at-
tack relation, as it is done in ASPIC+ [MP13]. This solves the problem
of preserving conflicts, but may, however, complicate matters in exhibit-
ing other desirable properties (such as the so-called Fundamental Lemma).
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Also, interestingly, under the standard working assumptions in ASPIC+,
this solution turns out to be semantically equivalent to simply requiring
conflict-freeness with respect to the defeat relation. Standard working as-
sumptions in ASPIC+ mean that ASPIC+ frameworks have to be well de-
fined; in particular, contraposing rules is needed (see Section 2.3.2 for more
details). However, specifically due to contraposition and its interaction with
general contrariness functions in ASPIC+ (similar to contrary mappings in
ABA), counter-intuitive results pertaining to knowledge representation may
sometimes prevail, as shown in [BGL15].
In this work, we propose an alternative way of accounting for preferences
in structured argumentation. In particular, drawing on the idea of attack
reversal in AA and insights from [Pra12, MP13], we equip ABA with a
novel preference handling mechanism that incorporates attack reversal to
obtain a new formalism, called ABA+. As we explain next, our approach
adheres to the conceptual intuitions delineated in this chapter, and avoids
miscellaneous unwelcome issues discussed in this section.
On the one hand, we take into consideration the structure of arguments
(i.e. deductions) when dealing with preferences. Specifically, we consider
preferences on the object level and integrate them directly into an attack
relation to reverse attacks whenever the attacker is less preferred than the
attackee. By taking the structure of arguments into account, we avoid the
failure to reverse attacks between sub-arguments and/or arguments based on
the same assumptions. In particular, we circumvent the issue of acceptance
of conflicting sets of arguments/assumptions, so that in ABA+, extensions
obtained after dealing with preferences are conflict-free with respect to the
attack relation not taking preferences into account.
On the other hand, we recognise the importance of the dialectical nature
of argumentation and handle preferences in a way that respects this nature.
To this end, we consider preferences as first class citizens on a par with
other defeasible and non-defeasible information (i.e. assumptions and rules,
respectively). More specifically, preferences in ABA+ qualify the defeasible
information and are used locally in resolving conflicts stemming from the
defeasible information. Preference information thus allows to dispense with
old extensions as well as to generate new ones, in contrast to treating knowl-
edge as a constraint that globally defines the space in which preferences are
employed to select among extensions. This way, preferences can be used in
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a dialectical context.
The role of attack reversal in a dialogical setting between a proponent and
an opponent can be summarised as follows. The mechanism for reversing
attacks (i) recognises that a conflict is present, (ii) takes, for the sake of
argument, the opponent’s premises as true, and (iii) shows that they conflict
with a more preferable proponent’s premise, on which basis the proponent
attacks the opponent (via reverse attack). This is illustrated next.
Example 1.3. Consider Example 1.2 in a dialogical setting where Zed’s
interlocutors try to persuade him of their positions leveraging on Zed’s be-
liefs about them. With the ABA representation (absent preferences) from
Section 1.1.2, an ABA dialogue as in [FT14] would amount to an exchange
of the building blocks of arguments as deductions. More specifically, each
of the interlocutors can put forward their claims, as well as the inference
rules and the assumptions that are used to deduce those claims. For in-
stance, suppose that Bob—the proponent—moves the claim stay. In order
to back his claim, Bob then reveals the rule stay ← β together with the
assumption β. Given this, Ann—the opponent—uses the fact that leave is
the contrary of β, and moves leave as a claim. She then continues with the
rule leave ← α and the assumption α. At this point, in order to defend
his claim, Bob could solicit Zed’s trust in him over Ann, and put forward a
preference of β over α. This should lead to Ann conceding that her attack
against Bob is not dialectically valid. At the same time, by virtue of the fact
that Ann is contradicting Bob based on a weaker assumption, Bob could
counter-attack Ann, thus winning the dialogue.
In addition to the above mentioned features of ABA+ regarding prefer-
ences in structured argumentation generally, we address several particular
issues specific to ABA with preferences. These pertain principally to repre-
sentation of preferences and are discussed next.
ABA has so far dealt with preferences mainly in one of two ways. On the
one hand, preference information can be represented implicitly, by compiling
it into the object level, i.e. by encoding preference information within ex-
isting components (assumptions and rules), as in e.g. [KT96, Ton08, FT13,
TL14]. Dealing with preferences implicitly is a well known method in NMR
and LP, for instance in Default Logic and ASP (see e.g. [Wak14]). In the
case of ABA, this has the advantage that neither the attack relation nor
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the semantics need be modified. However, dealing with preferences implic-
itly suffers from some serious drawbacks: for instance, numerous rules and
assumptions may be generated from compact preference relations [Wak14];
also, encoding preferences is very knowledge-sensitive and thus hinders mod-
ularity and generalisability.
On the other hand, in ABA Equipped with Preferences (p ABA hence-
forth) [Wak14], preference information is represented explicitly, expressed
as a binary relation over the sentences in the language. Note well that pref-
erences over the whole language means that all the sentences are subject
to preferences, rather than only the assumptions. This complements the
conceptual ideal of p ABA to use preferences in the spirit of the major-
ity of NMR and LP formalisms. Indeed, in p ABA, preferences are lifted
from the object level to the extension level to select the most ‘preferable’
extensions. We have already argued that using preferences to select among
extensions neglects the dialectical nature of argumentation, ABA included.
As discussed, we maintain that preferences should be used to resolve con-
flicts stemming from the defeasible information, and thus that it suffices for
the preference information to qualify only the defeasible knowledge, namely
assumptions in ABA.
Another limitation of the existing approaches to represent and handle
preferences in ABA is the restriction to a specific class of ABA frameworks.
Indeed, whether in ABA with implicit preferences or p ABA, the use of pref-
erences has been restricted to the class of so-called flat ABA frameworks,
where, roughly put, assumptions cannot themselves be deduced from other
assumptions. The usefulness of non-flat ABA frameworks can be exempli-
fied as follows.
Example 1.4 (Example 1.1 continued). Suppose that Dan joins the con-
versation of Zed, Ann and Bob, and says that one should always trust Bob.
A natural way to model this in ABA is to add an assumption δ, standing
for trust in Dan, as well as a rule β ← δ, conveying Zed’s representation of
Dan’s statement about Bob. (The contrary δ of δ can be some new symbol
in the language, unimportant in this example.) Such a representation would
result in a non-flat ABA framework, because the assumption β is deducible
from the set {δ} of assumptions.
To address these representation issues, we provide a general method to
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explicitly represent and reason with preference information over defeasible
knowledge in both flat and non-flat ABA. More specifically, we consider pref-
erences over assumptions in ABA frameworks. Such preferences in ABA+
are expressed explicitly via a binary relation over assumptions. ABA+ deals
with preferences in generic—both flat and non-flat—ABA frameworks.
Overall, we advance a structured argumentation formalism, ABA+, with
a novel mechanism to handle preferences. We develop ABA+ so that it ad-
heres to the conceptions and intuitions outlined in this chapter. Throughout
the thesis, we argue that ABA+ meets various desirable formal properties.
1.3 Thesis Contributions
To recapitulate, the following are the main presuppositions that we make,
and the main issues that we tackle in this thesis.
• We maintain that dealing with preferences in structured argumenta-
tion requires taking into account the structure of arguments/deductions
and attacks.
• We believe that preference information should qualify the defeasible
knowledge—assumptions, in the case of ABA.
• We take that preference information in ABA should be represented
explicitly, as a new component, rather than implicitly, via existing
components.
• We wish to equip generic ABA with preferences, not limiting ourselves
to flat ABA.
• We insist that to respect the dialectical nature of argumentation, pref-
erence information in argumentation should help to locally resolve
conflicts stemming from defeasible information, without appealing to
the use of preferences to select among extensions.
• We want to incorporate the idea of attack reversal in structured ar-
gumentation, particularly ABA, thus obtaining ABA+. Specifically,
we aim to integrate preferences directly into the attack relation of
ABA+ to reverse attacks from attackers that are less preferred than
attackees.
• We note that the attack relation in ABA is not in general symmetric,
because the contrary mapping is not in general symmetric. We want
to preserve this important knowledge representation feature of ABA
25
so that attacks in ABA+ are not in general symmetric. Attack reversal
in ABA+ will thus not amount to breaking the symmetry of attacks.
• We incorporate attack reversal in ABA+ through a new attack relation
without separately lifting preferences from the object level to either
the argument or the extension level. This avoids the issue of failing
to reverse attacks originating from the same assumptions.
• We desire that reasoning outcomes after accounting for preferences be
as coherent as they should be prior to accounting for preferences. In
particular, we seek to preserve conflicts after accounting for prefer-
ences. This means that extensions in ABA+ should be conflict-free
with respect the attack relation prior to preferences.
• Throughout, we aspire to show that ABA+ exhibits various desir-
able formal properties encountered in the literature on argumentation,
NMR and preference handling. To this end, we demonstrate various
desirable features of generic ABA+ frameworks, without imposing any
restrictions on their components. Where applicable, we establish con-
ditions that guarantee additional desirable features of ABA+.
Having these points in mind, our work and contributions can be sum-
marised as follows.
In this thesis, we propose a new way to explicitly handle preferences over
defeasible information in (not necessarily flat) ABA and advance an alter-
native framework for structured argumentation with preferences. The new
formalism, called ABA+, uses preference information to reverse attacks from
an attacking set of assumptions whenever it contains an assumption that
is less preferred than the attacked assumption. Differently from e.g. PAFs,
but similarly to e.g. ASPIC+, ABA+ deals with preferences on the object
level (in particular, over assumptions), which is necessary in structured ar-
gumentation: if arguments and/or attacks are built from components, then
a non-trivial mechanism is needed to deal with the object-level preferences
given over those components. To this end, in order to obtain desirable out-
comes, we propose a relaxed version of the principle of rule contraposition,
called Weak Contraposition, to be used in ABA+. We investigate properties
of both generic ABA+ and flat ABA+ subject to Weak Contraposition.
Specifically, we consider properties regarding argumentation formalisms
in general, such as relationships among semantics (as studied e.g. in [Dun95b]
for AA) and rationality postulates (as studied e.g. in [MP13] for ASPIC+).
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We show that generic ABA+ exhibits desirable behaviour as regards these
properties and that flat ABA+ with Weak Contraposition has additional
desirable features. Further, we consider properties pertaining to preference
handling in argumentation (as discussed e.g. in [AV14] for PAFs, [BTW10]
for NMR, [Dun16b] for ASPIC+), such as preserving conflicts after account-
ing for preferences, conservatively extending the underlying formalism in
the absence of preferences and selecting versus generating new extensions
due to preferences, among others. We demonstrate that generic ABA+ ex-
hibits desirable behaviour with respect to preference handling properties
and that flat ABA+ with Weak Contraposition has additional desirable fea-
tures. Further still, we analyse ABA+ in the context of non-monotonic
inference properties, particularly Cautious Monotonicity and Cumulative
Transitivity (following the research e.g. in [Mak88, KLM90]). We establish
how flat ABA+, with and without preferences, behaves in certain contexts
of information change.
We compare other formalisms of argumentation that deal with prefer-
ences to ABA+ and establish their differences and/or advantages of ABA+,
through examples and/or preference handling properties. Particularly, we
demonstrate that ABA+ subsumes attack reversal in AA by generalising
PAFs, which also allows us to extend existing results pertaining to pref-
erence handling in PAFs. We further argue that ABA+ improves upon
p ABA as a formalism of structured argumentation with preferences that
respects the dialectical nature of argumentation. We back this by estab-
lishing preference handling properties of p ABA as well as ABA+. Further
still, we show that formalisms that use preferences to discard attacks, such
as ASPIC+, deviate from ABA+ in their preference handling and reasoning
outcomes. For one, we observe that reversing attacks in ABA+ does not
amount to making attacks symmetric and then discarding some of them
due to preferences. Another major difference is that in ABA+, attacks are
reversed between sets of assumptions, independently of the deductions that
can be built from those assumptions, whereas discarding attacks in, say,
ASPIC+, works between arguments as deductions. This means that revers-
ing attacks in ABA+ leads to defence of assumptions that were attacked by
the same set of assumptions, whereas discarding attacks need not lead to
defence of arguments that were attacked by arguments build from the same
assumptions/premises. With respect to ASPIC+, we also observe that, for
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instance, the Fundamental Lemma and rationality postulates hold in ABA+
under weaker conditions than those required in ASPIC+.
Additionally, we describe a software system, called ABAplus, that imple-
ments flat ABA+ subject to Weak Contraposition. In addition to providing
theoretical underpinnings of visualisation of ABA+ frameworks and compu-
tation of their extensions, we give technical details and illustrate the work-
ings of the system. We also discuss ABAplus in relation to other systems
implementing either ABA or argumentation with preferences.
1.4 Thesis Structure
In Chapter 2, we provide background on abstract and structured argumen-
tation, with and without preferences. As regards argumentation without
preferences, we give details on AA and ABA. Regarding argumentation
with preferences, we give details on p ABA, ASPIC+ and PAFs.
In Chapter 3, we present ABA+. In particular, we define generic ABA+
frameworks and investigate their properties in light of properties regarding
argumentation formalisms and preference handling discussed in the litera-
ture.
In Chapter 4, we present Weak Contraposition. More specifically, we dis-
cuss the effects of Weak Contraposition in ABA+ and investigate additional
properties of flat ABA+ subject to Weak Contraposition, regarding argu-
mentation formalisms, preference handling and non-monotonic inference.
In Chapter 5, we present ABAplus, a proof-of-concept system implement-
ing flat ABA+ subject to Weak Contraposition. Particularly, we provide
theoretical underpinnings of the system, describe the back- and front-ends
of ABAplus, and complement the exposition with a possible application of
ABA+ and ABAplus.
In Chapter 6, we compare our proposal to those present in the current
literature on argumentation with preferences. To this end, we compare
ABA+ to several formalisms of argumentation with preferences, and discuss
ABAplus in the context of several systems implementing other argumenta-
tion formalisms.
In Chapter 7, we conclude the thesis, informally discuss several other
aspects of ABA+ in the context of related work, and give future work di-
rections.
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6. K. Cˇyras, X. Fan, C. Schulz, and F. Toni. Assumption-Based Argu-
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2 Background
In this chapter, we provide technical background material needed in this the-
sis. First, we give preliminaries (Section 2.1) on the notation used through-
out this work. In Section 2.2, we provide background on argumentation
without preferences, particularly AA and ABA. Those details will be impor-
tant throughout the thesis. In Section 2.3, we provide background on three
formalisms of argumentation with preferences, namely p ABA, ASPIC+ and
PAFs. Those details will predominantly be used in Chapter 6 when com-
paring ABA+ to several formalisms of argumentation with preferences.
2.1 Preliminaries
The following notions are used throughout the thesis.1
• Given a set X, ℘(X) denotes the powerset of X.
• Given a set X and a binary relation R ⊆ X ×X over (or on) X, for any
x, y ∈ X, we write xRy to abbreviate (x, y) ∈ R.
• A binary relation R over a set X is:
– transitive iff ∀x, y, z ∈ X, xRy and yRz imply xRz;
– reflexive iff ∀x ∈ X, xRx;
– total iff ∀x, y ∈ X, either xRy or yRx;2
– antisymmetric iff ∀x, y ∈ X, xRy and yRx imply x = y;
– asymmetric iff ∀x, y ∈ X, xRy and yRx cannot both hold.
• A transitive and reflexive binary relation R over a set X is a preorder.
• Any transitive binary relation may be called a preference ordering (e.g. in
Chapter 3 Section 3.1). Note well that in the literature on e.g. social
choice theory and decision making, it is common to define a preference
relation as a total preorder (also called a weak ordering). In this thesis,
1Here and later, ‘iff’ abbreviates ‘if and only if’.
2In the literature, the word ‘complete’ is often used interchangeably with ‘total’. In this
thesis, we use only the latter.
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we assume that preferences need not relate every pair of elements (i.e. to-
tality is optional). However, we often assume reflexivity as uncontrover-
sial. Further still, we take for granted that preferences are transitive, as
in virtually every other approach to preferences in argumentation. Pref-
erence orderings are typically denoted by the following symbols, with or
without subscripts: 6, <, 4, ≺, v, @, E, C.
• Given a preoder 6 over X, < denotes a transitive and irreflexive (and
hence asymmetric) relation over X, also called the strict counterpart of
6, given by x < y iff x 6 y and y 6 x.3
• Given a transitive and irreflexive (and hence asymmetric) preference or-
dering < over a set X, 6 denotes the reflexive closure of <, i.e. 6 is a
preorder over X given by 6=< ∪{(x, x) : x ∈ X}.
• Given a preorder 6 over a set X and its strict counterpart <, x ∈ X is:
– 6-maximal (resp. 6-minimal) iff ∀y ∈ X, x 6 y implies y 6 x
(resp. y 6 x implies x 6 y);
– <-maximal (resp. <-minimal) iff ∀y ∈ X, x 6< y (resp. y 6< x).
2.2 Argumentation without Preferences
In this section, we give background on two well established formalisms of
argumentation that do not explicitly account for preference information.
These details will be used throughout this work.
2.2.1 Abstract Argumentation (AA)
We base the background on AA on [Dun95b] and [DMT07].
Definition 2.1. An AA framework is a pair (Args, ) where:
• Args is a set whose elements are referred to as arguments;
•  is a binary relation on Args referred to as attack relation.4
For A,B ∈ Args, whenever (A,B) ∈ , we write it as A B and say that
the argument A attacks the argument B.
3Note that the strict counterpart < of 6 does not define a strict weak ordering, because
the incomparability relation with respect to < thus defined need not be transitive.
4We use the symbol  to denote attacks instead of e.g. the commonly used symbols →
and R in order to avoid confusion with other notation in structured argumentation
formalisms: we use → (or ← in the case of ABA) to denote rules, e.g. in ASPIC+
(see Section 2.3.2); we use R to denote a set of rules, e.g. in ABA and ASPIC+. Such
notation is also employed in e.g. [CT16a].
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With an abuse of notation, we extend the attack relation  to sets of
arguments as follows. For S, T ⊆ Args and B ∈ Args:
• S  B just in case there is A ∈ S such that A B;
• B S just in case there is A ∈ S such that B A;
• S  T just in case there is C ∈ T such that S  C.
For any two entities X and Y , notation X 6 Y abbreviates ‘it is not the
case that X  Y ’. This notation is assumed throughout this thesis for any
attack relation  .
For the rest of this section, unless specified otherwise, we assume as given
a fixed but otherwise arbitrary AA framework (Args, ).
Auxiliary definitions of conflict-freeness and defence follow next.
Definition 2.2. Let E ⊆ Args and A ∈ Args.
• E is conflict-free just in case E 6 E.
• E defends A just in case for every B ∈ Args such that B A it holds
that E  B;
• E is admissible just in case E is conflict-free and defends every argu-
ment in E.
AA semantics is defined as follows.
Definition 2.3. Let E ⊆ Args. E is:
• complete just in case E is admissible and contains all the arguments
that it defends;
• preferred just in case if E is ⊆-maximally admissible;
• stable just in case E is admissible and for every B ∈ Args \E it holds
that E  B;
• ideal just in case E is ⊆-maximal such that E is admissible and con-
tained in all the preferred sets of arguments;
• grounded just in case E is ⊆-minimally complete.
A complete/preferred/stable/ideal/grounded set E of arguments is also
called a complete/preferred/stable/ideal/grounded extension of (Args, ).
We recall the following facts about AA semantics [Dun95b, DMT07]:
• stable extensions are preferred;
• preferred extensions are complete;
• ideal and grounded extensions always exist and are unique;
• ideal extensions are complete.
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The following example illustrates AA frameworks.
Example 2.1. Consider (Args, ) with
• Args = {A,B,C,D},
• B C, C B, C D, D C, D D.
(Args, ) can be graphically depicted as in Figure 2.1 (here and in further
illustrations of AA frameworks, nodes hold arguments and directed edges
(arrows) indicate attacks).
A B C D
Figure 2.1: AA framework from Example 2.1
This AA framework has three complete extensions: {A}; {A,B}; {A,C}.
Among these, the latter two are preferred, and only {A,C} is stable. {A} is
the grounded and ideal extension of (Args, ).
2.2.2 Assumption-Based Argumentation (ABA)
We base the background on ABA on [BDKT97, DMT07, Ton14].
Definition 2.4. An ABA framework is a tuple (L,R,A,¯¯), where:
• (L,R) is a deductive system with L a language (a set of sentences5)
and R a set of rules of the form ϕ0 ← ϕ1, . . . , ϕm, with m > 0 and
ϕi ∈ L for i ∈ {0, . . . ,m};
– ϕ0 is referred to as the head of the rule, and
– ϕ1, . . . , ϕm is referred to as the body of the rule;
– if m = 0, then the rule ϕ0 ← ϕ1, . . . , ϕm is said to have an empty
body, and is written as ϕ0 ← >, where > 6∈ L;
• A ⊆ L is a non-empty set whose elements are referred to as assump-
tions;
• ¯¯ : A → L is a total contrary mapping: for α ∈ A, the sentence α is
referred to as the contrary of α.6
5We make no presuppositions about the logical form of sentences in the language.
6The contrary mapping can also be defined to assign non-empty sets of sentences to each
assumption, as in e.g. [FT14]. The two ways of defining the contrary mapping yield
semantically equivalent outcomes (with respect to the ABA semantics defined later
in this section). We chose the original formulation, as in [BDKT97], for notational
convenience.
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Note well that contraries are assigned to assumptions only, because as-
sumptions in ABA represent defeasible information, which can be argued
against (via contraries).
Observe also that contraries are not in general symmetric, in the sense
that if α is an assumption with the contrary α, then α need not (and, in
general, will not) be the contrary of α; indeed, α need not (and, in general,
will not) itself be an assumption, and hence need not have a contrary. Thus,
the contrary mapping is generally different from (classical) negation, which
may or may not be present in the language L.
The contrary mapping in ABA can be seen as a generalisation of negation
as failure (NAF) [Cla78], in the sense that an assumption α is acceptable
as long as its contrary α is not acceptable, in the same vain as a NAF
literal not a holds as long as the literal a cannot be shown to hold. For
example, in the LP instance of ABA [BDKT97], every NAF literal not a in
a logic program is an assumption in the instantiated ABA framework, with
the contrary not a = a. Naturally thus, just like NAF in LP, the contrary
mapping in ABA is not symmetric.
In the remainder of this section, unless specified differently, we assume as
given a fixed but otherwise arbitrary ABA framework (L,R,A,¯¯).
Definition 2.5. A deduction for ϕ ∈ L supported by S ⊆ L and R ⊆ R,
denoted by S `R ϕ, is a finite tree such that:
• the root is labelled by ϕ;
• the leaves are labelled by > or elements from S;
• for each non-leaf node labelled by ψ ∈ L, its children are labelled by
the elements ψ1, . . . , ψm of the body of some rule ψ ← ψ1, . . . ψm from
R with head ψ;
• R is the set comprising exactly those rules ψ ← ψ1, . . . ψm.
The deduction relation `⊆ ℘(L)×L associated with (L,R,A,¯¯) is defined
thus: for S ⊆ L and ϕ ∈ L,
S ` ϕ iff ∃ S `R ϕ for some R ⊆ R.
Definition 2.6. The conclusion operator Cn : ℘(L) → ℘(L) associated
with (L,R,A,¯¯) is defined thus: for S ⊆ L,
Cn(S) = {ϕ ∈ L : S′ ` ϕ, S′ ⊆ S}.
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That is, conclusions of S constitute the set of sentences for which deduc-
tions supported by subsets of S exist. Although conclusions are defined for
any set of sentences, we are usually interested in the conclusions of sets of
assumptions, because ABA semantics is defined through set of assumptions.
Semantics of ABA frameworks is defined in terms of sets of assumptions
meeting desirable requirements. One such requirement is being closed under
deduction of assumptions, defined next.
Definition 2.7. Let (L,R,A,¯¯) be given and let S ⊆ L.
• The closure Cl(S) of S is the set of assumptions that can be deduced
from S, i.e. Cl(S) = Cn(S) ∩ A.
• S is closed just in case S = Cl(S).
• (L,R,A,¯¯) is flat just in case every A ⊆ A is closed.
Example 2.2. Consider an ABA framework (L,R,A,¯¯) with
• the language L = {α, β, x, y, z},
• the set of rules R = {β ← α, z ← >},
• the set of assumptions A = {α, β},
• the contraries given by α = x, β = y.
The following are deductions in (L,R,A,¯¯):
∅ `{z←>} z, {α} `∅ α, {β} `∅ β, {α} `{β←α} β.
Since the only conclusion that can be drawn from ∅ is z, Cn(∅) = {z}.
Since no assumptions can be deduced from the empty set of assumptions, the
closure of ∅ is Cl(∅) = ∅. The conclusions of {α} are Cn({α}) = {α, β, z},
because both assumptions α and β can de deduced from {α} and ∅ ⊆ {α}.
The closure of {α} is Cl({α}) = Cn({α}) ∩ A = {α, β}. Since {α} is not
equal to its closure, it is not closed. As not every set of assumptions is
closed, (L,R,A,¯¯) is not flat.
Note that Cl({β}) = {β}, so {β} is closed. Similarly, {α, β} is closed too.
We often use the term ‘flat ABA’ to refer to the class of flat ABA frame-
works. We will see later that flat ABA exhibits additional properties to
those exhibited by ABA in general.
The remaining desirable requirements met by sets of assumptions, as
semantics for ABA frameworks, are given in terms of a notion of attack
between sets of assumptions, defined as follows.
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Definition 2.8. Let (L,R,A,¯¯) be given and let A,B ⊆ A. A attacks B,
denoted A B, just in case A′ ` β for some β ∈ B and A′ ⊆ A.
To define ABA semantics, we use the following auxiliary notions.
Definition 2.9. Let (L,R,A,¯¯) be given and let E,A ⊆ A.
• E is conflict-free just in case E 6 E;
• E defends A just in case for every closed B ⊆ A such that B  A it
holds that E  B;
• E is admissible just in case E is closed, conflict-free and defends itself.
Defence as above can be said to be defined ‘setwise’, in the sense that a
set E ⊆ A defends a set A ⊆ A (that contains possibly more than one as-
sumption) against attacks on the whole of A. Originally [BDKT97], defence
in ABA was defined with respect to a single assumption, in that E ⊆ A
defended {α} for some α ∈ A whenever for every closed B ⊆ A such that
B  {α} it held that E  B. Defence with respect to a set of assumptions
was then extended so that E ⊆ A defended A ⊆ A whenever E defended
every α ∈ A. In other words, defence in ABA was originally defined ‘point-
wise’, as formulated next:
E ⊆ A defends A ⊆ A pointwise just in case for all α ∈ A, for
every closed B ⊆ A such that B  {α} it holds that E  B.
The notions of defence (‘setwise’) and defence pointwise are equivalent in
the following sense:7
Lemma 2.1. Let (L,R,A,¯¯) be given and let E,A ⊆ A. E defends A iff
E defends A pointwise.
Proof. Suppose first E defends A. Let α ∈ A and consider B  {α} with
B ⊆ A closed. By definition of attack, we find B  A. As E defends A,
it holds that E  B. Since α ∈ A and B  {α} with B ⊆ A closed were
arbitrary, we conclude that E defends A pointwise.
Suppose now that E defends A pointwise. Consider B  A with B ⊆ A
closed. By definition of attack, there is B′ ` α for some α ∈ A and B′ ⊆ B.
Hence, B  {α}. As E defends A pointwise, it holds that E  B. Since
B  A with B ⊆ A closed was arbitrary, we conclude that E defends A.
7The following result and its proof are new (i.e. not found in the literature).
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Due to equivalence, in what follows we will use the standard (‘setwise’)
notion of defence as in Definition 2.9, because it is more appropriate for
ABA+, as we will see in Section 3.1.
ABA semantics is defined as follows.
Definition 2.10. Let (L,R,A,¯¯) be given and let E ⊆ A. E is:
• complete just in case E is admissible and contains every set of as-
sumptions it defends;
• preferred just in case E is ⊆-maximally admissible;
• stable just in case E is closed, conflict-free and for every β ∈ A \E it
holds that E  {β};
• ideal just in case E is ⊆-maximal among sets of assumptions that are
admissible and contained in all preferred sets of assumptions;
• well founded just in case E is the intersection of all complete sets of
assumptions.
A complete/preferred/stable/ideal/well founded set E of assumptions
is also called a complete/preferred/stable/ideal/well founded extension of
(L,R,A,¯¯).
Note that ideal sets of assumptions were originally defined in [DMT07] in
the context of flat ABA frameworks only. The original definition naturally
generalises to generic, possibly non-flat, ABA frameworks as given above.
Note also that, in the case of flat ABA frameworks, the term grounded is
conventionally used instead of well founded (e.g. in [DMT07]): we will adopt
this convention too.
In this work we focus on the five semantics given above. To the best of
our knowledge, other semantics have not been defined for, or investigated
in, ABA, except for the semi-stable semantics [Cam06, Ver96], which was
recently defined [CSAD13, ST15] and investigated for (flat) ABA [ST17].
We leave defining (for ABA+) and investigating other semantics, among
them semi-stable, for future work.
We will also make use of the so-called defence operator, defined next.
Definition 2.11. Let (L,R,A,¯¯) be given. Define the defence operator
Def : ℘(A)→ ℘(A) thus: for A ⊆ A, Def (A) = {α ∈ A : A defends {α}}.
We recall the following established facts regarding ABA semantics and
the defence operator, in the context of flat ABA: by [BDKT97, Theorem
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5.7], for E ⊆ A admissible and S ⊆ Def (E), we have that E∪S is admissible
(this is called the Fundamental Lemma of ABA); by [BDKT97, Theorem
6.2], the grounded extension is the least fixed point of Def obtained by
iteratively applying Def to ∅, equal to ⋃i>0 Def i(∅), and it is therefore
complete.
We illustrate various ABA concepts with a formalisation of the Referen-
dum example from the Introduction.
Example 2.3 (Example 1.1 as a flat ABA framework). The information
given in Example 1.1 can be represented as an ABA framework FZ =
(L,R,A,¯¯) (which models Zed’s knowledge) with
• L = {α, β, leave, stay},
• R = {leave← α, stay← β},
• A = {α, β},
• α = stay, β = leave.
Here, assumptions α and β stand for believing in Ann and Bob, respec-
tively. Rules leave ← α and stay ← β represent the statements of Zed’s
interlocutors: for instance, leave← α represents that if Zed were to believe
in Ann, the outcome of the referendum would be the Dutch leaving the EU.
The contraries indicate which information is conflicting: for instance, the
contrary of β being leave models that the Dutch leaving the EU—leave—
conflicts with believing in Bob—β.8
Note that FZ is flat: no assumption can be deduced from the empty set
of assumptions, so Cl(∅) = ∅; the only assumptions deducible from {α} and
{β} are α and β, respectively, so both {α} and {β} are closed; clearly, A is
closed; hence, all sets of assumptions are closed.
In FZ , we find that {α} and {β} attack each other, and both of them at-
tack and are attacked by {α, β}, which also attacks itself. FZ can be graphi-
cally represented as in Figure 2.2 (in illustrations of ABA frameworks, nodes
hold sets of assumptions while directed edges (arrows) indicate attacks).
FZ has two preferred extensions {α} and {β}, which are also stable, with
conclusions Cn({α}) = {α, leave} and Cn({β}) = {β, stay}, respectively.
FZ has a unique grounded (well founded) and ideal extension ∅, with con-
8We contend that other ways of formalising such examples in ABA are possible; we chose
what seemed a natural and simple representation. Generally, representing knowledge
in argumentation (and KR in general) is an open problem, discussion of which is
beyond the scope of this thesis.
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∅ {α} {β} {α, β}
Figure 2.2: Flat ABA framework FZ from Example 2.3
clusions Cn(∅) = ∅. Furthermore, all of {α}, {β} and ∅ are complete exten-
sions.
Similarly, the extended Referendum example can be represented in ABA,
but via a non-flat ABA framework, as follows.
Example 2.4 (Example 1.4 as a non-flat ABA framework). The situation
where Dan joins the conversation can be represented by a non-flat ABA
framework FD, which is FZ from Example 2.3 extended with an additional
rule β ← δ and an additional assumption δ (standing for trust in Dan).
Overall, FD has
• L = {α, β, δ, leave, stay, δ},9
• R = {leave← α, stay← β, β ← δ},
• A = {α, β, δ},
• α = stay, β = leave.
FD can be depicted as in Figure 2.3.
∅ {α} {β} {α, β}
{δ} {α, δ} {β, δ} {α, β, δ}
Figure 2.3: Non-flat ABA framework FD from Example 2.4
In FD, if a set of assumptions contains δ, then it is closed only if it also
contains β. In particular, {δ} is not closed, and hence (L,R,A,¯¯) is not
flat. Further, the only admissible sets of FD are ∅, {α}, {β} and {β, δ}.
Also, {β, δ} is a unique stable extension of FD, whereas both {α} and {β, δ}
9Throughout the thesis, we assume, unless specified otherwise, that the contrary δ of
any assumption δ is actually a symbol in the language L (i.e. δ ∈ L), wherefore we do
not need to specify (some part of) the contrary mapping separately.
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are preferred. Hence, ∅ is a unique ideal extension of FD. Also, {β, δ} is
the only complete extension, so it is a unique well founded extension of FD.
2.3 Argumentation with Preferences
In this section, we provide background on formalisms of argumentation with
preferences that are most closely related to ABA+ and that we will formally
compare ABA+ to. These details will be required in Chapter 6; in addition,
details on ASPIC+ will be needed in Chapter 4.
2.3.1 ABA Equipped with Preferences (p ABA)
In this section, we discuss p ABA as the only other formalism that extends
ABA with explicit preferences.
Conceptually, the main idea underlying the p ABA formalism is to ad-
vance a structured argumentation formalism that deals with preferences in
the spirit of how preferences are dealt with in LP formalisms, namely by us-
ing preference information to select among models (extensions) [Wak15]. In
particular, the aim is to equip ABA with a mechanism to deal with explicit
preferences in a way that allows to compare ABA extensions and select the
preferable ones. To this end, p ABA follows the approach of Sakama and In-
oue in LP with preferences [SI96, SI00] by taking the following steps. First,
preferences are assumed to be explicitly given over the sentences in the lan-
guage. Second, preferences are lifted to sets of sentences in order to compare
those sets. Finally, the preferable sets of sentences are selected. Conceiv-
ably, p ABA yields advantages (over ABA) in modelling some problems of
decision making with preferences by, for instance, reducing the number of
rules needed to obtain the desirable outcomes (see [Wak14]).
We base the background on p ABA on [Wak14]. In this section, ABA
frameworks are assumed to be flat.
First, a p ABA framework is defined as an ABA framework with explicitly
given preferences.
Definition 2.12. A p ABA framework is a tuple (L,R,A,¯¯,4) where
(L,R,A,¯¯) is an ABA framework and 4 is a preorder over L.
For any two sentences ϕ,ψ ∈ L, ψ 4 ϕ means that ϕ is at least as pre-
ferred as ψ; ψ ≺ ϕ means that ϕ is strictly more preferred than ψ. Note that
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in contrast to most LP formalisms where preferences are taken over rules,
preferences in p ABA are taken over sentences in the language; potentially,
this allows for more suitable comparisons among ABA extensions [Wak14].
In the remainder of this section, unless specified otherwise, we assume as
given a fixed but otherwise arbitrary p ABA framework (L,R,A,¯¯,4). We
call (L,R,A,¯¯) the underlying ABA framework of (L,R,A,¯¯,4).
Given a p ABA framework, the preorder 4 is lifted to an ordering over
extensions of the underlying ABA framework. To this end, p ABA follows
Sakama and Inoue’s criterion [SI96, SI00] for comparing answer sets in LP
with preferences. We give a reformulation of this criterion as used in p ABA
next.10
Definition 2.13. Let E be the collection of σ extensions of (L,R,A,¯¯).
A preference relation over extensions is a preorder v over E such that for
E,E′, E′′ ∈ E :
• E v E′ if there is ϕ ∈ Cn(E′) \ Cn(E) such that
– there is ψ ∈ Cn(E) \ Cn(E′) with ψ 4 ϕ and
– there is no χ ∈ Cn(E) \ Cn(E′) with ϕ ≺ χ;
• E v E;
• if E v E′ and E′ v E′′, then E v E′′.
Note that the second and third conditions ensure that v is a preorder.
In essence, an extension E′ is at least as preferred as an extension E, in
symbols E v E′, if there is a conclusion ϕ of E′ but not E such that ϕ is
at last as preferred as some conclusion of E but not E′ and no conclusion
of E but not E′ is strictly more preferred than ϕ.
Finally, p ABA semantics is defined to select the ‘preferable’ (with respect
to v) extensions, called P-extensions:
Definition 2.14. Let (L,R,A,¯¯,4) be a p ABA framework and let E ⊆ A.
E is a σ P-extension of (L,R,A,¯¯,4) just in case E is a v-maximal σ
extension of (L,R,A,¯¯).
We illustrate how p ABA works with an example.
Example 2.5. Consider a p ABA framework (L,R,A,¯¯,4) with
10Wakaki in [Wak14] uses the AA framework corresponding to (L,R,A,¯ )¯ and its ar-
gument extensions, as in e.g. [DKT09]. Instead, we provide an equivalent definition
directly using assumption sets (enabled by results from [DMT07, Ton12, Wak14]).
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• L = {α, β,¬α,¬β},11
• R = {¬β ← α},
• A = {α, β},
• α = ¬α, β = ¬β,
• α 4 β, β 64 α.
Note: here and henceforth, we usually omit to specify the reflexive in-
stances of preorders (e.g. we omitted α 4 α and β 4 β).
In the underlying ABA framework (L,R,A,¯¯), there is only one non-
trivial deduction, namely {α} ` ¬β. Thus, {α} is unattacked and, since
β = ¬β, {α} attacks {β}. Hence, (L,R,A,¯¯) has a unique σ extension
{α}. Consequently, (L,R,A,¯¯,4) has a unique σ P-extension {α} too.
We see that in Example 2.5 preferences do not really play a role, because
their action is constricted to the space of extensions to begin with. We will
see that in contrast, ABA+ accounts for preferences before constructing
extensions, thus possibly modifying the space of extensions to begin with.
2.3.2 ASPIC+
ASPIC+ is an expressive argumentation formalism, encompassing many
key elements of structured argumentation with preferences (such as strict
and defeasible rules, general contrariness functions, various forms of at-
tack as well as preferences). There is an established relationship between
ASPIC+ and ABA as structured argumentation formalisms. On the one
hand, it is known that flat ABA frameworks can be seen as instances of
ASPIC+ frameworks (i.e. as a class of ASPIC+ frameworks without pref-
erences) [Pra10, MP13]. On the other hand, ASPIC+ frameworks with-
out preferences can be seen as instances of flat ABA frameworks [HS16].
In light of this relationship, perhaps one of the most notable features of
ASPIC+ is its management of preferences. We discuss this and other as-
pects of ASPIC+ in this section.
We base the background on ASPIC+, in a simplified exposition suffi-
cient for our purposes, on [MP13, MP14, YMR16]. This simplification
amounts to omissions of some aspects of ASPIC+. For one, we are not
interested in the details that allow ASPIC+ to capture the so-called de-
11Note that the language does not need to be closed under negation ¬; this is simply to
make this example more uniform with other examples to come later in this chapter.
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ductive approaches to argumentation (see e.g. [BH14]), so the concept of
‘contradictory-consistency’ (c-consistency for short) and related notions are
omitted. Also, the notion of closure under transposition is omitted, as
it can be interchangeably used with the closure under contraposition; we
cover the latter, as it is very closely related to Weak Contraposition. Fur-
ther still, in terms of preference orderings for comparing arguments, we
omit to specify the so-called last- and weakest-link principles, because in
the settings that we consider these two principles coincide and do not yield
additional ways to compare arguments. (An interested reader is referred to
[MP13, MP14, Pra10] for additional details.)
Definition 2.15. An ASPIC+ argumentation system is a tuple (L, C,R, n),
where:
• L is a language;
• C : L → ℘(L) is a contrariness function such that:
– ϕ is a contrary of ψ if ϕ ∈ C(ψ) and ψ 6∈ C(ϕ);
– ϕ is a contradictory of ψ, denoted ϕ = −ψ, if ϕ ∈ C(ψ) and ψ ∈ C(ϕ);
– every ψ ∈ L has at least one contradictory −ψ;
• R = Rs ∪Rd is a set of rules such that:
– Rs is a set of strict rules of the form ϕ1, . . . , ϕn → ϕ;
– Rd is a set of defeasible rules of the form ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ⇒ ϕ;
– for a strict/defeasible rule ϕ1, . . . , ϕn → /⇒ ϕ, each of ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ∈
L is called an antecedent and ϕ ∈ L is called the consequent ;
– Rs ∩Rd = ∅;
• n : Rd → L is a naming function for defeasible rules.
Note that the contrariness function assigns contradictories to all elements
of the language rather than to only some distinguished elements, as it is
done in ABA. Effectively, this makes contradictories symmetric, akin to the
symmetry of classical negation; yet, the contraries, if they exist, need not
(indeed, cannot) be symmetric in this sense.
Definition 2.16. An ASPIC+ knowledge base in an argumentation system
(L, C,R, n) is a set K = Kn ∪ Kp of sentences such that:
• Kn ⊆ L is a set whose elements are referred to as axioms;
• Kp ⊆ L is a set whose elements are referred to as premises;
• Kn ∩ Kp = ∅.
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Premises in ASPIC+ can be seen analogous to assumptions in ABA,
in that premises (along with defeasible rules) represent defeasible infor-
mation that can be argued against (i.e. attacked). Meanwhile, axioms in
ASPIC+ can be understood in ABA as rules with the empty body.
Definition 2.17. Given and an ASPIC+ argumentation system (L, C,R, n)
and an ASPIC+ knowledge base Kn∪Kp, an ASPIC+ argumentation theory
is a tuple (L, C,R, n,Kn,Kp).
In the remainder of this section, unless specified otherwise, we assume
as given a fixed but otherwise arbitrary ASPIC+ argumentation theory
(L, C,R, n,Kn,Kp).
The next definition gives an analogue to the notion of ABA’s conclusions
operator (Definition 2.5) for ASPIC+.
Definition 2.18. For S ⊆ L, the closure of S under strict rules, denoted
by ClRs(S), is the ⊆-smallest set containing S and the consequent of any
strict rule from Rs whose antecedents are in ClRs(S).
The following notion of consistency is utilised in ASPIC+:
Definition 2.19. A set S ⊆ L is:
• directly consistent just in case @ϕ,ψ ∈ S with ψ ∈ C(ϕ);
• indirectly consistent just in case ClRs(S) is directly consistent.
Arguments in ASPIC+ are constructed similarly as in ABA, as trees
rooted at the conclusion and having as leaves either premises or axioms,
with rules determining the node labels.
Definition 2.20. An ASPIC+ argument A is any of the following.
• [ϕ] just in case ϕ ∈ Kn ∪ Kp. It has:
– premises Prem(A) = {ϕ};
– conclusion Conc(A) = ϕ;
– sub-arguments Sub(A) = {A};
– defeasible rules DefRules(A) = ∅;
– last defeasible rules LastDefRules(A) = ∅;
– top rule TopRule(A) undefined.
• [A1, . . . ,An → ψ] just in case A1, . . . ,An are arguments such that there
is a strict rule Conc(A1), . . . , Conc(An)→ ψ in Rs. It has:
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– Prem(A) = Prem(A1) ∪ . . . ∪ Prem(An);
– Conc(A) = ψ;
– Sub(A) = Sub(A1) ∪ . . . ∪ Sub(An) ∪ {A};
– DefRules(A) = DefRules(A1) ∪ . . . ∪ DefRules(An);
– LastDefRules(A) = LastDefRules(A1)∪. . .∪LastDefRules(An);
– TopRule(A) = Conc(A1), . . . , Conc(An)→ ψ.
• [A1, . . . ,An ⇒ ψ] just in case A1, . . . ,An are arguments such that there
is a defeasible rule Conc(A1), . . . , Conc(An)⇒ ψ in Rd. It has:
– Prem(A) = Prem(A1) ∪ . . . ∪ Prem(An);
– Conc(A) = ψ;
– Sub(A) = Sub(A1) ∪ . . . ∪ Sub(An) ∪ {A};
– DefRules(A) = DefRules(A1) ∪ . . . ∪ DefRules(An)∪
{Conc(A1), . . . , Conc(An)⇒ ψ};
– LastDefRules(A) = {Conc(A1), . . . , Conc(An)⇒ ψ};
– TopRule(A) = Conc(A1), . . . , Conc(An)⇒ ψ.
When clear from the context, we omit to specify the indicator ‘ASPIC+’,
e.g. we say ‘an argument’ instead of ‘an ASPIC+ argument’.
We use the following notation.
• An argument A is strict if DefRules(A) = ∅; otherwise, it is defeasible.
• We write S ` ϕ (respectively, S |∼ ϕ) if there exists a strict (respec-
tively, defeasible) argument A with Conc(A) = ϕ and Prem(A) ⊆ S.
• We abuse the notation so that for a set E of arguments and F ∈
{Prem, Conc, Sub, DefRules, TopRule}, F(E) denotes ⋃A∈E F(A).
In ASPIC+, attacks encode the mutual incompatibility of the information
borne by the arguments. Arguments can be attacked only on their defeasible
components, namely defeasible rules and premises, as follows.
Definition 2.21. Let A and B be arguments. A attacks B, denoted A B,
just in case A either undercuts, or undermines, or rebuts B, where:
• A undercuts B (on B′) if Conc(A) ∈ C(n(TopRule(B′))) for some
B′ ∈ Sub(B) such that TopRule(B′) ∈ Rd;
• A undermines B (on B′) if Conc(A) ∈ C(ϕ) for some B′ ∈ Sub(B) such
that B′ = [ϕ] and ϕ ∈ Kp;
– if, in addition, Conc(A) is a contrary of ϕ, i.e. ϕ 6∈ C(Conc(A)),
then A contrary-undermines B;
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• A rebuts B (on B′) if Conc(A) ∈ C(ϕ) for some B′ ∈ Sub(B) such that
B′ = [B′′1, . . . ,B′′n ⇒ ϕ];
– if, in addition, Conc(A) is a contrary of ϕ, i.e. ϕ 6∈ C(Conc(A)),
then A contrary-rebuts B.
Observe that, effectively, five types of attacks are distinguished in ASPIC+.
In particular, while undercutting has a single version, undermining and re-
butting attacks come in two versions, one of which we can call the ‘contrary’
version. The authors in [MP13] argue that along undercutting, these ‘con-
trary’ versions of undermining and rebutting are of specific nature, in that
they are preference-independent. That is, whereas in general undermining
and rebutting is subject to preferences over arguments, their ‘contrary’ ver-
sions, as well as undercutting, succeed irrespective of any preferences. For
instance, if a premise stands for ‘the absence of evidence to the contrary’
(such as negation as failure premise), then simply exhibiting a contrary suf-
fices to contrary-undermine such a premise, and no preference information
is required. Contrary-rebutting realises this idea of asymmetric incompat-
ibility at the level of consequents of defeasible rules. Undercutting, on the
other hand, is taken to be preference-independent, since, in the opinion
of [MP13], undercutting already yields a preference for not inferring the
attacked argument’s conclusion.
We will soon see how explicit preferences can be used to qualify the
preference-dependent attacks. Before covering preferences, however, we list
conditions that are often assumed in ASPIC+. (Other typical conditions on
ASPIC+ frameworks will be met automatically in our setting, so we omit
to specify them here.)
Definition 2.22. (L, C,R, n,Kn,Kp) is:
• axiom consistent just in case ClRs(Kn) is consistent;
• closed under contraposition just in case for all S ⊆ L, s ∈ S and ϕ ∈ L
it holds that if S ` ϕ, then (S \ {s}) ∪ {−ϕ} ` −s;12
• well formed just in case whenever ψ has a contrary (i.e. some ϕ with
ϕ ∈ C(ψ) and ψ 6∈ C(ϕ)), it holds that both
– ψ 6∈ Kn (i.e. ψ is not an axiom)
12We omit the closure under transposition, because it can be used interchangeably with
the closure under contraposition; for completeness, (L, C,R, n,Kn,Kp) is closed un-
der transposition just in case for every strict rule ϕ1, . . . , ϕn → ϕ ∈ Rs, we find
ϕ1, . . . , ϕk−1,−ϕ,ϕk+1, . . . , ϕn → −ϕk ∈ Rs for every k ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
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– and @ϕ1, . . . , ϕn → ψ ∈ Rs (i.e. ψ is not the consequent of any
strict rule).
The rationale behind axiom consistency is that the factual knowledge
about the situation at hand should be consistent in order to draw non-
trivial inferences. Closure under contraposition embodies contrapositive
reasoning with strict rules in the presence of symmetric contradictories.
The condition of well formedness ensures that axioms and consequents of
strict rules cannot be asymmetrically (and hence preference-independently)
attacked.
ASPIC+ frameworks13 are defined on the basis of ASPIC+ argumentation
theories together with orderings 4 that express preferences over arguments,
as follows.
Definition 2.23. An ASPIC+ framework is a triple (Args, ,4), where
• Args is the set of all finite ASPIC+ arguments constructed from a
given ASPIC+ argumentation theory (L, C,R, n,Kn,Kp);
•  is the attack relation on Args;
• 4 is a binary relation on Args.
(Args, ,4) is well defined just in case (L, C,R, n,Kn,Kp) is axiom consis-
tent, closed under contraposition and well formed.
In the remainder of this section, unless specified otherwise, we assume
an ASPIC+ framework (Args, ,4) defined by (L, C,R, n,Kn,Kp). With
an abuse of notation, we say that (Args, ,4) is axiom consistent, closed
under contraposition or well formed, whenever (L, C,R, n,Kn,Kp) is.
In general, no assumptions are made about 4. The so-called strict version
≺ of 4 is defined by A ≺ B iff A 4 B and B 64 A. For arguments A,B ∈ Args,
A 4 B expresses that B is at least as preferred as A; and A ≺ B expresses
that B is strictly preferred over, or stronger than, A.
Preferences over ASPIC+ arguments are used to modify the attack rela-
tion into a defeat relation. To this end, in practice, restrictions on 4 are
imposed in order to obtain desirable reasoning outcomes. In particular, the
relation 4 is in the literature usually assumed to be reasonable. Intuitively,
reasonableness amounts to three conditions. First, strict arguments with
only axiom premises should be strictly preferred over arguments that are
13Called structured argumentation frameworks in e.g. [MP13, MP14]; we employ different
notation to indicate which structured argumentation formalism we have in mind.
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defeasible or have ordinary premises, and should not be less preferred than
other arguments. Second, extending an argument with only strict rules
and/or axiom premises should not change its relative preference. Third,
such strengthening of arguments with strict rules/axiom premises should
yield an acyclic strict counterpart ≺ of 4. We will provide particular in-
stances of several established reasonable ASPIC+ orderings, which can be
induced by the following most widely used (in ASPIC+) principles of com-
paring sets of elements.14
Definition 2.24. Let S and S′ be finite sets and assume a preorder 6 over
S∪S′. The strict and non-strict Elitist comparison principles CEli and EEli
are defined thus:
• S CEli S′ if ∃s ∈ S such that ∀s′ ∈ S′ we find s < s′;
• S EEli S′ if either S CEli S′ or S = S′.
Definition 2.25. Let S and S′ be finite sets and assume a preorder 6 over
S∪S′. The strict and non-strict Disjoint Elitist comparison principles CDEli
and EDEli are defined thus:
• S CDEli S′ if ∃s ∈ S \ S′ such that ∀s′ ∈ S′ \ S we find s < s′;
• S EDEli S′ if either S CDEli S′ or S = S′;
Definition 2.26. Let S and S′ be finite non-empty sets and assume a
preorder 6 over S ∪ S′. The strict and non-strict Democratic comparison
principles CDem and EDem are defined thus:
• ∅ 6EDem S′;
• S EDem ∅;
• S CDem S′ if ∀s ∈ S we find s′ ∈ S′ with s < s′;
• S EDem S′ if either S CDem S′ or S′ = S.
In this work, we will use argument orderings induced by the comparison
principles given in Definitions 2.24, 2.26, 2.25, based on a preference ordering
over argument premises, as follows.
Definition 2.27. Let a preorder 6p over Kp be given and let A,B ∈ Args.
For O ∈ {Eli, Dem, DEli}, define 4O thus:
B 4O A just in case Prem(B) ∩ Kp EO Prem(A) ∩ Kp.
14In the definitions below, the terms Elitist and Democratic are used as in [MP13], rather
than as in e.g. [AV14, CRS92]; the Democratic comparison principle is also known as
Hoare ordering, see e.g. [BTW10]; the term Disjoint Elitist is used as in [YMR16].
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So, an argument A is at least as preferred as an argument B if the ordinary
premises of A are at least as preferred as the ordinary premises of B with
respect to a chosen set comparison principle.
Note: for O ∈ {Eli, Dem}, it is known that 4O is reasonable.15
Given an ordering over arguments, a defeat relation is obtained by modi-
fying the attack relation to discard attacks from the arguments that are less
preferred than their attackees. In particular, a preference-dependent attack
succeeds unless the attacker is strictly less preferred than the attackee.
Definition 2.28. Let A,B ∈ Args be such that A B on B′. A defeats B,
denoted A ↪→ B, just in case one of the following holds:
• A undercuts B on B′;
• A contrary-undermines B on B′;
• A contrary-rebuts B on B′;
• A undermines B on B′ and A 6≺ B′;
• A rebuts B on B′ and A 6≺ B′.
If a defeat relation is obtained from  using 4O for some comparison prin-
ciple O ∈ {Eli, Dem, DEli}, then we denote it by ↪→O.
Note well that the preference-independent attacks always succeed as de-
feats (the first three bullet points); in contrast, the preference-dependent
attacks succeed only if the attacked sub-argument is not strictly more pre-
ferred than the attacker (the last two bullet points).
As opposed to the attack relations encompassing the mutual incompatibil-
ity of arguments, the defeat relations “encode the preference-dependent use
of attacks in the dialectical evaluation of the acceptability of arguments.”
[MP13, p. 365] In effect, the defeat relation specifies “whether attack can
be validly employed in a dialectical setting.” [MP13, p. 365]
Given the different uses of attack and defeat, ASPIC+ utilises two notions
of conflict-freeness: one with respect to attacks; another one with respect
to defeats.
Definition 2.29. Let (Args, ,4) be an ASPIC+ framework and let ↪→
be a defeat relation obtained from  and 4. For E ⊆ Args:
• E is attack conflict-free ( -conflict-free for short) just in case E 6 E;
15Argument orderings induced by the Disjoint Elitist comparison principle need not be
reasonable in general (Anthony Young, personal communication). However, for our
purposes, it is not important whether 4DEli as defined in Definition 2.27 is reasonable.
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• E is defeat conflict-free (↪→-conflict-free for short) just in case E 6↪→ E.
Finally, ASPIC+ semantics is defined via AA frameworks obtained from
arguments and a defeat relation, with either of the two notions of conflict-
freeness, as follows.
Definition 2.30. Let (Args, ,4) be an ASPIC+ framework and let ↪→ be
a defeat relation obtained from  and 4. Let E ⊆ Args be  /↪→-conflict-
free.
• E defends A just in case for every B ∈ Args such that B ↪→ A it holds
that E ↪→ B.
• E is, respectively:
–  /↪→-admissible just in case E is /↪→-conflict-free and defends
every argument in E;
–  /↪→-complete just in case E is  /↪→-admissible and contains
all the arguments that it defends;
–  /↪→-preferred just in case E is ⊆-maximally /↪→-admissible;
–  /↪→-stable just in case E is  /↪→-admissible and for every
B ∈ Args \ E it holds that E ↪→ B;
–  /↪→-grounded just in case E is ⊆-minimally  /↪→-complete.
A  /↪→-grounded/stable/preferred/complete set E of arguments is also
called a /↪→-grounded/stable/preferred/complete (respectively) extension
of (Args, ,4).
Note well that  - and ↪→- extensions differ just in the conflict-freeness
requirement: the former have to be attack conflict-free, and the latter defeat
conflict-free; otherwise, defence is defined with respect to the defeat relation.
While it is standard to define argumentation semantics directly in terms
of the defeat relation which is based on an attack relation and preferences
(see e.g. Section 2.3.3), the authors in [MP13] argue that defining conflict-
freeness, and hence ASPIC+ semantics, in terms of defeat is conceptually
wrong. This is because, as noted, in the structured argumentation set-
ting, conflict-freeness models mutual acceptability of arguments, and it is
precisely the attack relation that encodes this. In contrast, the defeat re-
lation encodes whether preference-dependent attacks can be validly em-
ployed in a dialectical setting. Hence, conflict-freeness, and consequently
ASPIC+ semantics, should be defined with respect to attacks, rather than
defeats. Nevertheless, the two definitions of semantics coincide for well
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defined ASPIC+ frameworks with reasonable argument orderings, in the
following sense [MP13, Prop. 16]:
Let (Args, ,4) be a well defined ASPIC+ framework with a
reasonable argument ordering 4, and let E ⊆ Args. Then
E is  -grounded/stable/preferred/complete/admissible iff
E is ↪→-grounded/stable/preferred/complete/admissible.
In this thesis, ASPIC+ frameworks will for the most part be well defined
with reasonable argument orderings. Hence, for the most part, the two
definitions of semantics will coincide and we will usually omit the prefixes 
and ↪→. Whenever the attack and defeat definitions of ASPIC+ semantics
do not coincide and we want to stress this (e.g. in Chapter 4), we will
comment accordingly.
In this thesis, for notational convenience, we will use the following nota-
tion regarding ASPIC+. We identify an ASPIC+ framework (Args, ,4)
defined by an ASPIC+ argumentation theory (L, C,R, n,Kn,Kp) with the
tuple (L, C,Rs,Rd,6d, n,Kn,Kp,6p), where 6d and 6p are given preorders
over the set Rd of defeasible rules and the set Kp of premises, respectively,
and 4 is lifted from 6p to Args in some way specified by Definitions 2.24,
2.26, 2.25 and 2.27. Furthermore, whenever a component of an ASPIC+
framework (L, C,Rs,Rd,6d, n,Kn,Kp,6p) is empty, we may omit it. In
particular, as we use neither the naming function n for defeasible rules nor
the axioms Kn, these components are henceforth omitted. Thus, unless
specified otherwise, (L, C,Rs,Rd,6d,Kp,6p) denotes a fixed but otherwise
arbitrary ASPIC+ framework.16
Given our notation, we illustrate how ASPIC+ employs, particularly, clo-
sure under contraposition and the notions of attack and defeat conflict-
freeness to address the issues pertaining to conflict preservation when ac-
counting for preferences, as discussed in the Introduction.
Example 2.6. Consider an ASPIC+ framework (L, C,Rs,Rd,6d,Kp,6p)
with
• language L = {α,¬α, β,¬β},
• contrariness function given by C(α) = ¬α, C(¬α) = α, C(β) = ¬β,
C(¬β) = β,
16We have not made use of the ordering 6d of defeasible rules in any way so far, but we
still keep this component present, because it will be needed in Section 6.1.4.
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• set of strict rules Rs = {β → ¬α},
• set of defeasible rules Rd = ∅,
• preferences over defeasible rules given by 6d = ∅,
• set of premises Kp = {α, β},
• preferences over premises given by β 6p α, α 
p β.
Note the similarity of this ASPIC+ framework to the p ABA framework
from Example 2.5.
This ASPIC+ framework is not closed under contraposition, because
{β} ` ¬α, but {α} 6` ¬β. Hence, (L, C,Rs,Rd,6d,Kp,6p) is not well de-
fined. The following three arguments can be constructed, namely A = [α],
B = [β] and B′ = [B→ ¬α], and a single attack B′  A among them.
Fix O ∈ {Eli, Dem, DEli}. Since there are no defeasible rules and all the ar-
guments have non-empty singleton sets of ordinary premises, we find B ≺O A
and B′ ≺O A. Hence, under any of the argument comparison principles, the
attack B′  A fails, so that there are no defeats, i.e. ↪→O = ∅. Consequently,
the set {A,B,B′} is ↪→-conflict-free as well as undefeated (with respect to
↪→O). Thus, {A,B,B′} is a unique ↪→-grounded/stable/preferred/complete
extension of (L, C,Rs,Rd,6d,Kp,6p) under any of the three argument com-
parison principles.
On the other hand, {A,B,B′} is not -conflict-free. Therefore, {A,B,B′}
is not a  -grounded/stable/preferred/complete extension of this ASPIC+
framework under any of the three argument comparison principles. In-
stead, {B,B′} is a unique -grounded/stable/preferred/complete extension
of (L, C,Rs,Rd,6d,Kp,6p) under any of the three argument comparison
principles.
This illustrates the difference between the semantics based on the attack
and defeat conflict-freeness notions in not well defined ASPIC+ frameworks.
At the same time, it shows how the semantics based on attack conflict-free
sets of arguments preserves conflicts after accounting for preferences.
Now, in order for the framework to be well defined, we need to ensure that
it is closed under contraposition. To close the framework under contraposi-
tion, we need e.g. a strict rule α→ ¬β. This gives an additional argument
A′ = [A → ¬β] with B ≺O A′ and B′ ≺O A′. Thus, A′ defeats B and B′ (un-
der any argument comparison principle). As a result, {A,A′} is obtained as
a unique grounded/stable/preferred/complete extension of (Args, ,4O),
provided that contraposition is imposed. This illustrates how well defined-
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ness, particularly closure under contraposition, guarantees that extensions
of ASPIC+ frameworks are conflict-free.
An issue with the attack definition of conflict-freeness is that the proof of
the Fundamental Lemma [MP13, Proposition 11] is more involved than with
the defeat definition of conflict-freeness [MP13]. The Fundamental Lemma
says, roughly, that the union of an admissible set with an argument defended
by that set is admissible. To illustrate a violation of the Fundamental
Lemma in ASPIC+, consider again Example 2.6. There, {B,B′} is not
attacked (with respect to ), and thus -admissible; since A is undefeated
(with respect to ↪→O), it is defended by {B,B′}; however, {A,B,B′} is not
 -admissible.
It has been shown that under the assumptions that an ASPIC+ framework
is well defined and has a reasonable argument ordering, the Fundamental
Lemma holds with respect to either definition of conflict-freeness. Observe
that well definedness implies, in particular, contraposition of rules. Con-
trastingly, we will show that a strictly weaker form of contraposition, namely
Weak Contraposition, suffices to guarantee the Fundamental Lemma in flat
ABA+. In addition, the only condition on preferences required in ABA+
to prove the Fundamental Lemma is transitivity; in particular, we will not
need to presuppose any extra requirements on preferences than those triv-
ially guaranteed by preference orderings/preorders.
2.3.3 Preference-Based Argumentation Frameworks (PAFs)
An early version of PAFs without the attack reversal was introduced in
[AC02] as a generalisation of AA frameworks to deal with preferences. Pref-
erences were assumed to be explicitly given over arguments. Conceptually,
preferences expressed which arguments were stronger than others. Account-
ing for preferences meant handling the so-called critical attacks: attacks
from an attacker that is weaker than the attackee. To this end, the main idea
was to discard attacks from attackers that are less preferred (i.e. weaker)
than attackees. Discarding such attacks would result into a new AA frame-
work with the same arguments, but a new defeat relation obtained from the
original attack relation and preferences over arguments. Extensions of this
framework would represent reasoning outcomes in AA with preferences.
However, later on it was acknowledged (e.g. in [AV09, AV10]) that simply
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discarding attacks may result in reasoning outcomes that are contradictory,
i.e. extensions not being conflict-free with respect to the original attack rela-
tion. To avoid this issue when handling critical attacks, PAFs were redefined
to reverse, rather than discard, such attacks [AV11, AV14]. The resulting
defeat relation would be such that extensions of the new AA framework are
conflict-free with respect the original attack relation too. This allowed to
preserve conflicts while accounting for preferences in AA. In what follows,
we give details of the later, improved version of PAFs.
We base the background on PAFs on [AV14].
Definition 2.31. A Preference-based Argumentation Framework (PAF) is a
tuple (Args, ,4), where (Args, ) is an AA framework and 4 is a preorder
over Args.
The preorder 4 in a PAF expresses preferences over arguments: for A,B ∈
Args, A 4 B means that B is at least as strong (or preferred) as A; A ≺ B
means that B is strictly stronger (or more preferred) than A.
The preorder 4 is used to generate a defeat relation, denoted by ↪→,
by reversing attacks from less preferred arguments, as defined next (the
following definition can already be found in [AV10]).
Definition 2.32. Given a PAF (Args, ,4), the associated repaired frame-
work is an AA framework (Args, ↪→) such that for A,B ∈ Args, A ↪→ B just
in case
• either A B and A ⊀ B,
• or B A and B ≺ A.
In the remainder of this section, unless specified differently, we assume
as given a fixed but otherwise arbitrary PAF (Args, ,4), and (Args, ↪→)
denotes the repaired framework associated with (Args, ,4).
Notions of conflict-freeness, defence and admissibility for PAFs are defined
via their repaired frameworks (see Definition 2.2). Semantics of PAFs is
defined via the semantics of their repaired frameworks (see Definition 2.3),
as follows (recall, σ ∈ {grounded, ideal, stable, preferred, complete}).
Definition 2.33. Let E ⊆ Args. E is a σ extension of (Args, ,4) just in
case E is a σ extension of (Args, ↪→).
Note well that PAFs operate on the abstract level. That is, PAFs do
not take the structure of arguments into account, and consider preferences
55
over arguments directly. However, even though in theory PAFs are based
on AA frameworks which abstract away from the structure of arguments,
in practice AA frameworks as well as PAFs are often instantiated with
e.g. formal logic or natural language arguments, whence the structure is
implicitly there. The problem is that if arguments have structure (e.g. are
built from assumptions/premises using rules), then it may not be sufficient
to compare them in terms of preferences without taking the structure into
account. Indeed, the deficiency can manifest in that reversing attacks may
happen without reversing attacks on sub-arguments, as discussed in the In-
troduction. As a consequence, one may end up accepting arguments without
accepting their ‘continuations’ with strict rules. At the same time, the con-
clusions of accepted arguments that follow by application of strict rules
may be conflicting too. (These points are well discussed in e.g. [MP13].)
We illustrate such behaviour with an example in ASPIC+ setting.
Example 2.7. Recall the ASPIC+ framework from Example 2.6. We have
arguments Args = {A,B,B′} and a single attack B′  A. For any of the
three argument comparison principles considered in Example 2.6, we find
the preorder 4 such that B′ ≺ A. Thus, any of the three PAFs (Args, ,4)
results in the same (Args, ↪→) with a single defeat A ↪→ B′. Note then that
(Args, ↪→) has a unique σ extension {A,B}. This extension is conflict-free
with respect to  , which illustrates that PAFs preserve conflicts.
However, observe that B is a sub-argument of B′, but the attack reversal
does not result in A ↪→ B, even though it results in A ↪→ B′. As a conse-
quence, the accepted argument B = [β] has a single premise β and there is a
strict rule β → ¬α, but the argument B′ = [B→ ¬α] is not accepted. This
is counter-intuitive because strict rules apply no matter what, so as long as
certain premises are acceptable, any inferences that follow from them via
strict rules should be acceptable too.
Note also that the closure of the set of premises that support the accepted
arguments, namely ClRs({α, β}) = {α, β,¬α}, is directly inconsistent (in
the sense of Definition 2.19). This is counter-intuitive because reasoning
outcomes should themselves be non-contradictory in order to make any rea-
sonable conclusions about the situation at hand.
This example illustrates that the structure of arguments should be taken
into account when dealing with preferences. Indeed, the problems arising
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in PAFs with structured arguments indicate that formalisms of structured
argumentation with preferences need more sophisticated mechanisms to deal
with preferences than provided by PAFs. We attempt to do this in this
thesis.
Rich PAFs
In [AV14], the authors identified two roles of preferences in argumenta-
tion. The first one, as discussed above, has to do with the critical attacks,
and preferences in PAFs are used to reverse such attacks. The second role
of preferences in argumentation is to “refine the evaluation of arguments”
[AV14, p. 589], which amounts to selecting among extensions those that
have the ‘best’ arguments. These two roles are orthogonal not only in that
they induce different aims, but also, as argued in [AV14], they cannot be
performed in one go and thus require distinct modelling mechanisms. To
model the second role of preferences, one can define the so-called rich PAFs,
where additional preferences are given over the extensions of the repaired
frameworks, as follows.
Definition 2.34. A rich PAF is a tuple (Args, ,4,E), where (Args, ,4)
is a PAF and E is a preorder, called refinement relation, on ℘(Args).
The refinement relation E on a PAF is used to compare sets of arguments.
It can be given directly, or could be induced by 4 by lifting the latter to
the extension level via various set comparison principles (similarly to how
it is done in p ABA). For instance, for E,E′ ⊆ Args,
E′ E E iff ∀A′ ∈ E′ \ E ∃A ∈ E \ E′ such that A′ ≺ A.
The refinement relation is then used to choose the most ‘preferable’, i.e. E-
maximal, extensions of the repaired framework, i.e. after reversing attacks:
Definition 2.35. Let (Args, ,4,E) be a rich PAF and let E ⊆ Args. E is
a σ extension of (Args, ,4,E) just in case E is a E-maximal σ extension
of (Args, ,4).
Note well that rich PAFs thus yield a two-phase process to account for
preferences: first, the critical attacks are reversed to repair a given frame-
work; second, the results of the repaired framework are further refined.
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We maintain, as argued in the Introduction, that due to the dialectical
nature of argumentation, selecting among extensions is not an appropriate
use of preferences. Nonetheless, given that rich PAFs employ preferences to
select among extensions in addition to accounting for preferences via attack
reversal, it would be interesting to see how this two-phase process relates
to preference handling in ABA+. We attempt this by way of an example in
Section 6.1.1.
In this chapter, we provided the essential technical background material
needed in this thesis. In particular, we gave background on AA and ABA as
formalisms of argumentation without preferences, and we gave background
on p ABA, ASPIC+ and PAFs as formalisms of argumentation with pref-
erences that we will compare ABA+ to. We discussed the details of ABA
and the formalisms of argumentation with preferences in the context of the
issues highlighted in the Introduction. All additional technical details as
well as discussions will be provided when necessary.
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3 ABA+: ABA with Preferences
In this chapter, we advance ABA+ and investigate its foundational prop-
erties. To this end, in Section 3.1, we introduce and illustrate the main
concepts pertaining to ABA+. In Section 3.2, we analyse foundational
properties of generic ABA+ frameworks. More specifically, we give basic
properties of ABA+ in Section 3.2.1, discuss relationships among ABA+ se-
mantics in Section 3.2.2, and in Section 3.2.3, study rationality postulates in
ABA+. In Section 3.3, we analyse preference handling properties of ABA+.
3.1 ABA+
In this section, we define and illustrate ABA+ frameworks, as well as the
main concepts and semantics of ABA+.
We extend any ABA framework (L,R,A,¯¯) with a preference ordering 6
over the set A of assumptions to obtain an ABA+ framework (L,R,A,¯¯,6),
as follows.
Definition 3.1. An ABA+ framework is a tuple (L,R,A,¯¯,6), where
(L,R,A,¯¯) is an ABA framework and 6 is a preorder (i.e. a transitive and
reflexive binary relation) on A.
From now on, unless stated differently, we consider a fixed but otherwise
arbitrary ABA+ framework (L,R,A,¯¯,6). We call (L,R,A,¯¯) the underly-
ing ABA framework of (L,R,A,¯¯,6). We henceforth apply the notions of
conclusions (Definition 2.6), closure and flatness (Definition 2.7) to ABA+
frameworks, having in mind their underlying ABA frameworks.
For assumptions α, β ∈ A, α 6 β expresses that α is less or equally
preferred to β; similarly, α < β (i.e. α 6 β and β 
 α) expresses that α is
(strictly) less preferred than β.
The preference ordering on assumptions in ABA+ being a preorder means,
first and foremost, that preferences are assumed to be transitive. Although
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controversial in for instance social choice theory, this assumption is pervasive
in the literature on argumentation with preferences (see e.g. [Kac11] for a
discussion), and we take it for granted in this thesis too. We also assume
the reflexivity of preferences as uncontroversial, as common in the literature
on preferences in argumentation and AI.
The Referendum (with Preferences) example can be used to illustrate the
concept of an ABA+ framework thus.
Example 3.1 (Example 1.2 as a flat ABA+ framework). Recall the ABA
framework FZ from Example 2.3 representing Zed’s knowledge. From Ex-
ample 1.2, we know that Zed trusts Bob more than Ann. Hence, we may
form a preference over Zed’s assumptions, namely α < β. So we obtain an
ABA+ framework F+Z = (L,R,A,¯¯,6) with
• the underlying ABA framework FZ (from Example 2.3) and
• the preference ordering 6 over A given by α < β.1
As discussed in the Introduction, we take that preferences in argumenta-
tion should qualify the defeasible information. As such, preference informa-
tion in ABA+ expresses the relative strength of defeasible knowledge. For
example, it can indicate the degree of belief, importance, relevance of un-
certain information. ABA+ will use preferences to resolve conflicts among
sets of assumptions in favour of the more preferred defeasible information.
Since assumptions are the only defeasible component in ABA (and ABA+),
our approach is somewhat different from some other structured argumenta-
tion approaches, such as ASPIC+ or DeLP, particularly in that they consider
preferences over defeasible rules. However, even though rules in ABA and
ABA+ formally are strict (i.e. accepting the antecedent necessitates accept-
ing the consequent), their application is contingent on the acceptability of
assumptions in their bodies (if any). Thus, having (defeasible) assump-
tions in the bodies of rules models a defeasible character of rules. (See
e.g. [DKT09, Ton08, Ton14] for discussions.) As a consequence, prefer-
ences over assumptions in ABA+ may model preferences over rules, whence
ABA+ will use preferences to arbitrate between conflicting rules of different
strength (we will see a concrete example of this in Chapter 7).
Note well, however, that particularly in ASPIC+, the distinction between
defeasible rules and rules with uncertain premises in the antecedents is em-
1As specified in Chapter 2, < defines the preorder 6 with α 6 β, β 6 α, α 6 α, β 6 β.
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phasised as conceptually important. In particular, defeasible rules are meant
to represent a generally unsound reasoning on a firm basis, whereas strict
rules with premises represent sound reasoning on an uncertain basis [Pra10].
We do not agree that this distinction is clear cut and requires a technical
separation, but a discussion is beyond the scope of this work. Be that as it
may, the distinction does not exist in ABA, and hence we are not making
one in ABA+ either.
We next define the attack relation in ABA+. The idea is that using less
preferred assumptions to attack a more preferred assumption leads to being
counter-attacked by the more preferred assumption. In other words, when
the attacker has an assumption less preferred than the one attacked, then
the attack is reversed. Intuitively, in ABA this works as follows.
Consider a set B of assumptions supporting a deduction B ` α for the
contrary α of another assumption α. Thus, a conflict among all the informa-
tion in play (i.e. assumptions from B ∪ {α}) is present. Suppose that pref-
erences indicate that the ‘attacked’ assumption α is strictly more preferred
than some assumption(s) involved in deducing the contrary α. I.e. prefer-
ence information expresses that the defeasible information represented by α
is ‘stronger’ than some of the information carried by B and used to argue
against α. Hence, on the one hand, the attack on α should fail, because one
cannot argue against something on the basis on poor knowledge. On the
other hand, the still-present conflict in the information from B ∪ {α} has
to be resolved. This is guaranteed by an attack from {α}—the relatively
‘strong’ information—on the set B of assumptions—including the relatively
‘weak’ information—that generates this conflict. In other words, by virtue
of using defeasible information in B to generate a conflict against the de-
feasible information α that is strictly more preferred than some defeasible
information from B used in generating this conflict, one not only fails to
argue against α on the basis of B, but also opens the information in B to
be argued against on the basis of α.
This rationale in ABA+ is formally expressed in full generality as follows.
Definition 3.2. A ⊆ A <-attacks B ⊆ A, denoted A < B, just in case:
• either A′ ` β, for some β ∈ B and A′ ⊆ A such that @α′ ∈ A′ with
α′ < β;
• or B′ ` α, for some α ∈ A and B′ ⊆ B such that ∃β′ ∈ B′ with
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β′ < α.
We call an <-attack formed as in the first bullet point above a normal
attack,2 and an <-attack formed as in the second bullet point above a reverse
attack.
Intuitively, A  < B as a normal attack if A  B and no assumption of
A used in this attack is strictly less preferred than the attacked assumption
(from B). On the other hand, B  < A as a reverse attack if A  B and
this attack depends on at least one assumption that is strictly less preferred
than the attacked one.
Example 3.2 (Attacks in the flat ABA+ framework representing Example
1.1). Recall the ABA+ framework F+Z from Example 3.1. In F+Z , {α} ‘tries’
to attack {β}, but is prevented by the preference α < β. Instead, {β} <-
attacks {α} (and also {α, β}) via reverse attack. Likewise, {α, β} <-attacks
both itself and {α} via reverse attack. F+Z can be represented graphically
as in Figure 3.1 (here and later, double-tipped arrows denote attacks that
are both normal and reverse).
∅ {α} {β} {α, β}
Figure 3.1: Flat ABA+ framework F+Z from Example 3.2
In contrast to the ABA framework FZ , where {α} defends itself, in the
ABA+ framework F+Z , {α} is <-attacked by {β}, but does not <-attack it
back. This concords with the intended meaning of the preference α < β in
this example, namely that the conflict should be resolved in favour of β.
The concept of <-attack reflects the interplay between deductions, con-
traries and preferences, by representing inherent conflicts among sets of
assumptions while accounting for preference information. Normal attacks
follow the standard notion of attack in ABA, additionally preventing the at-
tack to succeed when the attacker uses assumptions less preferred than the
one attacked. Reverse attacks, meanwhile, resolve the conflict between two
sets of assumptions by favouring the set containing an assumption whose
2Our notion of normal attack is different from the one proposed in [Dun16b], which will
be discussed in Section 6.1.4.
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contrary is deduced, over the set which uses less preferred assumptions to
deduce that contrary.
This role of reverse attacks applies to a dialectical setting too. Indeed, a
dialogue between two agents involves exchanging and arguing about infor-
mation. This can be done at the level of arguments, be it AA (e.g. [MC09])
or structured argumentation (see e.g. [MP13]). In ABA, however, instead of
exchanging full arguments, the agents can exchange their building blocks—
assumptions, contraries, rules—as in [FT14].3 These building blocks moved
by the agents constitute a knowledge base common to the agents. In ABA+,
preferences are shared by the agents and thus extend such a knowledge base.
Hence, any agent can reverse an attack against it by invoking preferences
alongside the building blocks of the attack, without explicitly construct-
ing another argument. That is, taking, say, the opponent’s information, the
proponent identifies a conflict in which the proponent’s assumption attacked
by the opponent is stronger than the opponent’s assumptions, whence the
proponent discards the opponent’s attack and instead counter-attacks the
opponent back.
Note well that reversing an attack in ABA+ does not amount to discarding
one direction of a symmetric attack. Indeed, on the one hand, attacks in
ABA are not in general symmetric. This relies on the fact that the contrary
mapping is not in general symmetric: the contrary α of an assumption
α ∈ A need not be an assumption itself; and even it if is, i.e. if α ∈ A,
then its contrary α need not be α. Making attacks in ABA, and hence
in ABA+, symmetric to begin with would require redefining the contrary
mapping and/or the attack relation in ABA altogether, rather than just
adding extra conditions to deal with preferences, as it is done in ABA+.
On the other hand, making attacks symmetric and discarding them due
to preferences would yield generally different outcomes than in ABA+. This
is because the normal attacks in ABA+ are in general non-symmetric. For
example, given a one-directional attack {α}  {β} with no preferences
relating α and β, it results into a one-directional normal attack {α} < {β}
in ABA+. Redefining the attack relation in ABA so as to make {α} {β}
symmetric would give an extra attack {β}  {α}, which would not be
3Indeed, in this thesis we take the ‘assumption-level’ view of attacks and semantics in
ABA—where attacks are between sets of assumptions, instead of the alternative yet
semantically equivalent ‘argument-level’ view—where attacks are between arguments
as deduction trees (see e.g. [Ton14] for a discussion).
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discarded due to absence of preferences. Overall, therefore, making attacks
symmetric in ABA to begin with and using preferences to discard some of
them would not amount to reversing attacks due to preferences as in ABA+.
We next define the notions of conflict-freeness and defence with respect
to  <, and then introduce ABA+ semantics.
Definition 3.3. Let E,A ⊆ A.
• E is <-conflict-free just in case E 6 < E;
• E <-defends A just in case for every closed B ⊆ A such that B  < A
it holds that E  < B;
• E is <-admissible just in case E is closed, <-conflict-free and <-
defends itself.
Note that the ‘pointwise’ definition of defence in ABA+, i.e.
E ⊆ A <-defends A ⊆ A pointwise just in case for all α ∈ A, for
every closed B ⊆ A such that B  < {α} it holds that E  < B,
would not be equivalent to the ‘setwise’ one given in Definition 3.3. Indeed,
even though <-defence ‘setwise’ plainly implies <-defence pointwise (if E
<-defends A ⊆ A, then E <-defends {α} for every α ∈ A, because for any
α ∈ A, B  < {α} implies B  < A), the converse is not true in general, as
illustrated in the following situation.
Consider an ABA+ framework (L,R,A,¯¯,6) with
• L = {α, α′, β, αc, α′c, βc},
• R = {βc ← α, α′},
• A = {α, α′, β},
• α = αc, α′ = α′c, β = βc,
• α < β.
Here, the set {α, α′} is closed, <-conflict-free and <-defends both {α} and
{α′} (because none of them is <-attacked), and so {α, α′} <-defends itself
‘pointwise’. However, it does not <-defend itself ‘setwise’, i.e. according
to Definition 3.3, because there is a reverse attack {β}  < {α, α′}, but
{α, α′} 6 < {β}.
In the end, we want (<-)admissibility to capture the concept of collec-
tive acceptability. This is in line with the general feature of argumenta-
tion semantics that it delineates sets of collectively acceptable arguments
(or other elements). Indeed, extensions are supposed to represent coherent
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viewpoints, so it is undesirable if an extension is formed by individually
acceptable arguments (or other elements) that are not acceptable together.
Precisely such situation is illustrated above: α and α′ are individually but
not collectively ‘acceptable’. Therefore, defence in ABA+ is more appropri-
ate ‘setwise’, as in Definition 3.3, rather than pointwise.
ABA+ semantics can be defined by replacing, in the definition of ABA
semantics (Definition 2.10), the notions of attack and defence with those of
<-attack and <-defence, as follows.
Definition 3.4. Let E ⊆ A. E is:
• <-complete just in case E is <-admissible and contains every set of
assumptions it <-defends;
• <-preferred just in case E is ⊆-maximally <-admissible;
• <-stable, just in case E is closed, <-conflict-free and for every β ∈
A \ E it holds that E  < {β};
• <-ideal just in case E is ⊆-maximal among sets of assumptions that
are <-admissible and contained in all <-preferred sets of assumptions;
• <-well founded just in case E is the intersection of all <-complete
sets of assumptions.
Similarly to the convention in ABA, in the case of flat ABA+ frameworks
we may use the term <-grounded instead of <-well founded.
The following examples illustrate ABA+ semantics.
Example 3.3 (Extensions of the flat ABA+ framework representing Exam-
ple 1.2). The flat ABA+ framework F+Z from Example 3.2 has <-admissible
extensions ∅ and {β}. In particular, {α} is not <-admissible in F+Z be-
cause it does not <-defend against, for instance, {β}. Also, {α, β} is not
<-admissible, because it is not <-conflict-free. Hence, F+Z has a unique
<-complete, <-preferred, <-stable, <-ideal and <-grounded extension {β},
with conclusions Cn({β}) = {β, stay}.
Example 3.4 (Example 1.4 as a non-flat ABA+ framework and exten-
sions thereof). Taking the non-flat ABA framework FD = (L,R,A,¯¯) from
Example 2.4 and equipping it with preference information α < β yields a
non-flat ABA+ framework F+D = (L,R,A,¯¯,6) which can be depicted as
in Figure 3.2.
F+D has a unique <-complete, <-preferred, <-stable, <-ideal and <-well
founded extension {β, δ}, with conclusions Cn({β, δ}) = {β, δ, stay}.
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∅ {α} {β} {α, β}
{δ} {α, δ} {β, δ} {α, β, δ}
Figure 3.2: Non-flat ABA framework FD from Example 2.4
Let us consider a slightly more complex setting, by way of building on
our Referendum example.
Example 3.5 (Example 1.2 extended and represented as a flat ABA+
framework, and extensions thereof). Carl joins the conversation of Zed,
Ann and Bob, and Zed quickly summarises the discussion by saying that if
one were to believe Ann, it would be ‘leave’, whereas if one were to trust
Bob, then it would be ‘stay’. Carl completes the statements (as if they were
enthymemes) with what Carl thinks is the missing premise, namely ‘if there
is a referendum’. Carl also distrusts Ann, and so believes Bob, more than
Ann. Conceivably, given Carl’s preferences, he should be convinced by Bob
rather than Ann.
The information available to Carl can be represented in ABA+ similarly
as for Zed in Example 2.3, but with the additional assumption γ stand-
ing for Carl’s presumption about the referendum, and having the rules
leave ← α, γ and stay ← β, γ instead. Overall, Carl’s ABA+ framework
is F+C = (L,R,A,¯¯,6) with
• L = {α, β, γ, leave, stay, γ},
• R = {leave← α, γ, stay← β, γ},
• A = {α, β, γ},
• α = stay, β = leave,
• α < β.
Note that F+C is flat.
The underlying ABA framework FC of F+C can be represented graphically
as in Figure 3.3. FC has {β, γ} and {α, γ} as stable/preferred extensions,
while {γ} is unique grounded/ideal, and all three sets are complete.
F+C can be represented graphically as in Figure 3.4 (for readability, we
omit the assumption sets ∅ and {α, β, γ}, as well as <-attacks to and from
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∅ {α}
{β}
{γ}
{α, β}
{α, γ}
{β, γ}
{α, β, γ}
Figure 3.3: The underlying ABA framework FC of F+C from Example 3.5
them; also, here and later, normal attacks are denoted by solid arrows
and reverse attacks are denoted by dotted arrows; as before, double-tipped
arrows denote attacks that are both normal and reverse).
{α}
{β}
{γ}
{α, β}
{α, γ}
{β, γ}
Figure 3.4: Flat ABA+ framework F+C from Example 3.5
In F+C , the set {α, γ} (supporting a deduction for the contrary leave of
β) is prevented from <-attacking {β}. This means that Carl cannot form
a successful attack on Bob based on Ann’s and his own beliefs. Instead,
by virtue of Ann’s and Carl’s beliefs jointly contradicting Bob’s beliefs, and
Bob being more trustworthy than Ann, arguments based jointly on Ann’s
and Carl’s beliefs are counter-attacked by Bob. That is, {β}, as well as any
set containing β, <-attacks {α, γ} via reverse attack. Also, {β, γ} <-attacks
{α}, as well as any set containing α, via normal attack, because {β, γ} sup-
ports a deduction for the contrary stay of α and no assumption in {β, γ}
is less preferred than α. That is, Carl can form a successful attack on Ann
based on Bob’s and his own beliefs. All in all, F+C has a unique <-complete,
<-preferred, <-stable, <-ideal and <-grounded extension, namely {β, γ},
with conclusions Cn({β, γ}) = {β, γ, stay}. This means that a unique ac-
ceptable set of beliefs consists of Bob’s and Carl’s beliefs, suggesting that
Carl should conclude that the Dutch would vote to stay in the EU in the
referendum. This is conceivably a desirable outcome in this example.
Henceforth, we use <-σ to refer to ABA+ semantics, where σ ∈ {well
founded/grounded, ideal, stable, preferred, complete}.
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Having provided and illustrated the basics of ABA+, we move on to study-
ing ABA+ in depth.
3.2 Foundational Properties of Generic ABA+
Argumentation formalisms can generally be measured against certain princi-
ples, such as those regarding relationships among semantics (see e.g. [Dun95b,
BDKT97, BG07]), rationality (see e.g. [CA07, MP13]) and other features of
argumentation frameworks (see e.g. [BGL14, Dun16a, Dun16b]). We inves-
tigate what principles ABA+ adheres to in this section.
We first (Section 3.2.1) investigate some basic properties of ABA+ and its
relationship to ABA. We then (Section 3.2.2) establish relationships among
ABA+ semantics, following the relationships established for ABA. Still fur-
ther (Section 3.2.3), we investigate ABA+ with respect to the rationality
principles a` la [CA07, MP13]. Results in this section apply to generic,
i.e. both flat and non-flat, ABA+ frameworks.
3.2.1 Basic Properties
In this section, we relate ABA+ to ABA by showing that ABA+ conserv-
tively extends ABA and relating the attack relationships of the two for-
malisms.
We start with the observation that attacks in ABA can be viewed as
<-attacks in ABA+ when preferences are absent.
Lemma 3.1. Let (L,R,A,¯¯,6) be an ABA+ framework such that 6= ∅
and let A,B ⊆ A. It holds that A B iff A < B.
Proof. Immediate from the definitions of attack in ABA, and <-attack in
ABA+, when 6= ∅.
This lemma allows us to conclude that ABA+ conservatively extends ABA
in the following sense.
Theorem 3.2. Let (L,R,A,¯¯,6) be an ABA+ framework such that 6= ∅
and let E ⊆ A. E is a σ extension of (L,R,A,¯¯) iff E is a <-σ extension
of (L,R,A,¯¯,6).
Proof. Immediate from definitions of ABA and ABA+ semantics (Defini-
tions 2.10 and 3.4), and Lemma 3.1.
68
In other words, ABA+ being a conservative extension of ABA means
that when there are no preferences (i.e. 6= ∅), then ABA+ framework
(L,R,A,¯¯, ∅) behaves exactly like its underlying ABA framework (L,R,A,¯¯).
Therefore, when there is no ambiguity, we may identify a given ABA frame-
work (L,R,A,¯¯) with (L,R,A,¯¯, ∅), and drop the suffix and/or subscript
< when talking about (L,R,A,¯¯), e.g. we may say ‘attack’ instead of ‘<-
attack’.
The next couple of results regard the basic properties of ABA+ <-attack
relation. First, as in ABA, the <-attack relation in ABA+ is monotonic
with respect to set inclusion:
Lemma 3.3. Let (L,R,A,¯¯,6) be an ABA+ framework and let A′ ⊆ A ⊆
A and B′ ⊆ B ⊆ A. If A′  < B′, then A < B.
Proof. Immediate from the definition of  <.
Second, attacks are preserved across ABA and ABA+ in the following
sense:
Lemma 3.4. Let (L,R,A,¯¯,6) be an ABA+ framework and let A,B ⊆ A.
• If A B, then either A < B or B  < A (or both).
• If A < B, then either A B or B  A (or both).
Proof. We consider case by case.
• Suppose first A B. Then ∃A′ ` β such that β ∈ B, A′ ⊆ A, and
either (i) ∀α′ ∈ A′ we have α′ 6< β,
or (ii) ∃α′ ∈ A′ with α′ < β.
In case (i), A′  < B, and hence A < B, by Lemma 3.3. In case (ii),
{β} < A′, and hence B  < A, by Lemma 3.3 as well.
• Suppose now A < B. Then
either (i) ∃A′ ` β such that β ∈ B, A′ ⊆ A and ∀α′ ∈ A′ we have
α′ 6< β,
or (ii) ∃B′ `R α such that α ∈ A, B′ ⊆ B and ∃β′ ∈ B′ with
β′ < α.
In case (i), A′  {β}, and so A B, whereas in case (ii), B′  {α},
so that B  A, using Lemma 3.3 in both cases.
As an immediate corollary, conflict is preserved across ABA and ABA+
in the following sense:
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Theorem 3.5. Let (L,R,A,¯¯,6) be an ABA+ framework and let E ⊆ A.
E is conflict-free in (L,R,A,¯¯) iff E is <-conflict-free in (L,R,A,¯¯,6).
In this section, we showed that ABA+ conservatively extends ABA and
related the attack relationships of ABA and ABA+. We will use these results
to establish other desirable properties of ABA+ frameworks, for instance in
Sections 3.2.3 and 3.3.
3.2.2 Relationship Among Semantics
In this section, we study relationships among ABA+ semantics, akin to the
relationships studied in e.g. [Dun95b, BDKT97, BG07], and show that ex-
tensions of ABA+ frameworks generally relate in the same way as extensions
of ABA frameworks, except for one difference between two semantics.
In terms of relationships among semantics, generic ABA+ frameworks
exhibit several features exhibited also by generic ABA frameworks. We
summarise and prove them next.
Theorem 3.6. Let (L,R,A,¯¯,6) be an ABA+ framework and let E ⊆ A.
(i) If E is <-admissible, then there is a <-preferred extension E′ such
that E ⊆ E′.
(ii) If E is <-stable, then it is <-preferred.
(iii) If E is <-stable, then it is <-complete.
(iv) If E is <-well founded, then for every <-stable extension E′ it holds
that E ⊆ E′.
(v) If E is the intersection of all the <-preferred extensions and E is also
<-admissible, then E is <-ideal.
(vi) If E is <-ideal, then it is not <-attacked by any <-admissible set of
assumptions.
(vii) If the empty set is closed, then there is a <-preferred extension, as
well as an <-ideal extension.
Proof.
(i) Let A0 ⊆ A1 ⊆ . . ., where A0 = E, be an ⊆-increasing sequence of <-
admissible supersets of E. Take its upper bound A =
⋃
i>0Ai and note
that it is <-admissible: if it were either not closed, not <-conflict-free,
or did not <-defend itself, then some finite subset (since deductions are
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finite) A′ ⊆ A would not be either closed or <-conflict-free, or would
not <-defend itself. Now, by Zorn’s Lemma, E has a ⊆-maximally
<-admissible superset, i.e. a <-preferred extension containing E.
(ii) Being <-stable, E is by definition closed and <-conflict-free. Given
that E  < {β} for every β ∈ A \ E, it is clear that E  < B for
every closed B ⊆ A such that B  < E. Hence, E is <-admissible.
Moreover, E is ⊆-maximally <-admissible, as E ∪ {β}  < E ∪ {β}
for any β ∈ A \ E. Thus, E is <-preferred, as required.
(iii) Being <-stable, E is <-admissible by (ii) above. Suppose for a con-
tradiction that E <-defends A ⊆ A but A * E. Then α 6∈ E for some
α ∈ A. Hence, E  < {α}, and so E  < A, due to stability. As E
<-defends A, we find E  < E, which is a contradiction. Thus, by
contradiction, E contains every assumption set it <-defends, and so
is <-complete.
(iv) Being<-well founded, E is by definition contained in every<-complete
extension. By (iii) above, every <-stable extension is <-complete.
Hence, E is contained in every <-stable extension.
(v) As the intersection of all <-preferred extensions, E is ⊆-maximal set
of assumptions contained in every <-preferred extension. Given that
E is also <-admissible, it is by definition <-ideal.
(vi) Suppose for a contradiction that B ⊆ A is <-admissible and B  < E.
By (i) above, there is a <-preferred extension A such that B ⊆ A.
Then, as E is <-ideal, we have E ⊆ A, and hence A  < A, which is
a contradiction.
(vii) ∅, being closed, is <-admissible. Hence, by (i) above, there is a
<-preferred extension. Still further, the intersection of <-preferred
extensions exists, and so it has a ⊆-maximally <-admissible subset,
i.e. an <-ideal extension.
In addition to the ‘positive’ properties as in Theorem 3.6, ABA+, being
a conservative extension of ABA, inherits various ‘negative’ properties from
ABA. For instance (see Example 3.6 below), <-complete, and thus <-well
founded, extensions need not exist in general; <-preferred extensions need
not be <-stable; <-stable extensions need not exist in general. However,
not all properties of ABA semantics are preserved in ABA+. In particular,
whereas in ABA preferred semantics is subsumed by complete semantics
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(i.e. preferred extensions are complete), in ABA+ <-preferred extensions
need not be <-complete, as the following example illustrates.
Example 3.6. Consider an ABA+ framework (L,R,A,¯¯,6) with4
• R = {β ← α, γ},
• A = {α, β, γ},
• α < β < γ.
(L,R,A,¯¯,6) can be depicted graphically as in Figure 3.5.
∅
{α}
{β}
{γ}
{α, β}
{α, γ}
{β, γ}
{α, β, γ}
Figure 3.5: ABA+ framework from Example 3.6 with <-preferred extensions
that are not <-complete
Here, all the sets {α}, {β} and {γ} are <-unattacked5 (in particular,
{β} is <-unattacked because α < β, so that {β}  < {α, γ} via a reverse
attack.) Both {α, β} and {β, γ} are also <-unattacked. However, {α, β, γ}
<-attacks itself. Therefore, (L,R,A,¯¯,6) has {α, β} and {β, γ} as its all
and only <-preferred extensions. However, neither of them is <-complete,
because they <-defend assumption sets they do not contain, namely {γ}
and {α}, respectively. Indeed, (L,R,A,¯¯,6) has no <-complete extension,
and thus no <-well founded extension either.
Note also that neither {α, β} nor {β, γ} is <-stable, because the former
does not <-attack {γ}, and the latter does not <-attack {α}. In fact,
(L,R,A,¯¯,6) has no <-stable extensions.
Example 3.6 also shows that in contrast to ABA, for ABA+ frameworks
the union of all the <-unattacked singleton sets of assumptions need not
4From now on, unless specified otherwise, we omit L and ¯¯ , and adopt the following
conventions: the contrary α of any assumption α is actually a symbol in L, and, unless
α appears in either A or R, it is different from the sentences appearing in A or R;
thus, L consists of all the sentences appearing in R, A and {α : α ∈ A}.
5<-unattacked means ‘not <-attacked’; we use the two interchangeably.
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be <-conflict-free: {α, β, γ} <-attacks itself, whereas none of the singleton
assumption sets is<-attacked at all. This leads to the main difference among
generic ABA and ABA+ frameworks, namely that <-preferred extensions
need not be <-complete, as illustrated in Example 3.6.
The significance of this example and the properties of ABA+ it illustrates
is that dealing with preferences in generic ABA+ frameworks may invalidate
some properties that hold in the absence of preferences. In this case, this
applies in particular to the relationship between<-preferred and<-complete
semantics. We will revisit this relationship later in Chapter 4, in the context
of Weak Contraposition.
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 summarise the relationships among the semantics of
ABA and ABA+. (Results covering Table 3.1 can be found in [BDKT97,
DMT07, Ton14, CˇFST]. Results covering Table 3.2 follow from Table 3.1
and results obtained in Section 3.2.)
Extension exists is
unique
is
admissible
is
complete
is
preferred
complete X X X X X
preferred X X X X X
stable X X X X X
ideal X X X X X
well
founded
X X X X X
Table 3.1: Relationships among non-flat ABA semantics
Extension exists is
unique
is <-
admissible
is <-
complete
is <-
preferred
<-complete X X X X X
<-preferred X X X X X
<-stable X X X X X
<-ideal X X X X X
<-well
founded
X X X X X
Table 3.2: Relationships among non-flat ABA+ semantics. The only differ-
ence from Table 3.1 is underlined
In summary, we established relationships that hold among ABA+ seman-
tics in contrast to relationships among ABA semantics: extensions of ABA+
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frameworks generally relate in the same way as extensions of ABA frame-
works, except that <-preferred extensions need not be <-complete.
3.2.3 Rationality Postulates
In this section, we analyse ABA+ with respect to principles concerning
rationality in argumentation (see e.g. [CA07, MP13]). We establish that
ABA+ adheres to those principles in general, and delineate conditions under
which ABA+ adheres to specific versions of those principles pertaining to
classical negation.
Rationality postulates proposed in [CA07] constitute a set of principles ap-
plicable to rule-based argumentation formalisms. They concern consistency
and closure under strict rules of the output of reasoning in a rule-based
argumentation formalism. In a nutshell, the principles require that the set
of conclusions of the arguments in any σ extension should be consistent and
closed under the application of strict rules. While originally the rationality
postulates concerned classical consistency (by utilising languages equipped
with classical negation), they have been generalised in [Pra10] to the set-
ting that involves the more general contrariness functions (see Definitions 2.4
and 2.15). The generalised principles are well studied in e.g. ASPIC+, where
several conditions guaranteeing satisfaction of the principles are established
(see e.g. [MP13, Pra10]). For example, if an ASPIC+ framework is well
defined (i.e. axiom consistent, closed under contraposition and well formed;
see Definition 2.22) and has a reasonable argument ordering (see Definitions
2.24, 2.25, 2.26 and remarks thereof), then it satisfies the ASPIC+ versions
of the consistency postulates.
Rationality postulates have not been studied in ABA in general. How-
ever, [Ton07] provides an analysis of a version of ABA that models reasoning
with defeasible rules, namely generalised Assumption-Based Argumentation
frameworks, with respect to the rationality postulates. The generalised
ABA frameworks make use of a different type of contrary relation and ex-
ploit classical negation in the language, and they are also restricted to flat
instances. On the other hand, [MP13] gives conditions under which a re-
stricted version of flat ABA adheres to the rationality postulates, by making
use of the embedding of flat ABA into ASPIC+ provided in [Pra10]. More
specifically, if the contrary mapping in ABA satisfies the conditions of a
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contrariness function, then well defined ASPIC+ instantiations with ABA
frameworks satisfy the ASPIC+ versions of the rationality postulates. Still
further, [DT14] studies variants of rationality postulates in a restricted ver-
sion of flat ABA. More precisely, rationality postulates and a novel property
of self-contradiction are defined with respect to abstract (Tarskian) logics
[AB09] and it is shown that if ABA frameworks satisfy self-contradiction,
then they satisfy the rationality postulates.
We now study the rationality postulates in ABA+ in general. That is, we
do not restrict ourselves to flat ABA, we use the original notion of a contrary
mapping in ABA, and we do not assume classical negation to be present
in the language. To this end, following [MP13], we provide formulations of
the principles applicable to generic ABA+, and establish their satisfaction
in general. Notably, in contrast to ASPIC+, we do not presuppose restric-
tions on ABA+ frameworks in order to satisfy the rationality postulates. In
addition, we provide formulations of rationality postulates for a restricted
class of ABA+ frameworks incorporating classical negation, and delineate
conditions under which ABA+ satisfies the postulates for that restricted
class of frameworks.
We define the rationality postulates for ABA+ using the following auxil-
iary definitions, which are adaptations of the respective notions of consis-
tency in ASPIC+ (Definition 2.19) to the context of ABA contrary map-
pings.
Definition 3.5. Let S ⊆ L. S is:
• directly consistent if there are no ϕ,ψ ∈ S with ϕ = ψ;
• indirectly consistent if Cn(S) is directly consistent.
We immediately note that Theorem 3.5 implies that <-conflict-free sets
are (in)directly consistent.
Lemma 3.7. Let (L,R,A,¯¯,6) be an ABA+ framework and let E ⊆ A be
closed and <-conflict-free. Then E is both directly and indirectly consistent.
Proof. As E is <-conflict-free, it is conflict-free, by Theorem 3.5. Suppose
for a contradiction that E is not directly consistent. Then there are α, β ∈ E
such that α = β. But as {α} `∅ α is a deduction supported by {α} ⊆ E,
we get E  E, contradicting conflict-freeness of E.
Likewise, suppose E is not indirectly consistent. Then there are ϕ, β ∈
Cn(E) such that ϕ = β, and as E is closed, β ∈ E. But as ϕ ∈ Cn(E),
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there is a deduction Φ ` ϕ supported by some Φ ⊆ E, so that Φ  {β},
and hence E  E, which is a contradiction.
In other words, closed and <-conflict-free sets in ABA+ are directly and
indirectly consistent by virtue of the fact that they do not <-attack them-
selves. Similarly, in ASPIC+, attack conflict-free sets of arguments (Defini-
tion 2.29) are both directly and indirectly consistent, by virtue of the fact
that they do not include attacking arguments.
We next formulate the rationality postulates for ABA+. We call them
principles, in accordance with other properties of ABA+ that we will inves-
tigate later.
Principle 3.1. Let E1, . . . , En be <-σ extensions of (L,R,A,¯¯,6). Then
(L,R,A,¯¯,6) fulfils, for <-σ semantics, the Principle of
• Closure just in case Cn(Ei) = Cn(Cn(Ei)) ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n};
• Consistency just in case Ei is directly consistent ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n};
• Indirect Consistency just in case Ei is indirectly consistent ∀i ∈
{1, . . . , n}.
The original idea [CA07] behind the Principle of Closure is that conclu-
sions of extensions should be closed under the application of strict rules.
For example, in ASPIC+ the operator of closure under strict rules (Defini-
tion 2.18) is used to formulate the principle. Since in ABA+ all rules are
strict (i.e. no defeasible rules, in contrast to e.g. ASPIC+), this boils down
to being deductively closed with respect to the deductive system (L,R). In
ABA+, the conclusions operator Cn (Definition 2.7) is actually the deduc-
tive closure operator; hence, the principle essentially says that Cn should
be idempotent.
The principles of Consistency and Indirect Consistency simply say that
extensions and their conclusions should be consistent with respect to the no-
tion of consistency formulated via the notion of contrary. The two principles
are straightforward reformulations of the ones used in [MP13].
Satisfaction of all these principles is guaranteed in ABA+, as shown next.
Theorem 3.8. Let (L,R,A,¯¯,6) be an ABA+ framework. Then
(L,R,A,¯¯,6) fulfils the principles of Closure, Consistency and Indirect
Consistency, for any <-σ semantics.
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Proof. Fulfilment of the Principle of Closure is immediate from the defini-
tion of the conclusions operator Cn (Definition 2.5), and fulfilment of the
principles of Direct and Indirect Consistency follows from Lemma 3.7.
Note that in ASPIC+, well defined frameworks do satisfy closure, con-
sistency and indirect consistency postulates, under either of the definitions
of conflict-freeness, provided that they have reasonable argument orderings
[MP13]. By contrast, in ABA+, no other condition than transitivity (as
well as, formally, reflexivity) is required from the preference ordering.
We note that [CA07] originally formulated the rationality postulates in
the presence of classical negation in the language. Classical negation is not,
however, singled-out in [MP13]’s formulations of the postulates. Neverthe-
less, the original intentions can be accounted for by appropriately formu-
lating the principle of ‘classical consistency’ for ABA+, and by formally
describing what is required of ABA+ frameworks to fulfil this principle. We
do this next, relying on the formulations in [CA07, Pra10, MP13, DT14].
For the remainder of this section, we assume the language L to be closed
under the classical negation operator ¬. As a shorthand, the complement
−ϕ of ϕ ∈ L is: ¬ψ if ϕ = ψ; and ψ if ϕ = ¬ψ.
Principle 3.2. Let E1, . . . , En be all the <-σ extensions of (L,R,A,¯¯,6).
Then (L,R,A,¯¯,6) fulfils the Principle of Classical Consistency for
<-σ semantics just in case for no ϕ ∈ L it holds that both ϕ ∈ Cn(Ei) and
−ϕ ∈ Cn(Ei), for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Obviously, if the rules of an ABA+ framework include a sentence and
its negation as rules with empty bodies, then the Principle of Classical
Consistency is violated, as illustrated below.
Example 3.7. Consider (L,R,A,¯¯, ∅) with
• L = {p,¬p, α,¬α},
• R = {p← >, ¬p← >},
• A = {α},
• α = p.
We find deductions ∅ `{p←>} p and ∅ `{¬p←>} ¬p. As ∅ is closed and <-
attacks {α}, it is a unique <-admissible set. So, ∅ is a unique <-σ extension
of (L,R,A,¯¯,6) for any σ, with conclusions Cn(∅) = {p,¬p}. Therefore,
(L,R,A,¯¯,6) does not fulfil the Principle of Classical Consistency.
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To avoid such situations, we can impose a restriction—akin to the prop-
erty of axiom consistency (Definition 2.22) of ASPIC+ frameworks—on
ABA+ frameworks, as follows.
Axiom 3.1. (L,R,A,¯¯,6) satisfies the Axiom of Consistency just in
case for no ϕ ∈ L we find ∅ ` ϕ and ∅ ` −ϕ.
The connection to the property of axiom consistency in ASPIC+ is the
following: the analogue of an axiom premise of an ASPIC+ framework in
ABA+ is the head of a rule with empty body (also called a fact); such a
head is deducible from the empty set of assumptions; hence, requiring that
no sentence and its complement can together be deduced from the empty set
in ABA+, mimics requiring the closure under strict rules of axiom premises
to be consistent in ASPIC+ (see Definition 2.22).
Clearly, (L,R,A,¯¯,6) from Example 3.7 does not satisfy the Axiom of
Consistency.
We now propose a property of ABA+ frameworks whose satisfaction, to-
gether with the Axiom of Consistency, leads to fulfilment of the Principle of
Classical Consistency. The property concerns integration of classical nega-
tion into the contrary mapping.
Axiom 3.2. (L,R,A,¯¯,6) satisfies the Axiom of Negation just in case
for all A ⊆ A and ϕ ∈ L it holds that if A ` ϕ and A 6= ∅, then for some
α ∈ A we find α = −ϕ.
The axiom of Negation essentially requires that for some assumption used
to derive a sentence, the negation of that sentence should be the contrary of
that assumption. That is, this axiom forces the contrary mapping to assign
particular sentences as contraries of certain assumptions. This is a syntactic
restriction, but not a semantic one, for the following reason.
Suppose that in a given (L,R,A,¯¯,6) we have A ` ϕ for some A 6= ∅.
Let α ∈ A be the assumption for which the Axiom of Negation requires
α = −ϕ. Assume, in addition, that another sentence, say ψ, is intended (by
a user—a knowledge engineer) as the contrary of α. Then rule −ϕ← ψ can
be added to R, so as to render −ϕ deducible whenever ψ is. This ensures
that −ϕ just acts as a proxy for the user-intended contrary ψ of α.
Likewise, let there be two deductions {α} ` ϕ and {α} ` ϕ′ with −ϕ 6=
−ϕ′. Given that the contrary ¯¯ : A → L is a function into L, it cannot
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satisfy both α = −ϕ and α = −ϕ′. However, we can add a new sentence, say
ψ, to L, and assign α = ψ, and then add the rules ψ ← −ϕ and ψ ← −ϕ′ to
R, whence the contrary ψ of α is deducible whenever either of −ϕ and −ϕ′
are. In any event, these syntactic restrictions need not change the semantics
of ABA+.
Another possibility would be to have a more general contrary mapping ¯¯¯ :
A → ℘(L) \ {∅} which assigns a set of contraries to each assumption, just
like in some formulations of ABA semantically equivalent to the standard
presentation we adopt in this work (see e.g. [FT14, Ton14]). Then, in addi-
tion to any user-intended contraries of an assumption, other sentences can
be assigned as contraries in order to satisfy the Axiom of Negation. We are
not particularly concerned with such knowledge representation choices, and
rather want to show that there are ways to account for classical negation in
ABA+ regarding the rationality postulates.
Satisfaction of the axioms of Consistency and Negation guarantees fulfil-
ment of the Principle of Classical Consistency, as our next result shows.
Proposition 3.9. Let (L,R,A,¯¯,6) be an ABA+ framework that satisfies
both axioms of Consistency and Negation. (L,R,A,¯¯,6) fulfils the Princi-
ple of Classical Consistency for any <-σ semantics.
Proof. Let E be a <-σ extension of (L,R,A,¯¯,6). Suppose for a contra-
diction that for some ϕ ∈ L we have ϕ,−ϕ ∈ Cn(E). Then, by the Axiom
of Consistency, there must be deductions A ` ϕ and B ` −ϕ with at least
one of A,B ⊆ E non-empty. Without loss of generality, say A 6= ∅. Then,
by the Axiom of Negation, we have α = −ϕ, for some α ∈ A. Thus, A∪B,
and as a consequence E, is not conflict-free, and hence not <-conflict-free
(by Theorem 3.5). This is a contradiction. Therefore, for no ϕ ∈ L we
have ϕ,−ϕ ∈ Cn(E). Thus, as σ was arbitrary, (L,R,A,¯¯,6) fulfils the
Principle of Classical Consistency for any semantics <-σ.
This result shows, given the class of ABA+ frameworks with classical
negation in the language, how to ensure that the conclusions of extensions
are classically consistent. In particular, it suffices to ensure that the non-
defeasible part of the ABA+ framework is consistent (the Axiom of Con-
sistency), and to accordingly incorporate the negation into the contrary
mapping.
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Ideas along these lines were pursued in [Ton07] and [DT14]. In the former
work, a variant of flat ABA is concerned, and also axiom consistency is not
considered, instead showing classical consistency conditionally for conflict-
free sets. In the latter work, also a variant of flat ABA is concerned, and
classical consistency is shown conditionally on the satisfaction of the so-
called axiom of self-contradiction (which is implied by, for instance, contra-
position; see [DT14] for details). Ours is also a different approach from the
one indirectly proposed in [MP13] for flat ABA as an instance of ASPIC+.
Drawing from the works of [MP13] and [DT14], contraposition on rules (see
Section 4.1) could, for example, be employed alongside the Axiom of Con-
sistency, to ensure fulfilment of the Principle of Classical Consistency. The
conditions that we identify are different from those proposed in the works in
question, essentially because ASPIC+ employs contrariness functions which
are different from contrary mappings in ABA+, while [DT14] considers ABA
and rationality postulates in the setting of abstract (Tarskian) logics.
In summary, following [CA07, MP13], we formulated rationality postu-
lates for ABA+ and showed that ABA+ satisfies them. We also formulated
versions of rationality postulates that take into account classical negation
and presented conditions under which ABA+ satisfies those postulates.
In this section (Section 3.2), we investigated basic properties of ABA+
and its relationship to ABA, and established relationships among ABA+
semantics. We also studied rationality postulates in ABA+ and established
their satisfaction generally, as well as conditionally for their variants con-
cerning classical negation.
3.3 Preference Handling Principles
In this section, we consider several desirable properties of argumentation
formalisms dealing with preferences, and analyse their satisfaction in ABA+.
More specifically, drawing on [AV09, AV10, BTW10, Kac11, Sˇim14, Dun16b],
we present and study seven preference handling principles, and show, as well
as argue for, satisfaction or violation of these principles under different se-
mantics in ABA+. Originally, most of the principles were defined in the
context of NMR, LP and AA with preferences. We appropriately reformu-
late them for ABA+ in this section. Results in this section apply to generic,
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i.e. both flat and non-flat, ABA+ frameworks.
3.3.1 Conflict Preservation
The first property, proposed in [AV09], insists that extensions returned after
accounting for preferences should be conflict-free with respect to the attack
relation that does not take preferences into account. We formulate it as a
principle applicable to ABA+, as follows.
Principle 3.3. (L,R,A,¯¯,6) fulfils the Principle of Conflict Preser-
vation for <-σ semantics just in case for all <-σ extensions E ⊆ A of
(L,R,A,¯¯,6), for any α, β ∈ A, {α}  {β} implies that either α 6∈ E or
β 6∈ E (or both).
Conflict preservation is guaranteed in ABA+ directly from Theorem 3.5:
Proposition 3.10. Let (L,R,A,¯¯,6) be an ABA+ framework. Then
(L,R,A,¯¯,6) fulfils the Principle of Conflict Preservation for any <-σ se-
mantics.
Proof. Let E be a <-σ extension of (L,R,A,¯¯,6). Let α, β ∈ A be such
that {α} {β}. Then {α, β} is not conflict-free, and hence not <-conflict-
free, by Theorem 3.5. If α, β ∈ E, then E is not <-conflict-free either, which
is a contradiction. Thus, {α, β} * E, as required.
Conflict preservation has been extensively discussed in e.g. [AV09, AV10,
AV14, Kac11, Mod09]. More specifically, [AV14, Kac11] argued that ex-
tensions of argumentation frameworks must never contain conflicting argu-
ments, whatever the preferences. This was particularly the case with the
original preference-based argumentation frameworks proposed in [AC02],
where attacks in an AA framework (Args, ) are simply discarded due to
preferences 4 over arguments Args, in order to define the so-called defeat
relation ↪→ and generate a new AA framework (Args, ↪→). Extensions of
(Args, ↪→) could thus contain arguments that attack each other (with re-
spect to  ). The following example illustrates the discarding of attacks in
AA as in [AC02].
Example 3.8. Consider an AA framework (Args, ) with Args = {A,B,C}
and A  B, B  C, C  A. This constitutes an example of well known
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odd cycles in AA frameworks, namely a 3-cycle. (Args, ) has no stable
extension and admits a unique complete extension ∅.
Now suppose we have preference information indicating that C is strictly
less preferred than A, in symbols C ≺ A. According to the proposal in
[AC02], we can construct an AA framework (Args, ↪→), where ↪→ is the
restriction of  to pairs of arguments in which the attacker is not strictly
less preferred than the attackee, i.e. A ↪→ B iff A  B and A ⊀ B. Then
(Args, ↪→) has only A ↪→ B and B ↪→ C. The frameworks (Args, ) and
(Args, ↪→) are graphically depicted in Figure 3.6.
(Args, )
C
B
A
(Args, ↪→)
C
B
A
Figure 3.6: AA 3-cycle with preferences
In (Args, ↪→), the attack cycle is broken, and the framework has {A,C}
as a unique σ extension. Note, however, that while {A,C} is conflict-free
with respect to ↪→ (that is, in (Args, ↪→)), it is not conflict-free with respect
to  , because we have C A.
As mentioned in the Introduction, we maintain that extensions (in argu-
mentation formalisms) are supposed to represent coherent viewpoints of a
situation at hand. Now, if an extension attacks itself (that is, for exam-
ple, contains arguments attacking each other), then it does not represent
a coherent viewpoint (see e.g. [Kac11, MP13, AV14] for discussions). In-
deed, argumentation semantics generally require extensions to be conflict-
free. Hence, having extensions that are not conflict-free with respect to the
original attack relation (i.e. before preferences) is highly problematic.
The problem of not preserving conflicts with respect to the original attack
relation when generating a defeat relation is not limited to the proposal in
[AC02], but also manifests itself in other approaches to AA with preferences,
such as VAFs [BC03]. To address this problem in the AA setting, in [Kac10]
the author argued for using a symmetric attack relation in the presence of
preferences, so as to avoid having conflicting arguments in extensions. How-
ever, symmetric attacks are not always desirable, especially in structured
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argumentation (see e.g. [MP13, Ton14] for discussions). On the other hand,
already in [AV10] it was suggested reversing, rather than discarding, attacks
due to preferences. This idea was also touched in [Kac11], and later fully
developed into PAFs in [AV14]. ABA+ follows this idea too.
The problem of not preserving conflicts with respect to the original attack
relation when generating a defeat relation can manifest in structured argu-
mentation too, particularly in ASPIC+. Two ways to address the problem
exist. One is to require extensions to be conflict-free with respect to the
original attack relation ( -conflict-freeness), rather than with respect to
the defeat relation (↪→-conflict-freeness), see Definition 2.29. Another one
is to impose contraposition on rules (Definition 2.22), which ensures that
↪→-conflict-free extensions are also -conflict-free. Nonetheless, to preserve
conflicts, restrictions on preferences (namely, reasonable preference order-
ings) are needed in both cases. Moreover, contraposition is a further re-
striction on knowledge representation. By contrast, no such restrictions are
needed in ABA+ to preserve conflicts.
To reiterate, we strongly agree with the idea that conflicts should be
preserved in the sense discussed above, and we take ABA+’s satisfaction
of the Principle of Conflict Preservation to be a most welcome feature,
guaranteed by the attack reversal in ABA+.
3.3.2 Empty Preferences
The second property, taken from [AV09, BTW10] (adapted also from the
literature on LP with preferences, see e.g. [Sˇim14] for a discussion), insists
that if there are no preferences, then the extensions returned using a pref-
erence handling mechanism should be the same as those obtained without
accounting for preferences. The intuition is that a mechanism to account for
preferences should deal with preferences, and be ineffective in the absence of
preferences. We formulate this property as a principle applicable to ABA+
next.6
Principle 3.4. (L,R,A,¯¯,6) fulfils the Principle of Empty Prefer-
ences for <-σ semantics just in case whenever 6= ∅, E ⊆ A is a <-σ
extension of (L,R,A,¯¯,6) iff E is a σ extension of (L,R,A,¯¯).
6Marek Sergot calls it the Principle of Sanity II [Ser15].
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This principle is guaranteed in ABA+, given that it is a conservative
extension of ABA (Theorem 3.2):
Proposition 3.11. Let (L,R,A,¯¯,6) be an ABA+ framework. If 6= ∅,
then (L,R,A,¯¯,6) fulfils the Principle of Empty Preferences for any <-σ
semantics.
Proof. Immediate from Theorem 3.2.
This is arguably a very natural and intuitive idea that a mechanism to
deal with preferences in a formalism should not change the behaviour of the
formalism when preference information is absent. We consequently believe
that satisfaction of the principle in question is a welcome feature of ABA+.
3.3.3 Maximal Elements
The next property, proposed in [AV14] in the context of AA with prefer-
ences, concerns inclusion in extensions of the ‘strongest’ arguments, i.e. ar-
guments that are maximal with respect to the preference ordering. The idea
is that the most preferred arguments, as long as they are collectively accept-
able, should be accepted. The intuition is that the ‘strongest’ arguments
cannot be objected by ‘weaker’ arguments, so they are ‘winning’ arguments
and should be accepted. We next reformulate the property to be applicable
to ABA+.
Principle 3.5. Suppose that the preorder 6 of (L,R,A,¯¯,6) is total, and
further assume that the set M = {α ∈ A : @β ∈ A with α < β} of 6-
maximal elements of A is closed and <-conflict-free. (L,R,A,¯¯,6) fulfils
the Principle of Maximal Elements for <-σ semantics just in case for
all <-σ extensions E ⊆ A of (L,R,A,¯¯,6), it holds that M ⊆ E.
For an illustration, consider F+Z from Example 3.1. There, 6 is a total
preorder and β is a unique 6-maximal element in A, and {β} is a unique
<-σ extension of F+Z for any σ (see Example 3.3), whence F+Z fulfils the
Principle of Maximal Elements for any semantics <-σ.
We maintain that the Principle of Maximal Elements is a desirable prop-
erty of ABA+ frameworks. Indeed, when assumptions in ABA+ represent
beliefs (or trust in a source of information), then it makes sense to accept
the most certain beliefs, as long as they are non-contradictory. Similarly,
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when assumptions represent defeasibility of rules (as discussed in Section
3.1), it makes sense to accept the most preferred assumptions that rep-
resent the least defeasible rules, as long as those assumptions are not in
conflict (we will see an example of assumptions representing defeasibility of
rules in Section 7.2.1). Further still, if assumptions are used to represent
presumed aspects of a situation (such as moot features or possibly achiev-
able goals), then preferences may indicate the relevant desirability of those
aspects (we will see an example of assumptions representing moot features
in Section 5.4). In such a case, it makes sense to seek to accept the as-
sumptions that represent the most desirable aspects of a situation, as long
as they are compatible together. Overall, given that defeasible information
in ABA+ is represented via assumptions, we believe it is desirable to accept
the most preferred defeasible information, as long as it is consistent.
Our next result shows that, in general, the Principle of Maximal Ele-
ments is guaranteed in ABA+ for <-well founded, <-stable and <-complete
semantics.
Proposition 3.12. Let (L,R,A,¯¯,6) be an ABA+ framework. Then
(L,R,A,¯¯,6) fulfils the Principle of Maximal Elements for <-complete,
<-stable and <-well founded semantics.
Proof. We first show that M is not <-attacked.
To begin with, observe that M cannot be <-attacked via reverse attack,
because its elements are 6-maximal in A. So fix α ∈ M and suppose for a
contradiction that for some B ⊆ A it holds that B ` α and ∀β ∈ B β 6< α.
In other words, either α 6 β or β 
 α, for any β ∈ B. Since 6 is total, it
follows that α 6 β ∀β ∈ B. From here, we show that B ⊆ M , which will
yield a contradiction to the <-conflict-freeness of M . Indeed, fix β ∈ B and
assume for a contradiction that β 6∈M . Then ∃γ ∈ A such that β < γ. By
transitivity of 6, we find α < γ, contradicting α’s 6-maximality. So, by
contradiction, we must have β ∈ M , and consequently, B ⊆ M . But now,
since α ∈M , B ⊆M and B  < {α}, this contradicts <-conflict-freeness of
M . Therefore, by contradiction, M is <-unattacked.
If (L,R,A,¯¯,6) admits no <-complete extensions, then the principle is
fulfilled trivially. Else, let E be a <-complete extension of (L,R,A,¯¯,6)
and suppose for a contradiction that M * E. Then E does not <-defend
M . This means that S  < M for some S ⊆ A, which is a contradiction to
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the fact that M is <-unattacked. Hence, by contradiction, M ⊆ E. Thus,
(L,R,A,¯¯,6) fulfils the Principle of Maximal Elements for <-complete se-
mantics.
As by Theorem 3.6(iii)<-stable extensions are<-complete, (L,R,A,¯¯,6)
fulfils the Principle of Maximal Elements for <-stable semantics too.
Finally, for the <-well founded semantics, recall that, by definition, the
<-well founded extension is the intersection of all the <-complete exten-
sions. So, if (L,R,A,¯¯,6) has a <-well founded extension G, then M
being contained in all the <-complete extensions, is contained in G as well.
It follows that (L,R,A,¯¯,6) fulfils the Principle of Maximal Elements for
<-well-founded semantics.
Under <-preferred and <-ideal semantics the Principle of Maximal Ele-
ments can in general be violated: in Example 3.6, γ is a unique 6-maximal
assumption, but the ABA+ framework (L,R,A,¯¯,6) has {α, β} as a <-
preferred extension, and {β} as an <-ideal extension, none of which contain
{γ}, so that (L,R,A,¯¯,6) does not fulfil the Principle of Maximal Ele-
ments. This happens essentially because <-preferred and <-ideal extensions
need not in general be <-complete. In Chapter 4, we will consider condi-
tions under which, as an example, <-preferred semantics is subsumed by
<-complete semantics. After establishing such conditions, in Section 4.2.2,
we will give sufficient conditions for ABA+ frameworks to fulfil the Principle
of Maximal Elements for <-preferred and <-ideal semantics too.
Note that the Principle of Maximal Elements is appropriate to ABA+,
but not necessarily to structured argumentation formalisms in general. This
is because defeasible information in ABA+ is represented through assump-
tions only, and <-attacks as well as semantics are considered in terms of
(sets of) assumptions. In contrast, if defeasible information is represented
via different components, as in e.g. ASPIC+, then different criteria may
be needed to identify the most preferred defeasible information. Also, if
attacks and/or semantics are considered in terms of arguments, then their
structure may take precedence over preferences. For instance, in ASPIC+,
attacks may be preference-independent (specifically contrary-undermining
and contrary-rebut, see Definition 2.21), so even the most preferred argu-
ment can be defeated by a strictly less preferred argument, whence the
former need not be accepted.
86
3.3.4 First BE Principle
The next property we consider is Brewka and Eiter’s Principle I for default
reasoning with preferences, taken from [BE00]. The principle says that,
intuitively, if two consistent sets are generated by the same defeasible el-
ements expect for a pair of defeasible elements, where one element in the
pair is preferred over the other, then the set using the less preferred element
should not be an extension. It was formulated, and called first BE principle,
for structured argumentation with defeasible rules in [Dun16b, Definition
7.4]. We reformulate it to be applicable to ABA+ next.7
Principle 3.6. (L,R,A,¯¯,6) fulfils the First BE Principle for <-σ
semantics just in case for all E,E′ ⊆ A such that E = E0 ∪ {α} and
E′ = E0 ∪ {α′} for some α, α′ ∈ A \ E0 with α′ < α, it holds that if E is
closed and <-conflict-free, then E′ is not a <-σ extension of (L,R,A,¯¯,6).
Our intuition behind the First BE Principle is that given two ‘minimally
coherent’ collections of defeasible information that differ only by a pair of
pieces of information, one piece of information in the pair being preferred
over the other one makes the latter one non-acceptable. Minimal coher-
ence here refers to <-conflict-freeness (or ‘consistency’), as opposed to <-
admissibility or <-completeness. Note that in [BE00], the two sets E and
E′ in question are assumed to be extensions of the default theory without
preferences; similarly, in [Dun16b], they are assumed to be consistent to
begin with. We hence mimic those assumptions with a ‘corresponding’ re-
quirement of being (<-)conflict-free (as well as closed, because this minimal
desirable requirement is specific to non-flat ABA+).
The principle represents a desirable property when the semantics in ques-
tion is global. By global we mean that an extension should be not only
coherent internally, but also decisive externally. That is, in addition to
satisfying certain internal requirements (such as consistency or <-conflict-
freeness), an extension should also satisfy certain requirements regarding
to the information outside of the extension (e.g. attacking everything not
in the extension). The First BE Principle is desirable for global semantics,
because a potential global extension should be explicitly decisive about the
7There are other possible ways to interpret and formulate this principle in ABA+. We
consider one alternative at the end of this section.
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one element outside the extension, and that element should not be ‘bet-
ter’ than what is in the extension. Otherwise, for non-global semantics,
the preference condition pertaining to a pair of defeasible elements is too
local to determine the acceptability of other defeasible elements. Indeed,
two arguments may be individually coherent (i.e. not self-attacking), and
one may be weaker than the other, but the stronger argument may be con-
tested (i.e. attacked) by a third argument while the weaker argument may
be uncontested (unattacked) at all. Conceivably, in such a situation, overall
the weaker, but not the stronger, argument should be accepted. A similar
situation can occur in ABA+, as exemplified next.
Example 3.9. Consider (L,R,A,¯¯,6) with
• R = {α← β, β ← β},
• A = {α′, α, β},
• α′ < α.
In a simplified graphical representation, (L,R,A,¯¯,6) can be graphically
depicted as in Figure 3.7.
{α′} {α} {β}
Figure 3.7: ABA+ framework from Example 3.9 violating the First BE
Principle
(L,R,A,¯¯,6) has a unique <-complete extension E′ = {α′}, which is
also a unique <-preferred, <-ideal and <-well founded extension. Note that
E = {α} is closed and <-conflict-free. Taking thus E0 = ∅ and noting that
α′ < α shows that (L,R,A,¯¯,6) does not fulfil the First BE Principle for
any <-σ semantics but <-stable ((L,R,A,¯¯,6) has no <-stable extensions).
This example can be used to illustrate the global/non-global distinction
of semantics: not only that {α′} does not <-attack {α}; it neither <-attacks
nor is <-attacked by {β}; yet {α′} is a unique extension under all but <-
stable semantics. Indeed, among the semantics that we consider, only stable
extension semantics is global, whereas the others are not (see e.g. [Dun95b]).
In particular, we see that if two sets of assumptions as in the formulation
of the First BE Principle are not in conflict (in Example 3.9, {α} and {α′}
do not <-attack each other), then (under semantics other than <-stable)
their acceptability depends not so much on the preference between the two
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assumptions distinguishing those sets, but on the standard acceptability
requirements. And precisely because <-complete, <-preferred, <-ideal and
<-well founded semantics are not global, we maintain that extensions under
these semantics should not be determined by local preferences, i.e. the First
BE Principle should not be in general fulfilled for these semantics. Indeed,
Example 3.9 shows that the First BE Principle need not hold in ABA+ in
general, under any but possibly <-stable semantics.
On the other hand, we insist that the satisfaction of this principle is de-
sirable under a global semantics, such as <-stable. Indeed, with respect to a
global semantics, in order to be an extension, a set (of arguments or assump-
tions) should be decisive towards elements outside it. That is, an extension
should explicitly exclude (e.g. attack) elements that do not belong to it.
So for two ‘candidate’ extensions distinguished only by a pair of elements,
if one ‘candidate’ extension explicitly excludes the element preferred over
the included element, then accepting this ‘candidate’ extension goes against
the preference information. In other words, to respect the preferences in
globally evaluating information in such a situation, the set containing the
less preferred information should not be an extension, provided that the set
containing the more preferred information is coherent.
We show next that the First BE Principle does hold in ABA+ under the
global <-stable semantics.
Proposition 3.13. Let (L,R,A,¯¯,6) be an ABA+ framework. Then
(L,R,A,¯¯,6) fulfils the First BE Principle for <-stable semantics.
Proof. Let E0 ⊆ A and α, α′ ∈ A \ E0 be such that α′ < α. Suppose for
a contradiction that E = E0 ∪ {α} is closed and <-conflict-free, and that
E′ = E0 ∪ {α′} is a <-stable extension of (L,R,A,¯¯,6). Since E′ is <-
stable and α 6∈ E′, we find E′  < {α}. As E is <-conflict-free, we cannot
have E0  < {α}, so E′  < {α} means that:
• either E′′ ∪ {α′} ` α with E′′ ⊆ E0 and ∀ε ∈ E′′ ∪ {α′} ε 6< α, which
contradicts α′ < α;
• or {α} ` α′ is such that α < α′, which is a contradiction to α′ < α.
In any event, we have a contradiction, so that E′ is not a <-stable extension,
provided E is closed and <-conflict-free.
The reasoning in this proof is in accordance with the reasons for the de-
sirability of the satisfaction of this principle discussed above. In particular,
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we see that in order for the ‘candidate’ extension E′ to be <-stable, it has
to <-attack {α}. But α′ ∈ E′ is strictly less preferred than α ∈ E, where
E = (E′ \ {α′})∪ {α} is (closed and) <-conflict-free. By virtue of this pref-
erence and E being coherent, E′ cannot be an acceptable extension under
<-stable semantics. That is, ABA+ satisfies the principle, as desired.
Notice that strengthening the condition on E to, for example, requiring
E to be <-admissible, would lead to a weaker version of the principle, which
would still be violated under, say, <-complete semantics, as witnessed by
the following example.
Example 3.10. Consider an ABA+ framework (L,R,A,¯¯,6) with
• R = {ε ← ε, ε′ ← ε′, ε′ ← ε, ε ← ε′, α ← ε, α′ ← ε′,
ε← α, β, ε′ ← α′, β, δ ← α, α′, β, δ ← δ},
• A = {α, α′, β, δ, ε, ε′},
• α′ < α, β < δ.
In a simplified graphical representation, (L,R,A,¯¯,6) can depicted as in
Figure 3.8.
{ε}
{ε′}
{α}
{α′}
{α, β}
{α′, β}
{α, α′, β} {δ}
Figure 3.8: ABA+ framework from Example 3.10
The sets E = {α, β} and E′ = {α′, β} are <-admissible. The former does
not <-defend {α′} (from the self-<-attacking {ε′}) and the latter does not
<-defend {α} (from the self-<-attacking {ε}). Their union {α, α′, β} does
not <-defend against the self-<-attacking {δ}. So (L,R,A,¯¯,6) has two
<-complete extensions, namely E and E′, where E ∩E′ = {β} and α′ < α.
We see that in Example 3.10, just as in Example 3.9, the two sets of
interest, E and E′, are not in conflict (i.e. do not <-attack each other).
Hence, under non-global semantics, their acceptability depends not so much
on the local preference between the two assumptions distinguishing those
sets, but on the standard acceptability requirements.
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3.3.5 Second BE Principle
We next consider Brewka and Eiter’s Principle II for default reasoning
with preferences, taken from [BE00]. The principle says that, paraphrasing
[DSTW04, p. 314], adding a non-applicable rule to an acceptable extension
does not make the extension non-acceptable, so long as prior preferences are
not changed. The principle was formulated, and called second BE principle,
for structured argumentation with defeasible rules in [Dun16b, Definition
7.3]. We reformulate it to be applicable to ABA+ next.
Principle 3.7. (L,R,A,¯¯,6) fulfils the Second BE Principle for <-σ
semantics just in case for any <-σ extension E ⊆ A of (L,R,A,¯¯,6) and
any rule ϕ0 ← ϕ1, . . . , ϕn such that {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn} * Cn(E), it holds that E
is a <-σ extension of (L ∪ {ϕ0, . . . , ϕn},R∪ {ϕ0 ← ϕ1, . . . , ϕn},A,¯¯,6).
We maintain that just like with the First BE Principle discussed in Section
3.3.4, there is a distinction in behaviour of global and non-global semantics
with respect to the Second BE Principle. More specifically, we think it
is a desirable property for global semantics, such as <-stable. Intuitively,
this is because under a global semantics, an extension explicitly excludes
(e.g. attacks) elements outside it, so that addition of rules that the extension
does not ‘support’ should not alter the acceptability of the extension. After
all, if the rule is not ‘supported’ by the extension, then at least one element
that is required for the rule to apply is already ruled out by the extension,
whence the acceptability of the extension should not change with the rule
being added. Indeed, we next show that this principle holds in ABA+ under
<-stable semantics.
Proposition 3.14. Let (L,R,A,¯¯,6) be an ABA+ framework. Then
(L,R,A,¯¯,6) fulfils the Second BE Principle for <-stable semantics.
Proof. Let E ⊆ A be a <-stable extension of (L,R,A,¯¯,6) and consider
ϕ0 ← ϕ1, . . . , ϕn with {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn} * Cn(E). Let
F ′ = (L ∪ {ϕ0, . . . , ϕn},R∪ {ϕ0 ← ϕ1, . . . , ϕn},A,¯¯,6).
As {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn} * Cn(E), it is plain to see that E is closed and <-conflict-
free in F ′. Furthermore, in F ′ it clearly holds that E <-attacks {β} for
every β ∈ A \ E, because E  < {β} in (L,R,A,¯¯,6). Consequently, E is
a <-stable extension of F ′.
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In contrast to the global <-stable semantics, this principle does not ex-
press a generally desirable property with respect to non-global (i.e. other)
ABA+ semantics. This is because extensions under non-global semantics
need not be decisive externally, so that elements outside an extension are
not ruled out explicitly (e.g. attacked), but rather cannot be coherently in-
cluded internally (i.e. their addition violates, for instance, conflict-freeness).
Hence, addition of a rule that is not ‘supported’ by an extension should allow
for generating new arguments that prevent the acceptability of the exten-
sion. For instance, one can hold a coherent viewpoint without including
certain premises that are mutually incompatible with the viewpoint, but
which separately do not contradict the viewpoint; however, addition of a
rule may lead those premises to explicitly contradict the viewpoint in ques-
tion, whence the viewpoint may cease to be tenable. Such a situation is
illustrated in ABA+ with the following example.
Example 3.11. Consider (L,R,A,¯¯,6) with
• R = {β ← β},
• A = {α, β},
• 6= ∅
and the rule α← β.
In (L,R,A,¯¯,6), {α} is <-unattacked, while {β} <-attacks itself. Hence,
(L,R,A,¯¯,6) has a unique <-complete extension E = {α}, which is also
a unique <-preferred, <-ideal and <-grounded extension. Note that {β} *
{α} = Cn(E). Consider thus F ′ = (L,R ∪ {α ← β},A,¯¯,6). There, {β}
<-attacks {α}, whence {α} is not <-admissible, and hence E is neither <-
complete, nor <-preferred, nor <-ideal, nor <-grounded. As a consequence,
(L,R,A,¯¯,6) does not fulfil the Second BE Principle.
This example shows that the Second BE Principle need not hold in ABA+
in general, under any semantics except <-stable, because no other semantics
is in general global. In particular, E = {α} does not represent a global view-
point, as it does not explicitly concern β. It is still an acceptable<-complete,
<-preferred, <-ideal and <-grounded—but not <-stable—extension to be-
gin with, particularly because β does not concern α either. However, adding
the rule α← β forces β to contradict α, leaving the latter defenceless. As a
consequence, E is no longer acceptable. In other words, we see that under
all but <-stable semantics, an assumption (β) which does not tamper with
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extensions to begin with, can, after addition of a rule (α ← β) with that
assumption in the body, change the acceptability of previously accepted as-
sumptions (α). This behaviour in ABA+ concords with the idea that in
argumentation, unlike stable semantics, other semantics do not conform to
the concept of external/internal stability [Dun95b], as discussed above.
Note that in many formalisms of LP/NMR with preferences, the Sec-
ond BE Principle (appropriately formulated) is often undesirable. Roughly
speaking, this is because the combination of the First BE Principle and
the Second BE Principle leads to violation of a property which says that
preferences should not compromise extensions. In other words, satisfaction
of both the First BE Principle and the Second BE Principle may yield a
situation where extensions exist prior to accounting for preferences, but do
not exist after accounting for preferences. Put in context, this property re-
lates to the feature of LP/NMR approaches to preferences where preference
information is used to select among extensions, rather than to generate new
ones. We investigate these properties in ABA+ context next.
3.3.6 Principle of Tolerance
The next principle that we considered is based on [Sˇim14, Principle III],
where it was adopted from [BE99] to LP with preferences. The principle
says that preferences should not compromise extensions. More formally, if
some extensions exist to begin with, then some extensions should exist after
accounting for preferences too. We formulate this principle for ABA+ as
follows.8
Principle 3.8. (L,R,A,¯¯,6) fulfils the Principle of Tolerance for <-
σ semantics just in case (L,R,A,¯¯,6) admits <-σ extensions whenever
(L,R,A,¯¯) admits σ extensions.
In effect, this principle requires that if a given ABA framework (L,R,A,¯¯)
has extensions under a particular semantics σ, then, for any preference
relation 6, (L,R,A,¯¯,6) must have <-σ extensions. Note well that the
Principle of Tolerance does not require the extensions of (L,R,A,¯¯,6) to
be extensions of (L,R,A,¯¯). We discuss such a stronger version of this
principle in the next section.
8Marek Sergot calls it the Principle of Tolerance [Ser15], a name which we adopt too.
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We first show, via the following example, that the Principle of Tolerance
is not fulfilled in ABA+ under <-stable semantics.
Example 3.12. Consider (L,R,A,¯¯,6) with
• R = {β ← α, γ ← β, γ ← α},
• A = {α, β, γ},
• α < γ.
The underlying ABA framework (L,R,A,¯¯) has {α} as a unique stable
extension. Meanwhile, in ABA+, {γ} <-attacks {α} via reverse attack,
whence we have a 3-cycle, so that (L,R,A,¯¯,6) has no <-stable extensions.
Thus, (L,R,A,¯¯,6) does not fulfil the Principle of Tolerance. (The two
frameworks can be illustrated as in Figure 3.9.)
(L,R,A,¯¯)
{γ}
{β}
{α}
(L,R,A,¯¯,6)
{γ}
{β}
{α}
Figure 3.9: ABA+ frameworks from Example 3.12 violating the Principle of
Tolerance
We maintain that, everything else being equal, the preference information
in ABA+ that α is less preferred than γ renders {α} ‘unstable’. Indeed,
‘stability’ of {α} in ABA depends on the fact that it can attack {γ}, but
this is no longer the case if γ is preferred over α.
The notion of preference supported in Example 3.12 is that preference
information is integrated within a framework as a first class citizen to locally
resolve conflicts between conflicting sets of assumptions. Thus, in ABA+,
preferences arbitrate among conflicting assumptions locally via <-attacks,
which then determine the acceptable extensions of a framework. Hence,
the existence of extensions after accounting for preferences is in no way
predetermined by the existence of extensions prior preferences. This is in
contrast to the approach where preference information is used to select
among the extensions obtained before accounting for preferences, where the
existence of extensions after accounting for preferences is guaranteed by the
existence of extensions prior to preferences.
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Example 3.12 shows that ABA+ does not fulfil the Principle of Tolerance
for <-stable semantics. The following example establishes that ABA+ does
not fulfil the Principle of Tolerance for other semantics either.
Example 3.13. Consider (L,R,A,¯¯,6) with
• R = {α← >, β ← α},
• A = {α, β},
• α < β.
In the underlying (L,R,A,¯¯), neither ∅ nor {β} is closed, but {α} is
closed, and it is in fact a unique σ extension. In (L,R,A,¯¯,6), however, {α}
is not <-admissible, since {β} < {α} via reverse attack and {α} 6 < {β}.
In fact, no set is <-admissible in (L,R,A,¯¯,6), whence it has no extension
under any semantics <-σ.
What happens here, is that absent preferences, α (as an assumption)
represents some defeasible information that nevertheless should be taken
at face value (due to the rule α ← >). Acceptance of α then implies
non-acceptance of an otherwise unobjected defeasible information β. With
preferences in play, given that α and β are mutually incompatible, the
preference of β over α forces to resolve the conflict in favour of β. This is
achieved by {α} failing to <-attack {β} and {β} <-attacking {α} instead.
However, the rules still insist that α be accepted, i.e. a set of assumptions
is closed—which is necessary for acceptance—only if it contains α. This
results in the following situation: α should be accepted; α and β cannot be
accepted together; β should be accepted rather than α, in case both cannot
be accepted together. We believe that knowledge represented this way is
ambiguous and no conclusions should be drawn from this ABA+ framework.
This is captured by there not being extensions under any <-σ semantics.
Again, the notion of preference supported in Example 3.13 is that pref-
erence information is on a par with the other components of ABA+ frame-
works and is utilised to arbitrate among conflicting (sets of) assumptions.
Thus, even if the information prior to preferences yields acceptable reason-
ing outcomes, preferences may resolve conflicts in a way that they end up
being irreconcilable with the remaining information. This likewise contrasts
with the approach of using preferences to select among extensions, which,
as we have argued, is unsuitable in argumentation primarily due to the
dialectical nature of argumentation.
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Observe that the ABA+ framework from Example 3.12 is flat, which
means that even flat ABA+ violates the Principle of Tolerance under <-
stable semantics. This is expected because in flat ABA, as well as in e.g. AA,
existence of stable extensions is not guaranteed in general. On the other
hand, the ABA+ framework from Example 3.13 is not flat, leaving the
possibility that (certain, if not all) flat ABA+ frameworks fulfil the principle
for other semantics. This can be anticipated because in flat ABA, as well
as in e.g. AA, existence of extensions under semantics other than stable is
guaranteed in general. And indeed, in Chapter 4, Section 4.2.2, we will
give sufficient conditions for flat ABA+ frameworks to admit extensions
under any <-σ semantics but <-stable, and hence to fulfil the Principle of
Tolerance for all <-σ semantics bar <-stable.
3.3.7 Principle of Reduction
Related to the Principle of Tolerance, is the following principle based on
[Sˇim14, Principle IV], which says that addition of preferences possibly re-
duces the space of acceptable extensions, in the sense that any extension
after accounting for new preferences had to already be an extension in the
absence of the new preferences. This is precisely the idea behind employing
preferences to select among extensions. In general, it can be formulated in
ABA+ as follows.
Principle 3.9. (L,R,A,¯¯,6) fulfils the Principle of Reduction for <-σ
semantics just in case for any preorder 6′⊇6, if E ⊆ A is a <-σ extension
of (L,R,A,¯¯,6′), then E is a <-σ extension of (L,R,A,¯¯,6).9
The Principle of Reduction also generalises what Marek Sergot calls the
Principle of Sanity [Ser15]. In ABA+ terminology, the Principle of Sanity
would say that the set of extensions (under a particular semantics) of an
ABA+ framework should be a subset of the set of extensions (under the
same semantics) of the underlying ABA framework. That the Principle of
Reduction generalises the Principle of Sanity can be seen by taking 6 to be
empty to begin with. The Principle of Sanity can then be seen as a stronger
version of the Principle of Tolerance, requiring not only the existence of
extensions, but also that preferences be used to select among extensions.
9Marek Sergot calls it the Principle of Anti-monotony [Ser15].
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We have argued that selection among extensions due to preferences is a
conceptually flawed approach to argumentation with preferences because of
the dialectical nature of argumentation. Instead, we maintain, preference
information should be used to directly and locally resolve conflicts stemming
from the defeasible information, which is compatible with the dialectical use
of argumentation and preferences. It is thus not surprising that the Principle
of Reduction is not fulfilled in ABA+:
Example 3.14. Consider (L,R,A,¯¯, ∅) with
• R = {β ← α},
• A = {α, β}.
(L,R,A,¯¯, ∅) has a unique <-σ extension {α}. Adding the preference
α < β yields (L,R,A,¯¯,6) with a unique <-σ extension {β}.
What happens here is that absent preferences, α represents acceptable
defeasible information, whereas β does not, because α refutes β, but not
vice versa. With preferences to qualify the defeasible information, α cannot
successfully refute β, and due to the presence of conflict between the two, β
refutes α instead. Therefore, preferences help to generate the new extension
{β} to be accepted instead of the old extension {α} when preferences were
unavailable.
Overall, we believe that preferences should not (only) help to select among
extensions, but should help to generate new ones that are more intuitive
given the preference information. We thus maintain that it is a desirable
feature of ABA+ to generally violate the Principle of Reduction under all
semantics.
In a way, both principles of Tolerance and Reduction reflect the non-
monotonic aspect of preferences [DSTW04], in that adding preference infor-
mation non-monotonically changes extensions. In this sense, the Principle of
Tolerance is violated because in ABA+ extensions may be lost after adding
preferences; similarly, the Principle of Reduction is violated in ABA+ be-
cause new extensions may be obtained given new preference information.
This aspect of preferences fits well the dialectical nature of argumentation
in ABA+, in that preference information is on a par with other defeasi-
ble and non-defeasible information and is directly involved in generation of
<-attacks and extensions.
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3.3.8 Summary
In this section (Section 3.3), we investigated several preference handling
properties, formulated as principles, in ABA+. We established that ABA+
frameworks fulfil some desirable principles (the Principle of Conflict Preser-
vation, the Principle of Empty Preferences) for any <-σ semantics, and
some for specific semantics (particularly, the First BE Principle and the
Second BE Principle for <-stable semantics). We also argued that it is a
desirable feature of ABA+ that some principles (e.g. the First BE Principle,
the Second BE Principle) are not generally satisfied under certain seman-
tics, for example due to the non-global nature of certain semantics. Further
still, we discussed how due to the dialectical nature of argumentation it is
particularly desirable that ABA+ does not in general satisfy the Principle
of Reduction. In Chapter 4, Section 4.2.2, we will revisit these principles
and inspect their satisfaction for a particular class of ABA+ frameworks,
namely flat ABA+ with Weak Contraposition. In particular, we will estab-
lish that those frameworks satisfy the Principle of Maximal Elements for all
<-σ semantics and the Principle of Tolerance for all but <-stable semantics.
In the future, we plan to study more preference handling properties rel-
evant to ABA+ and try to compare different argumentation formalisms
against such properties. In particular, we aim to investigate preference
handling properties concerning argumentation (see e.g. [Dun16b]) as well as
NMR (see e.g. [Sˇim14]). It would also be interesting to draw from studies
on preference handling in AI more generally (see e.g. [Kac11]).
In this chapter, we presented ABA+ and investigated its foundational
properties in terms of relationship to ABA, relationships among semantics
and satisfaction of rationality postulates. We then analysed and established
various desirable preference handling principles that ABA+ frameworks ful-
fil. In the next chapter, we present Weak Contraposition and study a dis-
tinguished class of ABA+ frameworks and their properties.
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4 ABA+ and Weak Contraposition
In this chapter, we present Weak Contraposition and study its effects on
ABA+. Weak Contraposition concerns contrapositive reasoning (i.e. con-
traposition, as understood in classical logic) in (rule-based) structured ar-
gumentation. Specifically, it is a (strictly) weaker version of contraposition
that at the same time deals with preferences. In addition, Weak Contraposi-
tion guarantees, as we will see in this chapter, additional desirable properties
for flat ABA+.
In Section 4.1, we introduce the concept of Weak Contraposition as well
as its formal definition, and analyse how Weak Contraposition relates to
flat and non-flat ABA+ frameworks. Then, in Section 4.2, focusing on a
distinguished class of ABA+ frameworks, namely flat ABA+ with Weak
Contraposition, we show that additional desirable properties regarding re-
lationships among semantics as well as preference handling are satisfied
in that class, and we also examine satisfaction of non-monotonic inference
properties [Mak88, KLM90] in flat ABA+ with Weak Contraposition.
4.1 Weak Contraposition
In this section, we introduce and discuss the concept of Weak Contraposition
in ABA+. In particular, we first set the ground by defining the principle of
contraposition in ABA+. Then, in Section 4.1.1, we formalise the principle
of Weak Contraposition. In Sections 4.1.2 and 4.1.3, we outline the concept
of enforcing Weak Contraposition on ABA+ frameworks and consider what
effect enforcing has regarding flatness of ABA+ frameworks.
Introduction of Weak Contraposition in ABA+ is motivated by the fact
that restrictions on ABA+ frameworks may be needed to ensure certain de-
sirable properties, such as existence of <-complete extensions, which need
not be guaranteed in general, as illustrated in Example 3.6. Given that
in other formalisms, notably ASPIC+, restrictions on frameworks, such as
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closure under contraposition, guarantee desirable behaviour, it is reasonable
to expect that similar restrictions can be utilised in ABA+. Indeed, as will
be clear from this chapter, contraposition in ABA+ is one such restriction
that ensures certain desirable properties, such as existence of <-complete
extensions. However, Weak Contraposition is a lesser restriction that distin-
guishes a larger class of ABA+ frameworks than contraposition, still allowing
to retain the desirable properties, as we will see in Section 4.2.
To introduce Weak Contraposition, we first define contraposition in ABA+.
To this end, we follow the formulation of the closure under contraposition
in ASPIC+ (Section 2.3.2, Definition 2.22) to analogously express contra-
position in ABA+ thus.1
Axiom 4.1. (L,R,A,¯¯,6) satisfies the Axiom of Contraposition just
in case for all A ⊆ A and β ∈ A it holds that
if A ` β,
then for all α ∈ A, there is Aα ` α with Aα ⊆ (A \ {α}) ∪ {β}.
This axiom requires that if an assumption plays a role in deducing the
contrary of another assumption, then it should be possible for the latter to
contribute to a deduction of the contrary of the former assumption too.
To illustrate, (L,R,A,¯¯,6) from Example 3.6 does not satisfy the Axiom
of Contraposition. As discussed, (L,R,A,¯¯,6) does not admit <-complete
extensions. In addition, Example 3.6 shows that even if an <-admissible set
<-defends another set of assumptions, their union need not be <-admissible:
for instance, {β, γ} is <-unattacked, therefore <-admissible, and <-defends
{α} (since the latter is <-unattacked), but, as observed, {α, β, γ} is not even
<-conflict-free, and therefore not <-admissible. This indicates violation of
the Fundamental Lemma (as understood and discussed below for e.g. AA,
ABA, ASPIC+), which says, roughly, that the union of an admissible set
with an argument/assumption defended by that set is admissible.
The Fundamental Lemma is one of the key results in Dung’s seminal paper
[Dun95b, Lemma 10]. It has been established for flat ABA [BDKT97, The-
orem 5.7] too. (Note, however, that non-flat ABA frameworks may violate
the Fundamental Lemma due to the closure condition, see e.g. [BDKT97]).
1In other settings, such as argumentation based on classical logic as presented in [DM16]
or Deductive Argumentation [BH14], contraposition can be similarly formulated.
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Regarding ASPIC+, it has been shown that under the assumptions that an
ASPIC+ framework (Definition 2.23) is well defined (Definition 2.22) and
has a reasonable argument ordering, the Fundamental Lemma holds too
(see discussion in Section 2.3.2). As stated in Section 2.3.2, one particular
requirement for ASPIC+ frameworks to be well defined is being closed under
contraposition.2, is reminiscent of the flatness condition in ABA+.
Regarding ABA+, it can be shown that if a flat ABA+ framework satisfies
the Axiom of Contraposition, then the Fundamental Lemma holds too (this
is immediate from the results in this chapter). Instead, however, in the next
section, we formulate the Axiom of Weak Contraposition—a weaker version
of the Axiom of Contraposition that suffices to guarantee, in flat ABA+, the
Fundamental Lemma, as well as other desirable properties that follow from
it, such as existence of <-complete extensions (as shown in Section 4.2.1).
4.1.1 The Axiom of Weak Contraposition (WCP)
We now propose a relaxed version of the Axiom of Contraposition, appli-
cable first and foremost to ABA+, that concerns a form of contrapositive
reasoning in the presence of preferences.
Axiom 4.2. (L,R,A,¯¯,6) satisfies the Axiom of Weak Contraposi-
tion (WCP for short) just in case for all A ⊆ A and β ∈ A it holds that
if A ` β and there exists α′ ∈ A such that α′ < β,
then, for some α ∈ A which is 6-minimal such that α < β,
there is Aα ` α with Aα ⊆ (A \ {α}) ∪ {β}.
This axiom insists on contraposing only when a deduction involves as-
sumptions less preferred than the one whose contrary is deduced.
For instance, consider the ABA+ framework F+C from Example 3.5. There
is a deduction {α, γ} ` leave, where leave = β and α < β, which makes
true the antecedent of WCP. There is also a deduction {β, γ} ` stay, where
stay = α, which makes true the consequent of WCP. Since there are no other
deductions for the contrary of any assumption apart from the two discussed
above, and as we have β 6< α, γ 6< α, there are no other deductions that
make true the antecedent of WCP. Therefore, F+C satisfies WCP.
2Note that another requirement, that of being well formed (Definition 2.22)
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On the other hand, consider the ABA+ framework (L,R,A,¯¯,6) from
Example 3.6. There is a deduction {α, γ} ` β with α < β, which makes
true the antecedent of WCP. However, there is no deduction S ` α with
S ⊆ ({α, γ} \ {α}) ∪ {β} = {β, γ}, whence the consequent of WCP is false.
Thus, (L,R,A,¯¯,6) does not satisfy WCP.
In essence, WCP plays the role of ensuring that, in a conflict arising from
assumptions, contraries and rules, preferences help to pinpoint a culprit
assumption that should be argued against. A culprit is identified as having
the property of being least preferred among the assumptions that are used
to derive the contrary of an assumption they are strictly less preferred to.
In this way, WCP ensures an <-attack against such a culprit assumption
from (some of) the rest of assumptions.
Observe the following contrast between WCP and attack reversal in ABA+.
Attack reversal ensures that, informally, if an attack against an assumption
uses an assumption that is strictly less preferred than the one attacked, then
the attack should be reversed so that the previously attacked assumption
now <-attacks its previous attacker. In other words, if A ` β (i.e. A {β})
and the preferences specify that some α′ ∈ A is strictly less preferred than
β, then the attack is reversed into the <-attack {β}  < A. In contrast,
WCP ensures that, informally, if an attack against an assumption uses an
assumption that is strictly less preferred than the one attacked, then some
such least preferred assumption should be singled out and <-attacked col-
lectively by all the other assumptions involved. In other words, if A ` β
(i.e. A {β}) and the preferences specify that some α′ ∈ A is strictly less
preferred than β, then WCP uses preferences to pinpoint a culprit α ∈ A
which is the least preferred to β, and ensures that the remaining assump-
tions suffice to build an argument against α: for some α ∈ A which is
6-minimal such that α < β (so α may or may not be α′), there exists an
<-attack Aα  < {α}, where Aα ⊆ (A \ {α}) ∪ {β}. So, in the presence of
conflict between assumptions of different relative preference, attack reversal
resolves the conflict in favour of the preferred assumption, whereas WCP
identifies a particular culprit assumption against which a new argument
should be constructed.
To find intuition for the difference between the two concepts in a dialec-
tical setting, consider the following situation. Imagine two agents A and
B. Suppose B moves forward some defeasible information, in the form of
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an assumption, β. Suppose then that A produces an argument {α, α′} ` β
against β, based on defeasible information (assumptions) α and α′. So
{α, α′}  {β}. Assume that it is objectively the case that (the source of)
α is less reliable than (the source of) β, i.e. α < β. Now, the agent B can
evoke attack reversal to insist that collectively the information α and α′ is
flawed, given the information β and the preference information. That is,
{β} < {α, α′}. Note that this is all that B argues for, namely that {α, α′}
is not sustainable against β. In particular, this does not mean that either
α or α′ is not sustainable against either {β, α′} or {β, α}, respectively. To
go further, however, agent B can invoke WCP to specify that precisely α is
the piece of information that cannot be justified in the presence of (possi-
bly both) β and α′. That is, there should be Aα ` α with Aα ⊆ {α′, β}.
Thus, WCP allows to identify a least certain piece of agent’s A information
incompatible with the other information. Overall, attack reversal allows
agent B to argue against agent A on the basis of the shared information
and preferences, whereas WCP allows allows the agents to jointly dispute
certain defeasible information.
Note well that WCP does not play the role of ‘making attacks symmetric’.
That is, in general, if A ` β (i.e. A  {β}) and α′ < β for some α′ ∈ A,
then WCP does not guarantee {β} ` α for any α ∈ A (i.e. {β}  < A is
not guaranteed). Instead, WCP guarantees that Aα ` α for some α ∈ A
being 6-minimal with α < β and some Aα ⊆ (A \ {α}) ∪ {β}. (Hence,
a normal attack (A \ {α}) ∪ {β}  < A is guaranteed.) In particular, to
generate the deduction, and hence an <-attack, other assumptions in A
may in general be needed, and also the assumption β may not be needed at
all. Consequently, having WCP and reversing attacks does not amount to
making attacks symmetric and discarding them.
With our next result, we formally show that WCP is a strictly weaker
form of the Axiom of Contraposition. Clearly, satisfaction of the Axiom of
Contraposition implies satisfaction of WCP, but not vice versa:
Lemma 4.1. Let (L,R,A,¯¯,6) be an ABA+ framework. If (L,R,A,¯¯,6)
satisfies the Axiom of Contraposition, then (L,R,A,¯¯,6) satisfies WCP.
The converse does not hold in general.
Proof. Suppose (L,R,A,¯¯,6) satisfies the Axiom of Contraposition. Let
A ` β have α′ ∈ A with α′ < β. Take any α ∈ A being 6-minimal such
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that α < β. As A ` β, the Axiom of Contraposition ensures that there is
Aα ` α, for some Aα ⊆ (A\{α})∪{β}. Thus, (L,R,A,¯¯,6) satisfies WCP.
To show that the converse does not hold in general, consider the ABA+
framework F+C from Example 3.5. Note, for instance, that {α, γ} ` leave
makes true the antecedent of the Axiom of Contraposition, but there is no
S ` γ with S ⊆ {α, β}, and this makes false the consequent of the Axiom of
Contraposition. Therefore, F+C violates the Axiom of Contraposition.
Intuitively, the Axiom of Contraposition concerns all the assumptions
involved in a conflict. By contrast, WCP concerns only those related by
preferences. To put WCP in the context of another property concerning con-
flicting sets in argumentation (discussed below), think of WCP as follows.
Satisfaction of WCP ensures that, in the presence of preference information
(i.e. 6 being non-empty), given a ⊆-minimally non-<-conflict-free set S of
assumptions, some least preferred (i.e. 6-minimal) assumption α ∈ S is
<-attacked (via normal attack) by the rest of the set (i.e. S \ {α}). Thus,
WCP has a similar effect as the inconsistency resolving property proposed
in [Dun16a, Definition 8] in the context of structured argumentation with
strict and defeasible rules. That property says roughly that if the closure un-
der (strict) rules of a finite set S of arguments is contradictory (i.e. contains
complimentary literals), then S is attacked by some argument generated
by (i.e. obtained using only strict rules together with defeasible arguments
from) S. In particular, the inconsistency resolving property is implied by
conditions such as closure under contraposition, cf. [Dun16b].
However, note that the inconsistency resolving property does not take
preferences into account, and is therefore intended for general use, as an
application of the generic principle of contraposition to structured argumen-
tation with strict and defeasible rules. WCP, meanwhile, is effective only
when there are preferences. Indeed, any ABA+ framework (L,R,A,¯¯, ∅)
(i.e. when preference information is absent) automatically satisfies WCP,
without forcing any new rules. This is a welcome feature, because contra-
position together with general contrariness mappings may lead to certain
unintended behaviours when preferences are not present [BGL15].
Lemma 4.1 says that WCP is strictly weaker than the Axiom of Contra-
position. In the next section, we discuss this relationship further, by looking
at how the two axioms can be satisfied in an ABA+ framework.
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4.1.2 Enforcing WCP
In this section, we discuss how an ABA+ framework that does not satisfy
WCP (or the Axiom of Contraposition, for that matter) to begin with, can
be modified by adding new rules (not necessarily in a unique way) so as to
satisfy the axiom. We call this enforcing WCP (in case of contraposition,
this is also sometimes called ‘closing under contraposition’).
To illustrate the idea, recall the ABA+ framework F = (L,R,A,¯¯,6)
from Example 3.6. As discussed in Section 4.1.1, it does not satisfy WCP,
because there is no deduction S ` α with S ⊆ {β, γ}. Suppose we add the
rule α← β, γ to R to obtain the ABA+ framework F ′ = (L,R∪{α← β, γ},
A,¯¯,6). In F ′, we find {β, γ} ` α and note that there are no other deduc-
tions that make the antecedent of WCP true. Hence, F ′ satisfies WCP.
Enforcing WCP will amount to such addition of rules in order to obtain
a new framework that satisfies WCP. We give a formal account of this next.
We call the situation where a deduction satisfies the antecedent of WCP
while the consequent is false an instance of WCP. More formally:
Definition 4.1. A ` β is an instance of WCP just in case
• ∃α′ ∈ A such that α′ < β, and
• for no α ∈ A which is 6-minimal such that α < β there is Aα ` α, for
some Aα ⊆ (A \ {α}) ∪ {β}.
In F from Example 3.6, {α, γ} ` β is an instance of WCP.
By contrasting the ways to enforce WCP and contraposition, we can see
how less restrictive the former is than the latter. Indeed, we next show how,
for WCP to be satisfied, it suffices, for every instance of WCP, to ensure one
additional deduction for the contrary of some single 6-minimal assumption
among those less preferred than the one whose contrary is deduced. We call
any such 6-minimal assumption a witness:
Definition 4.2. Let A ` β be an instance of WCP and let α ∈ A. Then α
is a witness to A ` β just in case α is 6-minimal such that α < β.
In F from Example 3.6, α is a witness to the instance of WCP {α, γ} ` β.
So a witness to an instance of WCP can be seen as a candidate assumption
with regards to which an additional deduction is needed in order to satisfy
WCP. This can be achieved by adding a single enforcing rule, defined next.
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Definition 4.3. Let A ` β be an instance of WCP with a witness α ∈ A.
Say A = {α1, . . . , αn}, where α = αi for some i. The enforcing rule,
denoted by α← A \ α, β, is the rule α← α1, . . . , αi−1, αi+1, . . . , αn, β.
In Example 3.6, for the only instance of WCP {α, γ} ` β and its sole
witness α, the enforcing rule is α← β, γ.
WCP can be enforced by adding an enforcing rule for every instance of
WCP, as shown next.
Proposition 4.2. Let
RA`β = {α← A \ α, β is an enforcing rule :
A ` β is an instance of WCP (in (L,R,A,¯¯,6))
with a witness α ∈ A}
be the set of enforcing rules given an instance A ` β of WCP in a given
ABA+ framework (L,R,A,¯¯,6), and let f be a function, defined for finite
non-empty sets, that selects any one element from a given set. The ABA+
framework (L,R∪R′,A,¯¯,6), where
R′ = {f(RA`β) : A ` β is an instance of WCP (in (L,R,A,¯¯,6))},
satisfies WCP.
Proof. Let A ` β be an instance of WCP (in (L,R,A,¯¯,6)) with a wit-
ness α ∈ A. Any rule α ← A \ α, β = f(RA`β) guarantees that in
(L,R ∪ R′,A,¯¯,6) we find {α1, . . . , αi−1, αi+1, αn, β} ` α. Note that no
such deduction can result in an instance of WCP (in (L,R ∪ R′,A,¯¯,6)),
precisely because the witness α is 6-minimal. Therefore, (L,R∪R′,A,¯¯,6)
satisfies WCP.
For illustration, to enforce WCP on F from Example 3.6, add the enforc-
ing rule α ← β, γ to R to obtain F ′ = (L,R ∪ {α ← β, γ},A,¯¯,6) which
satisfies WCP.
Observe that, as discussed in Section 4.1.1, enforcing WCP amounts to
generating additional normal attacks. That is, if A ` β is an instance of
WCP and α′ is a witness, then enforcing WCP (as in Proposition 4.2) guar-
antees the normal attack (A \ {α}) ∪ {β}  < {α}. Note well, however,
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that this does not have the same effect as attack reversal, because the latter
guarantees the reverse attack {β}  < A instead. So, on the one hand,
as opposed to attack reversal, enforcing WCP in general requires extra as-
sumptions to generate an <-attack. On the other hand, enforcing WCP
produces an <-attack targeted at a particular assumption, as opposed to
reversing attacks to in general produce <-attacks on sets of assumptions. As
a consequence, enforcing WCP and discarding <-attacks due to preferences
would not lead to the same outcomes (semantically) as reversing attacks
(with or without WCP).
In relation to the Axiom of Contraposition, the 6-minimality of a witness
assumption in enforcing WCP plays a crucial role. On the one hand, the
6-minimality of witnesses clearly distinguishes the outcomes of enforcing
WCP and closing under contraposition. Specifically, to satisfy the Ax-
iom of Contraposition, for every deduction that leads to violation of the
axiom, one needs to generate deductions for the contraries of all the as-
sumptions in the support (cf. non-existence of S ` γ with S ⊆ {α, β},
as in the proof of Lemma 4.1). This means adding at least as many, but
possibly more, rules as needed to enforce WCP. For instance, we would
need to add e.g. the rule γ ← α, β, in addition to α ← β, γ, to R of
F from Example 3.6, to obtain a new ABA+ framework F ′′ = (L,R ∪
{α← β, γ, γ ← α, β},A,¯¯,6) that satisfies the Axiom of Contraposition.
Recall, by way of contrast, that to enforce WCP on F , it suffices to add the
enforcing rule α← β, γ. Consequently, the 6-minimality of witnesses means
that generally, enforcing WCP as in Proposition 4.2, does not amount to
contraposing all the rules in a given ABA+ framework.
On the other hand, the 6-minimality of witnesses saves from generating
redundant deductions when enforcing the axiom. For instance, consider F =
(L,R,A,¯¯,6) with R = {γ ← α, β} containing a single rule, assumptions
A = {α, β, γ} and preferences α < β < γ. Then {α, β} ` γ is an instance of
WCP. If 6-minimality were not required in the conditions of the consequent
of WCP, one could choose β and add the rule β ← α, γ to R so as to
generate {α, γ} ` β in F ′ = (L,R∪ {β ← α, γ},A,¯¯,6). This would result
in {α, β} ` γ not being an instance of WCP in the new framework F ′.
However, {α, γ} ` β would then also make the antecedent of the WCP
true (because α < β) while keeping the consequent false, thus yielding an in-
stance of WCP in F ′. Consequently, to enforce WCP, one would additionally
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need to ensure existence of yet another deduction, for example, {β, γ} ` α,
by, for instance, adding the rule α ← β, γ. By contrast, choosing a (neces-
sarily 6-minimal) witness to begin with, in this case the only one such being
α, enables one to add a single rule, say the enforcing rule α ← β, γ, so as
to generate the deduction {β, γ} ` α in F ′′ = (L,R ∪ {α ← β, γ},A,¯¯,6).
Therefore, the instance of WCP in question is eliminated in F ′′, no further
instances of WCP are obtained in F ′′, and so WCP is enforced on F by
modifying it into F ′′.
Note again that in the above example, enforcing WCP in the first way by
adding two rules amounts to closing the framework under contraposition.
Enforcing WCP as in Proposition 4.2 is different, because in the latter case,
the additional rules are added for the contraries of (some, even if possibly all)
6-minimal witness assumptions, but not for the contraries of the preference-
wise ‘intermediate’ assumptions. In the above example, α as a witness is
6-minimal with α < γ, whereas β is ‘intermediate’ preference-wise in the
sense that α < β < γ. To enforce WCP, it suffices to account for the witness
α, and there is no need to consider the ‘intermediate’ β, as opposed to what
is done to enforce the Axiom of Contraposition.
There are other ways to enforce WCP on a given ABA+ framework. For
example, given an instance of WCP A ` β with a witness α ∈ A, one
could add the rule α ← > to obtain the deduction ∅ ` α with ∅ = Aα ⊆
(A \ {α}) ∪ {β}, as required to eliminate the instance of WCP in question,
at the same time avoiding to create additional instances. This particular
way seems rather ad hoc and also quite radical with respect to knowledge
representation: it seems very unintuitive to have assumptions immediately
‘rejected’ (by deducing their contraries from the empty set) just because
they are involved in the argumentative process of deducing contraries of
more preferred assumptions. Intuitively, this way of enforcing WCP seems
straightforward from a technical point of view, but strikes as very intrusive,
compared with Proposition 4.2, from the conceptual point of view.
Apart from the two opposite endmost ways of enforcing WCP discussed
above, there are options ‘in between’, in the sense of aiming Aα to be a
proper non-empty subset of (A ∪ {α}) \ {β} (see Axiom 4.2). We do not,
however, provide guidelines on how to enforce WCP; this is up to the user
of ABA+ to decide, given a specific situation. Nonetheless, we showed how
to enforce WCP in one particular way. We contend, however, that enforcing
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WCP as in Proposition 4.2 generally involves a choice among rules to be
added. This choice need not be innocent in the sense that different choices
may in general lead to different frameworks and distinct reasoning outcomes.
Again, we believe that such a choice belongs to the user of ABA+, and
enforcing WCP as Proposition 4.2 could simply act as an indication that
such a choice is needed.
In the next section, we show that, without loss of generality, the way
of enforcing WCP as in Proposition 4.2 also preserves flatness. It may be
generally desirable to preserve flatness while enforcing WCP, because, in
particular, some desirable properties are guaranteed in flat ABA+ subject
to WCP, as we will see in Section 4.2. In particular, we will show that
the Fundamental Lemma holds for flat ABA+ subject to WCP, and so it
is important that it is possible to enforce WCP on a flat ABA+ framework
while preserving flatness.
4.1.3 WCP and Flatness
In this section, we investigate what effect enforcing WCP on an ABA+
framework has with regards to its flatness.
First, observe that, technically, enforcing WCP on a flat ABA+ framework
may necessarily yield a non-flat ABA+ framework, as illustrated next.
Example 4.1. Consider (L,R,A,¯¯,6) with
• L = {α, β, γ, b, c},
• R = {β ← α},
• A = {α, β, γ},
• α = γ, β = b, γ = c,
• α < β.
This ABA+ framework is flat. Now, we find {α} ` β and α < β, but for
no S ⊆ {β} we have S ` α. Thus, (L,R,A,¯¯,6) violates WCP. In order to
enforce WCP, we need to add some rules so as to obtain S ` α, for some
S ⊆ {β}. However, note that whatever new rules we add, the support S of
S ` α will be such that S ` γ, because α = γ. Also note that as S ⊆ {β}
and γ ∈ Cn(S), S will not not be closed. Therefore, enforcing WCP on
(L,R,A,¯¯,6) will necessarily yield a non-flat ABA+ framework.
We will see in Section 4.2 that flat ABA+ subject to WCP exhibits certain
desirable properties, such as the Fundamental Lemma. Hence, it is desirable
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to be able to preserve flatness while enforcing WCP. To this end, we next
show how we can, without loss of generality, assume that enforcing WCP
preserves flatness. This is done by syntactically slightly modifying ABA+
frameworks without changing their behaviour semantically, and by appro-
priately adding new rules for instances of WCP. We begin by describing the
syntactic modification.
Instead of defining the contrary mapping ¯¯ : A → L to map assumptions
into the elements of the language, we can assign new symbols (not in L
to begin with) for contraries of assumptions. More concretely, for each
assumption α we take a new symbol αc not already in L, and define a
contrary mapping C so that C(α) = αc. Then, for the sentence a ∈ L that
was intended as the contrary α of α to begin with, we add the rule αc ← a.
Formally:
Definition 4.4. For (L,R,A,¯¯,6), its contrary-equivalent ABA+ frame-
work is (L ∪ Lc,R∪Rc,A, C,6) with
• Lc = {αc 6∈ L : α ∈ A},
• Rc = {αc ← a : α ∈ A, a ∈ L, α = a},
• C : A → Lc such that C(α) = αc ∀α ∈ A.
In the remainder of this section, unless specified otherwise, we assume
(L ∪ Lc,R∪Rc,A, C,6) to be contrary-equivalent to (L,R,A,¯¯,6). For
notational convenience, `c denotes the deduction relation (Section 2.2.2
Definition 2.5), Cnc denotes the conclusions operator (Section 2.2.2 Defini-
tion 2.6), and  c denotes the <-attack relation (Section 3.1 Definition 3.2)
associated with (L ∪ Lc,R∪Rc,A, C,6).
First observe that deduction relations ` and `c, as well as attack relations
 < and  c, coincide in the following sense.
Lemma 4.3. Let (L,R,A,¯¯,6) be an ABA+ framework and let S ⊆ A and
ϕ ∈ L. It holds that:
• S ` ϕ iff S `c ϕ;
•  < = c.
Proof. Suppose S ` ϕ. That is, S `R ϕ for some R ⊆ R. As S ⊆ A and
R ⊆ R ∪Rc, we have S `Rc ϕ too. That is, S `c ϕ.
Suppose instead S `c ϕ. That is, S `R′c ϕ for some R′ ⊆ R ∪ Rc. As
ϕ ∈ L, by construction of Rc it is plain that R′ ⊆ R. Thus, S ` ϕ.
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To show that the <-attack relations are the same, suppose first A < B.
If it is a normal attack, then A′ `R β, A′ ⊆ A, R ⊆ R, β ∈ B and α′ 6<
β ∀α′ ∈ A′. By the previous point and construction ofRc, A′ `R∪{β
c←β}
c βc.
As α′ 6< β ∀α′ ∈ A′, we have A  c B via normal attack. If, on the other
hand, A < B via reverse attack, then B′ ` α, B′ ⊆ B, α ∈ A and β′ < α
for some β′ ∈ B′. Likewise we have B′ `c αc. As β′ < α for some β′ ∈ B′,
we have A c B via reverse attack.
Suppose now A  c B. If it is a normal attack, then A′ `c βc, A′ ⊆ A,
β ∈ B and α′ 6< β ∀α′ ∈ A′. As βc 6∈ L, by construction of Rc we have that
A′ `R∪{βc←β}c βc for some R ⊆ R, and hence A′ `Rc β. Then A′ ` β, and as
α′ 6< β ∀α′ ∈ A′, we conclude with A  < B via normal attack. The case
with A c B via reverse attack is proven analogously.
Therefore, (L,R,A,¯¯,6) and (L ∪ Lc,R∪Rc,A, C,6) are semantically
equivalent:
Proposition 4.4. Let (L,R,A,¯¯,6) be an ABA+ framework and let E ⊆
A. It holds that E is a <-σ extension of (L,R,A,¯¯,6) iff E is a <-σ
extension of (L ∪ Lc,R∪Rc,A, C,6). Moreover, Cn(E) = Cnc(E) ∩ L.
Proof. That (L,R,A,¯¯,6) and (L ∪ Lc,R∪Rc,A, C,6) have the same ex-
tensions follows from (the second bullet point of) Lemma 4.3, and from the
fact that both ABA+ frameworks share the same set of assumptions. That
Cn(E) = Cnc(E)∩L follows from the definitions of Cn and Cnc, and from
(the first bullet point of) Lemma 4.3.
We can now specify at least one way of enforcing WCP that preserves
flatness, namely to take the ABA+ framework (L ∪ Lc,R∪Rc,A, C,6)
contrary-equivalent to (L,R,A,¯¯,6) and to add the enforcing rules thus.
Proposition 4.5. Let (L,R,A,¯¯,6) be a flat ABA+ framework. Let
RA`cβc = {αc ← A \ α, β is an enforcing rule :
A `c βc is an instance of WCP (in (L ∪ Lc,R∪Rc,A, C,6))
with a witness α ∈ A}
be the set of enforcing rules given an instance A `c βc of WCP in the ABA+
framework (L ∪ Lc,R∪Rc,A, C,6) contrary-equivalent to (L,R,A,¯¯,6).
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Let f be a function, defined for finite non-empty sets, that selects any one el-
ement from a given set. The ABA+ framework (L∪Lc,R∪Rc∪R′,A, C,6),
where
R′ = {f(RA`cβc) :
A `c βc is an instance of WCP (in (L ∪ Lc,R∪Rc,A, C,6))},
is flat and satisfies WCP.
Proof. Let F ′ = (L ∪ Lc,R ∪ Rc ∪ R′,A, C,6). As (L,R,A,¯¯,6) is flat,
(L ∪ Lc,R∪Rc,A, C,6) is also flat, by (the first bullet point of) Lemma
4.3 and construction of Lc and Rc. By definition of R′, it is plain to see
that F ′ is flat too.
Now note that every instance A `R β of WCP (in (L,R,A,¯¯,6)) corre-
sponds to an instanceA `R∪{βc←β}c βc of WCP (in (L ∪ Lc,R∪Rc,A, C,6)),
and vice versa, with the same (possibly multiple) witnesses. So, like in the
proof of Proposition 4.2, it is easy to see that F ′ satisfies WCP.
So, given a flat ABA+ framework, in order to avoid obtaining a non-flat
framework after enforcing WCP, take its contrary-equivalent ABA+ frame-
work (which is semantically equivalent (Proposition 4.4) and has the same
instances of WCP), and add to it the enforcing rules to guarantee satisfac-
tion of WCP. This is illustrated in the context of our previous example.
Example 4.2. For F = (L,R,A,¯¯,6) from Example 4.1, its contrary-
equivalent ABA+ framework is Fc = (L ∪ Lc,R∪Rc,A, C,6) with
• L = {α, β, γ, b, c}, Lc = {αc, βc, γc},
• R = {b← α}, Rc = {αc ← γ, βc ← b, γc ← c},
• A = {α, β, γ},
• C(α) = αc, C(β) = βc, C(γ) = γc,
• α < β.
Note that Fc is flat. Just like F , Fc has only one instance of WCP,
namely {α} ` βc, with a unique witness α. So we need S `c αc, for some
S ⊆ {β}, to enforce WCP. Consider the enforcing rule αc ← β and add it to
(L ∪ Lc,R∪Rc,A, C,6) to obtain F ′ = (L∪Lc,R∪Rc∪{αc ← β},A, C,6).
As intended, F ′ is flat and satisfies WCP.
The results in this section (Section 4.1.3) indicate that, without loss of
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generality, we can assume that enforcing WCP on an arbitrary flat ABA+
framework always yields a flat ABA+ framework that satisfies WCP.
4.1.4 Summary
In this section (Section 4.1), we defined two principles concerning rule con-
traposition in ABA+, namely the Axiom of Contraposition and WCP. We
showed that the latter is a strictly weaker version of the former, that also
applies only in the presence of preferences. We showed how to enforce WCP
on a generic ABA+ framework. More specifically, we showed how to trans-
form a generic ABA+ framework that does not satisfy WCP into an ABA+
framework that does satisfy WCP. In a similar vain, we also showed how to
enforce WCP on a flat ABA+ framework by at the same preserving flatness.
In the next section, we show that WCP allows flat ABA+ frameworks to
retain the relationships among semantics known to hold among semantics
of flat ABA frameworks. In particular, we will show that the Fundamental
Lemma holds for flat ABA+ frameworks satisfying WCP. As a consequence,
this will show how enforcing WCP changes the semantics of ABA+ frame-
works. This will allow us to extend results from Section 3.3 and prove that
flat ABA+ frameworks satisfying WCP satisfy additional desirable prefer-
ence handling principles.
4.2 Properties of Flat ABA+ with WCP
In this section, we study additional properties of flat ABA+ frameworks
satisfying WCP. First, in Section 4.2.1, we prove the Fundamental Lemma
for flat ABA+ with WCP and show that from it follow relationships among
ABA+ semantics known in flat ABA. Using the results obtained, we show,
in Section 4.2.2, that flat ABA+ with WCP exhibits additional desirable
preference handling properties. Finally, in Section 4.2.3, we investigate
non-monotonic inference properties of Cautious Monotonicity and Cumula-
tive Transitivity [Mak88, KLM90] in ABA+. In this section, unless stated
otherwise, we assume as given a flat ABA+ framework (L,R,A,¯¯,6) that
satisfies WCP.
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4.2.1 Relationship Among Semantics
In this section, we prove the Fundamental Lemma and show relationships
among semantics in flat ABA+ subject to WCP, complementing the results
from Section 3.2.2.
We first prove that WCP suffices for the Fundamental Lemma to hold in
flat ABA+:
Lemma 4.6 (Fundamental Lemma). Let (L,R,A,¯¯,6) be a flat ABA+
framework satisfying WCP. Let S ⊆ A be <-admissible and assume that
S <-defends {α}, {α′} ⊆ A. Then S ∪ {α} is <-admissible and <-defends
{α′}.
Proof. We first prove that S∪{α} is <-admissible. If α ∈ S, then S∪{α} is
trivially <-admissible. If α 6∈ S, we first show by contradiction that S∪{α}
is <-conflict-free, and then that S ∪ {α} <-defends itself.
Suppose first that S∪{α} is not <-conflict-free. Then S∪{α} < S∪{α}
via either 1. normal or 2. reverse attack. We show that either leads to
S  < S′∪{α} for some S′ ⊆ S, and then that this leads to a contradiction.
1. Suppose S ∪ {α}  < S ∪ {α} via normal attack. Note that as S
is <-conflict-free and <-defends {α}, the <-attack S ∪ {α}  < S ∪ {α}
must involve α in its support. That is, S′ ∪ {α} ` β for some S′ ⊆ S and
β ∈ S ∪ {α}, and ∀s′ ∈ S′ ∪ {α} we find s′ 6< β. (Else, if S′ ` β for some
S′ ⊆ S and β ∈ S ∪ {α}, and ∀s′ ∈ S′ s′ 6< β, then β ∈ S means S  < S,
while β = α means S  < {α}, whence S  < S, because S <-defends {α};
in any event, it contradicts <-conflict-freeness of S.)
• If β = α, then S′ ∪ {α}  < {α}, and so S  < S′ ∪ {α}, because S
<-defends {α}.
• Else, if β ∈ S, then S′∪{α} < S, and so S  < S′∪{α} too, because
S <-defends itself.
2. Suppose S∪{α} < S∪{α} via reverse attack. As in 1., this <-attack
must involve α, i.e. S′ ∪ {α} ` β for some S′ ⊆ S and β ∈ S ∪ {α}, and
∃s′ ∈ S′ ∪ {α} such that s′ < β. (Else, if S′ ` β for some S′ ⊆ S and
β ∈ S ∪ {α}, and ∃s′ ∈ S′ with s′ < β, then β ∈ S means S  < S, while
β = α means {α}  < S, whence S  < S, because S <-defends itself; in
any event, it contradicts <-conflict-freeness of S.)
• If β ∈ S, then {β} < S′ ∪ {α}, and so S  < S′ ∪ {α}.
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• Else, if β = α, then take s′ ∈ S′ ∪ {α} with s′ < β to be 6-minimal
such that using WCP we can find A ` s′ for some A ⊆ (S′∪{α})\{s′}.
Note also that s′ 6= α, by asymmetry of <. Therefore, S′ ∪ {α} S.
Then, by Lemma 3.4, either S′∪{α} < S or S  < S′∪{α}, yielding
S  < S′ ∪ {α} in any event (in the former case because S <-defends
itself).
In either case 1. or 2., we obtained S  < S′ ∪ {α}, and we are going
to show that this leads to a contradiction. As S is <-conflict-free and <-
defends {α}, this <-attack must be reverse and involve α: namely, there is
A1 ∪ {α} ` s1 with s1 ∈ S, A1 ⊆ S′, and ∃s′1 ∈ A1 ∪ {α} with s′1 < s1.
Take s′1 to be 6-minimal such that, by WCP, there is S′1 ` s′1 with S′1 ⊆
((A1 ∪ {α}) \ {s′1}) ∪ {s1} and ∀x ∈ S′1 x 6< s′1 (by 6-minimality of s′1 and
asymmetry of <). Note that if α 6∈ S′1, then S′1 ⊆ S, and so either S  < A1
or S  < {α}, any of which cannot happen, because S is <-conflict-free and
<-defends {α}. Thus, α ∈ S′1 and, in particular, s′1 6= α (because α 6∈ A1
and s ∈ S \ {α}). Hence, there is S1 ∪ {α} ` s′1 with S1 = S′1 \ {α} ⊆
(A1 \ {s′1})∪ {s1} and ∀x ∈ S1 x 6< s′1. That is, S1 ∪ {α} < A1, and as S
<-defends itself and A1 ⊆ S, we find S  < S1∪{α}. As before (because S is
<-conflict-free and <-defends {α}), this must be a reverse attack involving
α: A2 ∪ {α} ` s2, s2 ∈ S, A2 ⊆ S1, and ∃s′2 ∈ A2 ∪ {α} with s′2 < s2. For
some 6-minimal such s′2, by WCP we get S2 ∪ {α} ` s′2 with, as before,
s′2 6= α, S2 ⊆ (A2 \ {s′2}) ∪ {s2} and ∀x ∈ S2 x 6< s′2.
As deductions are finite (see Definition 2.5 in Chapter 2), < is asymmet-
ric and (L,R,A,¯¯,6) satisfies WCP, the procedure described above will
eventually exhaust pairs of s′k ∈ Ak and sk ∈ Sk such that s′k < sk, so that
S  < Sk ∪ {α} will have to be a normal attack, for some Sk. This leads to
a contradiction to S being <-admissible and <-defending {α}.
Hence, by contradiction, S ∪ {α} is <-conflict-free.
We now want to show that S∪{α} <-defends itself. So let B  < S∪{α}.
If it were a normal attack, then we would have either B  < S or B  < {α},
which in any event yields S  < B (and thus S ∪ {α}  < B), as S is <-
admissible and <-defends {α}. So we consider the <-attack B  < S ∪ {α}
to be reverse and involving α: S′ ∪ {α} ` β, S′ ⊆ S, β ∈ B, and there is
s′ ∈ S′ ∪ {α} with s′ < β. For some 6-minimal such s′, by WCP, there
is S1 ` s′ with S1 ⊆ ((S′ ∪ {α}) \ {s′}) ∪ {β}. Due to <-conflict-freeness
of S ∪ {α}, it holds that β ∈ S1. Also, due to 6-minimality of s′ and
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because s′ < β, we find that @x ∈ S1 with x < s′. Thus, S1  < {s′} via
normal attack. Since S is <-admissible and <-defends {α}, we must have
S  < S1, and hence S ∪ {α}  < S1. This <-attack cannot be normal on
(S′ ∪ {α}) \ {s′}, due to <-conflict-freeness of S ∪ {α}; while if it is normal
on β, then S ∪ {α}  < B, as required. Else, S ∪ {α}  < S1 via reverse
attack: there is B1 ` s1 with s1 ∈ S ∪ {α}, B1 ⊆ S1, and ∃s′1 ∈ B1 with
s′1 < s1. Due to <-conflict-freeness of S ∪ {α}, we find β ∈ B1. Then
again, by WCP, for some 6-minimal s′1 ∈ B1 with s′1 < s1 we find S2 ` s′1,
S2 ⊆ (B1 \ {s′1}) ∪ {s1}, and β ∈ S2. Like in the proof of <-conflict-
freeness of S ∪ {α} above, since deductions are finite, < is (transitive and)
asymmetric and (L,R,A,¯¯,6) satisfies WCP, this process must eventually
terminate with a normal attack S ∪ {α}  < B. As B was arbitrary with
B  < S ∪ {α}, we conclude that S ∪ {α} <-defends itself.
Finally, we need to show that S ∪ {α} <-defends {α′}. Given that S
<-defends {α′} to begin with, and that  < is monotonic (Lemma 3.3), we
conclude that S ∪ {α} <-defends {α′} too.
Recall that, without WCP, the Fundamental Lemma need not hold: in
Example 3.6, (L,R,A,¯¯,6) is flat but violates WCP, and {β, γ} is <-
admissible and <-defends {α} (because {α} is <-unattacked), but {α, β, γ}
is not <-conflict-free and thus not <-admissible.
Recall also that in e.g. ASPIC+, the Fundamental Lemma holds under
the conditions that an ASPIC+ framework is well defined and has a reason-
able argument ordering (see Definitions 2.22, 2.23 and comments thereof).
Well definedness entails contraposition (as well as well formedness, which
is similar to flatness in ABA+). Note again that WCP is a weaker restric-
tion than contraposition (Lemma 4.1). Therefore, a weaker restriction on
ABA+ frameworks than on ASPIC+ frameworks suffices to guarantee the
Fundamental Lemma (and subsequent properties of relationships among se-
mantics, discussed below). Also, in ABA+ we need only the transitivity of
the preferences, whereas in ASPIC+ a more involved condition of a reason-
able argument ordering is utilised.
Lemma 4.6 implies that, subject to WCP, the following additional proper-
ties of ABA+ semantics hold for flat ABA+ frameworks, mirroring the prop-
erties held by flat ABA (as well as AA) frameworks (cf. [Dun95b, BDKT97,
DMT07]).
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Theorem 4.7. Let F = (L,R,A,¯¯,6) be a flat ABA+ framework satisfying
WCP.
(i) F has a <-preferred extension.
(ii) Every <-preferred extension of F is <-complete.
(iii) F has a <-complete extension.
(iv) F has a unique <-grounded extension, which is moreover <-complete.
(v) F has a unique <-ideal extension, which is moreover <-complete.
Theorem 4.7. Proof of each claim follows the pattern of the corresponding
proofs in e.g. [Dun95b, BDKT97, DMT07, BCGG11].
(i) In flat ABA+ frameworks all sets of assumptions are closed, and, in
particular, ∅ is closed. Hence, ∅ is <-admissible, and so according to
Theorem 3.6(vii), F has a <-preferred extension.3
(ii) Let E be a <-preferred extension of F and suppose for a contradiction
that it is not <-complete. Let E <-defend some {α} ⊆ A \ E. As E
is <-admissible, E ∪ {α} is <-admissible, by Lemma 4.6. But then
E is not ⊆-maximally <-admissible, contrary to E being <-preferred.
Hence, by contradiction, E must be <-complete.
(iii) Follows from (i) and (ii) above.
(iv) Extend the defence operator Def : ℘(A)→ ℘(A) (Definition 2.11) to
ABA+ as follows: for A ⊆ A, Def (A) = {α ∈ A : A <-defends {α}}.
By Lemma 3.3, Def is monotonic: if A ⊆ B ⊆ A, then Def (A) ⊆
Def (B). As (℘(A),⊆) is a complete lattice, fixed points of Def also
form a complete lattice, according to Knaster-Tarski Theorem [Tar55].
As Def is compact (because deductions are finite), it has a unique least
fixed point G, given by G =
⋃
i∈N Def
i(∅). As ∅ is <-admissible, G
is also <-admissible, by Lemma 4.6. Hence, G is <-complete (as
G = Def (G)), and unique ⊆-minimal such (as the least fixed point).
Therefore, G is the intersection of all <-complete extensions, and thus
a unique <-grounded extension of F (also <-complete), as required.
(v) From (i) above, we know that F admits <-preferred extensions, so
let S be their intersection. If S = ∅, then it is <-admissible, and
so an <-ideal extension (unique). If S 6= ∅ is <-admissible, then
it is an <-ideal extension (unique as well). Else, assume S 6= ∅ is
not <-admissible. Then its ⊆-maximally <-admissible subsets I ( S
3Note that WCP is not needed here, only flatness is required.
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are <-ideal extensions of F . Suppose I and I ′ are two distinct <-
admissible subsets of S. Then their union I ∪ I ′ is a subset of S too,
and so <-conflict-free. By Lemma 4.6, I ∪ I ′ <-defends itself, so must
be <-admissible. Consequently, there can be only one ⊆-maximally
<-admissible subset of S, i.e. a unique <-ideal extension I of F .
Now, suppose for a contradiction that I is not <-complete. Then some
{α} ⊆ A \ I is <-defended by I. Such α must be contained in the
intersection S of<-preferred extensions of F , because I ⊆ S <-defends
{α} and every <-preferred extension F is <-complete, by (ii) above.
But then, I ∪ {α} is <-admissible, according to Lemma 4.6, so that I
is not <-ideal—a contradiction. Therefore, I must be <-complete.
On the one hand, observe that if an ABA+ framework is non-flat, sat-
isfaction of WCP does not guarantee the properties above, since ABA+
conservatively extends ABA (Theorem 3.2) and these properties can be fal-
sified for non-flat ABA frameworks [BDKT97].
On the other hand, flat ABA+ frameworks that do not satisfy WCP may
not retain the same relationships among semantics as flat ABA frameworks.
This was illustrated with Example 3.6 to show that <-complete (and hence
<-grounded) extension need not exist, and that <-preferred extension(s)
need not be <-complete. In addition, the following example shows further
four differences: <-ideal extension(s) need not be unique or <-complete; the
<-grounded extension need not be <-complete or even <-admissible.
Example 4.3. Consider (L,R,A,¯¯,6) with
• R = {γ ← δ, δ ← γ, α← γ, α← δ, α← β, β′},
• A = {α, β, β′, γ, δ}
• β < α.
This ABA+ framework can be represented graphically via selected sets of
assumptions and <-attacks between them, as in Figure 4.1.
Here, {γ, β, β′} and {δ, β, β′} are <-preferred (as well as <-stable and
<-complete) extensions of (L,R,A,¯¯,6). Their intersection {β, β′} is the
<-grounded extension, but it is not <-admissible, and so not <-complete.
Hence, it cannot be <-ideal either. Its two singleton subsets, {β} and
{β′}, are <-unattacked, hence <-admissible, and so are <-ideal extensions
of (L,R,A,¯¯,6). Note, in addition, that neither of them is <-complete.
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{γ}
{δ}
{α}
{β}
{β′}
{β, β′}
Figure 4.1: Flat ABA+ framework from Example 4.3 that has no <-
complete extensions, admits <-grounded extension that is not
<-complete, and two (non-<-complete) <-ideal extensions
Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 summarise the results regarding relationships
among semantics in flat ABA (Table 4.1), flat ABA+ (Table 4.2) and flat
ABA+ subject to WCP (Table 4.3). (Results covering Table 4.1 can be
found in [BDKT97, DMT07]; results covering Tables 4.2 and 4.3 follow
from Table 4.1 and results in Section 4.2; in the latter two tables, refer-
ences in parentheses point to either examples or theorems that establish the
corresponding result.)
Extension exists is unique is admissible is complete is preferred
complete X X X X X
preferred X X X X X
stable X X X X X
ideal X X X X X
grounded X X X X X
Table 4.1: Relationship among flat ABA semantics
In the next section, we establish additional results regarding preference
handling principles in flat ABA+ subject to WCP.
4.2.2 Preference Handling
We now revisit the principles from Section 3.3 and analyse whether they
are fulfilled by flat ABA+ frameworks satisfying WCP. In particular, we
show that flat ABA+ frameworks satisfying WCP fulfil the Principle of
Maximal Elements for all <-σ semantics and the Principle of Tolerance for
all but <-stable semantics, and consider the remaining principles. Recall,
however, that principles of Conflict Preservation (Principle 3.3) and Empty
Preferences (Principle 3.4) are fulfilled by generic ABA+ frameworks, so we
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Exten-
sion
exists is
unique
is <-
admissible
is <-
complete
is <-
preferred
<-
complete
X
(Ex. 3.6)
X X X X
<-
preferred
X X X X
(Ex. 3.6)
X
<-stable X X X X X
<-ideal X X
(Ex. 4.3)
X X
(Ex. 4.3)
X
<-
grounded
X
(Ex. 3.6)
X X (Ex. 4.3) X
(Ex. 4.3)
X
Table 4.2: Relationship among flat ABA+ semantics. Cells with references
to Examples 3.6 (Ex. 3.6) and 4.3 (Ex. 4.3), respectively, indicate
the differences from Table 4.1 as well as the relevant examples
,
Extension exists is
unique
is <-
admissible
is
<-complete
is
<-preferred
<-
complete
X X X X X
<-
preferred
X X X X X
<-stable X X X X X
<-ideal X X X X X
<-
grounded
X X X X X
Table 4.3: Relationship among flat ABA+ semantics, subject to WCP. Un-
derlined marks indicate differences from Table 4.2, sanctioned by
Theorem 4.7
do not discuss them here.
Maximal Elements
The Principle of Maximal Elements (Principle 3.5) concerns inclusion in
extensions of the most preferred assumptions, as long as they are <-conflict-
free. Theorem 4.7 implies that flat ABA+ frameworks satisfying WCP fulfil
the Principle of Maximal Elements not only for <-complete, <-stable and
<-grounded semantics (Proposition 3.12), but also for <-preferred and <-
ideal semantics:
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Corollary 4.8. Let (L,R,A,¯¯,6) be a flat ABA+ framework satisfying
WCP. Then (L,R,A,¯¯,6) fulfils the Principle of Maximal Elements for
<-preferred and <-ideal semantics.
Proof. By Theorem 4.7(ii, v), <-preferred and <-ideal extensions are <-
complete for flat (L,R,A,¯¯,6) that satisfies WCP. The claim thus follows
from Proposition 3.12.
First BE Principle
The First BE Principle (Principle 3.6) insists that among two sets of as-
sumptions that are identical but for a pair of distinct assumptions, as long
as the one containing the more preferred assumption is <-conflict-free, the
other set should not be an extension. Since generic ABA+ frameworks
fulfil the First BE Principle for <-stable semantics (Proposition 3.13), we
only need to see if flat ABA+ frameworks satisfying WCP fulfil the princi-
ple for any other semantics. However, this is not the case. Indeed, recall
(L,R,A,¯¯,6) from Example 3.9, which does not fulfil the First BE Princi-
ple for any semantics except <-stable. Note that (L,R,A,¯¯,6) is flat and
satisfies WCP. Therefore, the First BE Principle does not hold in flat ABA+
subject to WCP under any semantics bar <-stable. We have argued that
this is a desirable feature of ABA+, due to the global/non-global nature of
different semantics (see Section 3.3.4).
Second BE Principle
The Second BE Principle (Principle 3.7) insists that an extension remains
acceptable after addition of a rule which is non-applicable with respect to
that extension, as long as preferences are unchanged. Since generic ABA+
frameworks fulfil the Second BE Principle for <-stable semantics (Proposi-
tion 3.14), we only need to see if flat ABA+ frameworks satisfying WCP fulfil
the principle for any other semantics. However, this is not the case. Indeed,
recall (L,R,A,¯¯,6) from Example 3.11, which does not fulfil the Second
BE Principle for any semantics except <-stable. Note that (L,R,A,¯¯,6)
is flat and (trivially) satisfies WCP. Therefore, the Second BE Principle
does not hold in flat ABA+ subject to WCP under any semantics bar <-
stable. We have argued that this is a desirable feature of ABA+, due to the
global/non-global nature of different semantics (see Section 3.3.5).
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Principle of Tolerance
The Principle of Tolerance (Principle 3.8) requires an ABA+ framework to
admit extensions whenever its underlying ABA framework does. Trivially,
by Theorem 4.7, (L,R,A,¯¯,6) admits <-grounded, <-ideal, <-preferred
and <-complete extensions, so we have the following result.
Corollary 4.9. Let (L,R,A,¯¯,6) be a flat ABA+ framework satisfying
WCP. Then (L,R,A,¯¯,6) fulfils the Principle of Tolerance for <-grounded,
<-ideal, <-preferred and <-complete semantics.
Note that the fact that flat ABA+ frameworks satisfying WCP fulfil this
principle for all but <-stable semantics does not mean that the existence of
extensions is predetermined by the underlying ABA frameworks. Rather,
it is just a consequence of being flat and satisfying WCP that an ABA+
framework admits extensions under these semantics, just like it is a conse-
quence of being flat that an ABA framework admits extensions under all
but stable semantics.
Under <-stable semantics, however, even flat ABA+ frameworks satisfy-
ing WCP do not fulfil this principle, as the following example shows.
Example 4.4. Recall (L,R,A,¯¯,6) from Example 3.12, and enforce WCP
on it by adding the rule α← γ to obtain F ′ = (L,R′,A,¯¯,6) with
• R′ = {β ← α, γ ← α, γ ← β, α← γ},
• A = {α, β, γ},
• α < γ.
Just as (L,R,A,¯¯,6), F ′ comprises the 3-cycle {α} < {β} < {γ} <
{α}, and so does not admit <-stable extensions, whereas its underlying
ABA framework (L,R′,A,¯¯) admits a unique stable extension {α}. (Both
frameworks can be illustrated as in Figure 4.2.)
(L,R′,A,¯¯)
{γ}
{β}
{α}
(L,R′,A,¯¯,6)
{γ}
{β}
{α}
Figure 4.2: Flat ABA+ frameworks from Example 4.4 violating the Principle
of Tolerance under <-stable semantics
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Since in ABA+ preferences arbitrate among conflicting sets of assump-
tions through <-attacks, which in turn determine the extensions, existence
of extensions after preferences should not be predetermined by extensions
before preferences. Particularly with respect to (<-)stable semantics, pref-
erences may resolve conflicts in a way that make previously acceptable as-
sumptions untenable in the presence of preferences, leaving no acceptable
extensions whatsoever. As discussed in Section 3.3.6, this is an expected
feature of ABA+.
Principle of Reduction
The Principle of Reduction (Principle 3.9) requires that addition of new
preferences does not generate new extensions and instead possibly reduces
the space of acceptable extensions. Example 3.14 shows that flat ABA+
frameworks satisfying WCP do not in general fulfil the Principle of Reduc-
tion: (L,R,A,¯¯, ∅) is flat, satisfies WCP and has a unique <-σ extension
{α}, whereas (L,R,A,¯¯,6) with α < β has a unique<-σ extension {β}. We
have argued that this is a desirable behaviour, because preference informa-
tion should be used to directly and locally resolve conflicts stemming from
the defeasible information, and hence to possibly generate new extensions
that were not available in the absence of preference information. Unlike
using preferences to select among extensions, our approach is compatible
with the dialectical nature of argumentation.
Note that in Example 3.14, the framework (L,R,A,¯¯,6) with new pref-
erences does not satisfy WCP—the Principle of Reduction imposes no con-
ditions on the newly obtained ABA+ framework. We could thus investigate
this principle in the setting where the framework with new preferences does
satisfy WCP. To this end, we have the following result concerning <-stable
semantics.
Proposition 4.10. Let (L,R,A,¯¯,6) be a flat ABA+ framework satisfying
WCP. For any preorder 6′⊇6, if (L,R,A,¯¯,6′) satisfies WCP, then E ⊆
A is a <-stable extension of (L,R,A,¯¯,6′) only if E is a <-stable extension
of (L,R,A,¯¯,6).
Proof. Let E ⊆ A be a <-stable extension of F ′ = (L,R,A,¯¯,6′), where
6′⊇6 is transitive and F ′ satisfies WCP. We need to show that E is a
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<-stable extension of F = (L,R,A,¯¯,6) too. Let  < and  ′< be the <-
attack relations of F and F ′, respectively. Suppose for a contradiction that
E is not <-stable in F . First note that by Theorem 3.5, as E is <-conflict-
free in F ′, it is conflict-free in (L,R,A,¯¯), and hence <-conflict-free in F .
Hence, there is β ∈ A \ E such that E  ′< {β} but E 6 < {β}. Since
6⊆6′ and as F and F ′ have the same rules, it must be that E  ′< {β}
via reverse attack. That is, {β} ` α for some α ∈ E with β <′ α. As F ′
satisfies WCP, we must have S ` β with S ⊆ {α} (in both F and F ′). But
then E  < {β} after all, which is a contradiction. Therefore, E must be a
stable extension of F to begin with.
Under other semantics, one can exhibit examples which show that the
post-condition in the Principle of Reduction on the ABA+ framework with
new preferences to satisfy WCP does not yield satisfaction of the prin-
ciple: for <-grounded and <-ideal semantics, F+C from Example 3.5 has
a unique <-grounded and <-ideal extension {β, γ}, whereas the underlying
ABA framework FC (considered as having the empty preference relation) of
F+C has a unique <-grounded and <-ideal extension {γ}; for <-preferred se-
mantics, F ′ from Example 4.4 has a unique <-preferred extension ∅, whereas
(L,R′,A,¯¯, ∅) has a unique <-preferred extension {α}; for <-complete se-
mantics, an example of a flat ABA+ framework satisfying WCP that has a
unique non-empty <-complete extension, but whose underlying ABA frame-
work (considered as having the empty preference relation) has a unique <-
complete extension ∅, will be given later, in Example 6.2. As discussed in
Section 3.3.7, we maintain this exemplifies a generally desirable behaviour
of ABA+.
In summary, we revisited and discussed the principles from Section 3.3
in the context of flat ABA+ with WCP. We showed that flat ABA+ frame-
works satisfying WCP fulfil the Principle of Maximal Elements for all <-σ
semantics and the Principle of Tolerance for all but <-stable semantics, and
otherwise retain the same satisfaction results as generic ABA+ frameworks.
In the next section, we consider another set of properties, namely those
pertaining to non-monotonic inference in ABA+.
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4.2.3 Non-Monotonic Inference
Systemic investigations into aspects of Cautious Monotonicity and Cumula-
tive Transitivity of non-monotonic inference [Mak88, KLM90] contribute to
the well studied area of analysing NMR with respect to information change
(see e.g. [Rot01]). In this section, we investigate these properties in ABA+.
We will see that many of the properties we consider are not satisfied by
flat ABA+ frameworks with empty preferences. In other words, flat ABA
frameworks, seen as flat ABA+ frameworks with no preferences that triv-
ially satisfy WCP, yield many results that can be readily extended to flat
ABA+ with WCP more generally. Hence, for simplicity, we start our anal-
ysis with flat ABA, and after that investigate a selection of non-monotonic
inference properties in flat ABA+ with WCP.
Originally, the non-monotonic inference properties in question were de-
fined with respect to non-monotonic entailment. Since reasoning outcomes
in ABA are represented via extensions, we first reformulate the properties
to be applicable to extension-based NMR formalisms (but see e.g. [BNT08a,
Dix95] for different approaches). The essential idea is to characterise what
happens to extensions when a certain change in knowledge occurs. The
following will serve as an abstract pattern for producing the concrete in-
stances of the properties (from now on, CUT and MON stand for Cumulative
Transitivity and Cautious Monotonicity, respectively):
Let K be a knowledge base. Suppose that an ‘entity’ ψ ‘belongs’ to an
‘extension’ E of K, and let E′ be an ‘extension’ of the knowledge base K′,
which is obtained by ‘adding’ ψ to K. Then
CUT : E ‘contains’ E′; MON : E′ ‘contains’ E.
These properties concern what happens when a conclusion that is reached,
which could have been already present as a fact, or inferred defeasibly, is
added to the knowledge base and reasoned with anew.
The abstract formulation above, aiming to be universal, is informal: no-
tions like ‘entity’ act as placeholders for alternative formal concepts (e.g. con-
clusion of an extension); ‘containment’ need not be understood in set-
theoretic terms. For ABA, as well as ABA+, we will provide rigorously
defined instances of the abstract formulation.
To ease the intuition, consider the following illustration.
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Example 4.5. Three prospective academic partners—Al, Ben and Dan—
invite you to dine at a new restaurant. On the eve of the dinner it turns out
that no one has booked a table in advance and, unfortunately, you will have
to sit in pairs at two separate tables. You are the one invited, so you will
have to choose whom to sit with. In a playful manner, your associates start
competing for your company: both Ben and Dan claim that Al is antisocial,
while Al retorts that Ben is back-stabbing. Somewhat puzzled, you casually
inquire about the restaurant. Ben replies that it is a gourmet place. You
then recall that Dan is a disagreeable person in a gourmet place. It is high
time to decide, so what will be the verdict?
The reasoning may unfold as follows. Ben defends himself against Al by
insisting that the latter is antisocial. Meanwhile, Al has nothing against his
attacker Dan. The latter, being disagreeable, is not a good option, assuming
that Ben is right about gourmet food. No more hesitating, and you decide
to go for Ben.
Now, how would the information that you are really in a gourmet place
change your reasoning, if at all? One can argue that, knowing as a matter
of fact it is a gourmet restaurant immediately discards Dan as an option.
So if Dan is out of consideration, then Al is attacked only by Ben, and
in turn attacks him back. Thus, both Ben and Al defend themselves, and
hence are acceptable choices. In terms of non-monotonic inference, CUT
insists you should not draw any new conclusions, while MON demands not
to lose previous inferences. Sticking to your first choice would satisfy both
requirements, whereas choosing Al over Ben would violate both properties,
indicating a revision of your previous decision.
In this section, we first formulate and analyse non-monotonic inference
properties regarding ABA. There will be three different settings of instan-
tiations of CUT and MON. Each property will also have a sceptical (strong)
and a credulous (weak) version. The sceptical properties will quantify over
all extensions, indicating the necessity to preserve the previously accepted
conclusions after a change in information. Meanwhile, the credulous proper-
ties, by quantifying existentially over extensions, will insist on the possibil-
ity, rather than necessity, to preserve the previously accepted conclusions.
When referring to a property, we will have in mind its sceptical version,
unless specified otherwise.
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To instantiate the abstract formulations of CUT and MON given above,
we replace a knowledge base K with F = (L,R,A,¯¯), fix a semantics σ
and let E be a σ extension of F . An ‘entity’ ψ will come from the set
Cn(E) of conclusions of E. By default, the knowledge base K′ will be
represented by F ′, which will be the ABA framework obtained by ‘adding’
(to be formalised) ψ to F . Still further, E′ will denote a σ extension of
F ′ (under the same fixed semantics σ). Also, Cn and Cn ′ will denote the
conclusion operators of, respectively, F and F ′. To avoid trivialities, we
consider cases only where each of F and F ′ has at least one σ extension—E
and E′ respectively.
STRICT Setting: Strengthening of Information
Given ψ ∈ Cn(E) \ A, define F ′ = (L,R ∪ {ψ ← >},A,¯¯). There are four
properties:
SCEPTICAL STRICT CUT :
For all σ extensions E′ of F ′ we have Cn ′(E′) ⊆ Cn(E);
CREDULOUS STRICT CUT :
There is a σ extension E′ of F ′ with Cn ′(E′) ⊆ Cn(E);
SCEPTICAL STRICT MON :
For all σ extensions E′ of F ′ we have Cn(E) ⊆ Cn ′(E′);
CREDULOUS STRICT MON :
There is a σ extension E′ of F ′ with Cn(E) ⊆ Cn ′(E′).
Notational remark: For a particular semantics σ, if it is the case that
given F , for any σ extension E of F and for any conclusion ψ ∈ Cn(E), the
statement expressed in a particular property P holds true, then we say that
‘F fulfils P for σ semantics’. In addition, somewhat abusing the notation,
we extend this notation to the case where E and E′ are admissible in F
and F ′, respectively, and say that ‘F fulfils P for admissible semantics’ (to
be used e.g. Lemma 4.11).
STRICT CUT and STRICT MON concern what happens when a conclusion
(not itself an assumption) is reached and then considered as a fact (i.e. a
rule with empty body) to reason again. The conclusion may be learned as
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an objective truth, e.g. verifying that you are in a gourmet restaurant. In
essence, STRICT properties regard strengthening of information and what
effect it has on different ABA semantics in terms of extensions. A rea-
soner employing ABA semantics can utilise these properties to anticipate
its behaviour regarding changes that strengthen knowledge.
The following remarks are in place. First, satisfaction of a sceptical prop-
erty will always imply satisfaction of the corresponding credulous property.
Second, under sceptical semantics, sceptical and credulous formulations ac-
tually coincide, because the extension is unique, so we may omit to specify
either SCEPTICAL or CREDULOUS. Further, as grounded, ideal, stable and
preferred extensions are complete, a sceptical property satisfied under com-
plete semantics holds for the other four. Similarly, if a sceptical property
is violated under stable semantics, then it fails under both preferred and
complete semantics, because stable extensions are also preferred.
Note that the difference between F and F ′ is the following: in F , we have
deductions S `R ϕ with S ⊆ A, R ⊆ R, ϕ ∈ L, and which include sub-
deductions for ψ supported by some S′ ⊆ S; in F ′, additionally to the above
deductions as in F , we also have deductions S′ `R′∪{ψ←>} ϕ with S′ ⊆ S
containing possibly all assumptions from S and R′ ⊆ R not containing some
rules required to support at least one sub-deduction for ψ as in F . We use
this observation in the proofs that follow.
We first establish an auxiliary result. (Throughout the proofs in this
section, we use the following notation. Let E be an admissible extension of
F = (L,R,A,¯¯), fix ψ ∈ Cn(E) \ A, and let F ′ = (L,R ∪ {ψ ← >},A,¯¯).
For ease of reference, we will denote respectively by  and  ′ the attack
relations in F and F ′.)
Lemma 4.11. Let F be a flat ABA framework. F fulfils CREDULOUS STRICT
CUT and CREDULOUS STRICT MON for admissible semantics.
Proof. We show that E is an admissible extension of F ′ too. Clearly, E is
conflict-free in F ′. So we need to show that E defends itself in F ′. Suppose
that B  ′ E for some B ⊆ A. There are two possibilities which we consider
case by case.
• The attack B  ′ E uses the rule ψ ← >. That is, ∃B′ `R′∪{ψ←>} α
with B′ ⊆ B, R′ ⊆ R, and α ∈ E. Consider any Eψ ⊆ E with
Eψ `Rψ ψ, for some Rψ ⊆ R. Then B′ ∪ Eψ `R′∪Rψ α. This means
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B′ ∪ Eψ  E. As E is admissible in F , we have E  B′ ∪ Eψ. As
Eψ ⊆ E, it must be that E  B′. Then E  ′ B′ too, and so E  ′ B.
• The attack B  ′ E does not use the rule ψ ← >. Thus, B′ `R′ α
for some B′ ⊆ B, R′ ⊆ R, α ∈ E. This means B′  E, whence,
as E is admissible in F , we find E  B′, so that E  ′ B′ as well.
Consequently, E  ′ B.
In any case, E is admissible in F ′.
Proposition 4.12. Let F be a flat ABA framework. F fulfils SCEPTICAL
STRICT CUT and SCEPTICAL STRICT MON for grounded semantics.
Proof. We show that the grounded extensionG of F is equal to the grounded
extension G′ of F ′. Let Def and Def ′ denote the defence operators (Def-
inition 2.11) of F and F ′ respectively. We first prove by induction on
construction of G that G ⊆ G′.
• For the base case, G0 = Def (∅) is the set of assumptions unattacked
in F , and it is clearly also unattacked in F ′. Hence, G0 ⊆ G′.
• As an induction hypothesis assume that Gi = Def i(∅) ⊆ G′ and con-
sider Gi+1 = Def (Gi). As it is admissible in F , it is also admissible
in F ′, by Lemma 4.11. As G′ is the least fixed point of Def ′, we have
that Gi+1 ⊆ G′.
As (i) G =
⋃
i>0Gi, (ii) G0 ⊆ G′, and (iii) Gi ⊆ G′ implies Gi+1 ⊆ G′,
by induction we have that G ⊆ G′. Consequently, Cn ′(G′) ⊆ Cn(G), which
gives STRICT MON.
To prove STRICT CUT, we show G′ ⊆ G by induction on construction of
G′, utilising the fact that G ⊆ G′.
• Let G′0 ⊆ G′ \G be unattacked in F ′. Clearly, G′0 cannot be attacked
in F either, whence G′0 ⊆ G (i.e. G′0 = ∅).
• For the inductive step, let G′i+1 ⊆ G′ \G be attacked but defended in
F ′ by G, assuming G′i ⊆ G. As G defends G′i+1 in F ′ and ψ ∈ Cn(G),
we have that G defends G′i+1 in F too. Thus, as G is the least fixed
point of Def , we have G′i+1 ⊆ G (i.e. G′i+1 = ∅).
By induction, G′ =
⋃
i>0G
′
i ⊆ G, and thus Cn(G) ⊆ Cn ′(G′), giving
STRICT CUT.
Proposition 4.13. Let F be a flat ABA framework. F fulfils CREDULOUS
STRICT CUT and CREDULOUS STRICT MON for complete semantics.
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Proof. Let E be a complete extension of F . We claim that E is a complete
extension of F ′ too. That E is admissible in F ′ follows from Lemma 4.11.
It thus suffices to show that E contains every set of assumptions it defends
in F ′. To this end, suppose E defends A ⊆ A in F ′, and suppose for a
contradiction that A * E. Then, as E is complete in F , it does not defend
A in F . That is, there is B  A such that E 6 B. But note that B  ′ A
too, and as E defends A in F ′, we find E  ′ B. But as ψ ∈ Cn(E), this
attack is independent of the rule ψ ← >, so we obtain E  B too, which
is a contradiction to E 6 B. Hence, by contradiction, A ⊆ E. Therefore,
as E is admissible in F ′ and contains every set of assumptions it defends in
F ′, we conclude that E is a complete extension of F ′.
Proposition 4.14. Let F be a flat ABA framework. F fulfils CREDULOUS
STRICT CUT and CREDULOUS STRICT MON for preferred semantics.
Proof. We claim that a preferred extension E of F is a preferred extension
of F ′. Since admissibility follows as before from Lemma 4.11, suppose for a
contradiction that E is not ⊆-maximally admissible in F ′. Then, for some
α ∈ A\E, Eα = E∪{α} is admissible in F ′. We show that Eα is admissible
in F too. It is plain that Eα is conflict-free in F . So let B  Eα. If B  E,
then, as E is admissible in F , we find E  B, and so Eα  B. Else, assume
B  {α}. Whether or not this attack uses ψ, we find B  ′ {α} too. But
then, as Eα is admissible in F ′, we have Eα  ′ B. As ψ ∈ Cn(E), this
attack is independent of the rule ψ ← >, so that Eα  B too. Consequently,
Eα is admissible in F , and this contradicts E being preferred in F . Hence,
by contradiction, E must be preferred in F ′.
Corollary 4.15. Let F be a flat ABA framework. F fulfils SCEPTICAL
STRICT CUT for ideal semantics.
Proof. The ideal extension I of F is contained in every preferred extension
E of F , so that ψ ∈ Cn(E) for every such E. Thus, as every such E is
also a preferred extension of F ′, by Proposition 4.14, the ideal extension I ′
of F ′, being contained in every preferred extension E′ of F ′, must also be
contained in every E, so that I ′ ⊆ I. Consequently, Cn ′(I ′) ⊆ Cn(I), as
required for STRICT CUT.
Proposition 4.16. Let F be a flat ABA framework. F fulfils CREDULOUS
STRICT CUT and CREDULOUS STRICT MON for stable semantics.
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Proof. We claim that a stable extension E of F is a stable extension of
F ′. Conflict-freeness follows from Lemma 4.11. So let β ∈ A \ E. Then
E  {β} and so E  ′ {β} too. So E is stable in F ′, if E is stable in F .
The following formalisation of Example 4.5 in ABA shows that the re-
maining instances of CUT and MON in the STRICT setting are not satisfied.
Example 4.6 (STRICT CUT and STRICT MON violations). Consider L =
{α, β, δ, α, β, δ, ψ}, where: α, β, δ are the assumptions of choosing to believe
Al, Ben and Dan (respectively); α, β and δ stand for ‘antisocial’, ‘back-
stabbing’ and ‘disagreeable’ (respectively); and ψ expresses that we are in
a gourmet place. So A = {α, β, δ}. Then R = {β ← α, α ← δ, α ← β,
ψ ← β, δ ← ψ} completes the formalisation: e.g. the rule β ← α represents
Al’s claim about Ben; the rule δ ← ψ indicates that Dan is a disagreeable
company in a gourmet place. F = (L,R,A,¯¯) can be represented in a
simplified graphical notation as in Figure 4.3.
{δ}
{β}
{α}
Figure 4.3: ABA framework F from Example 4.6 leading to violations of
STRICT CUT and STRICT MON
F has a unique preferred (also stable and ideal) extension E = {β}
with Cn(E) = {α, β, δ, ψ}. Now suppose that after deciding to sit with
Ben, you check the menu and realise you are indeed in a gourmet restau-
rant. As knowledge changes—your belief that this is a gourmet place being
strengthened—you wonder whether you would make the same decision now.
Consider thus F ′ = (L,R∪{ψ ← >},A,¯¯), which can be depicted graph-
ically as in Figure 4.4.
F ′ has two preferred extensions (which are also stable): E1 = {β} with
Cn ′(E1) = Cn(E) and E2 = {α} with Cn ′(E2) = {α, β, δ, ψ}. Taking E2
with Cn ′(E2) * Cn(E) * Cn ′(E2) yields violations of SCEPTICAL STRICT
CUT and SCEPTICAL STRICT MON. Furthermore, STRICT MON is violated un-
der ideal semantics too, because we have Cn(E) * Cn ′(∅) = Cn ′(E1 ∩E2).
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{δ}
{β}
{α}
Figure 4.4: ABA framework F ′ from Example 4.6 violating STRICT CUT and
STRICT MON
We see that a reasoner using ABA could find itself in a situation where
adding credulously inferred information leads to a multitude of extensions.
Even if the extension to begin with is unique, as in Example 4.6, strengthen-
ing some of its conclusions can result in more than one acceptable extension.
Whether or not this behaviour is desirable depends on the application, an-
ticipated changes in information and intended flexibility of the reasoner.
For instance, one may wish for the reasoner to be credulous and try many
different scenarios in order not to fixate on one particular decision. In con-
trast, ideal (but not grounded) semantics provides insurance that no new
conclusions are attained—it fulfils STRICT CUT, while ensuring that some
conclusions are dropped (e.g. β, δ). However, a sceptical reasoner may com-
pletely lose some previously acceptable choices (such as β in Example 4.6).
Example 4.6 also reveals the contrast between STRICT CUT and STRICT
MON under ideal semantics: adding a previously attained conclusion as a
fact leaves all the original preferred extensions intact, yet allows for new
ones, thus possibly shrinking their intersection. Hence, the ideal extension
E′ of the ABA framework F ′ after the change in information will satisfy
STRICT CUT; indeed, we have Cn ′(E1 ∩ E2) = Cn ′(∅) ⊆ Cn(E) in Example
4.6. For the same reason, STRICT MON is violated under ideal semantics, as
illustrated in Example 4.6.
We observe that under stable, preferred and complete semantics, the
SCEPTICAL properties gain importance in settings where there is a unique ex-
tension to begin with, such as in Example 4.6. Indeed, while the CREDULOUS
properties merely ask for the existence of an extension E′ (of the framework
F ′ after the knowledge change) with the same conclusions as the chosen
extension E of the framework F to begin with, the SCEPTICAL proper-
ties require all new extensions to commit to the conclusions of E. The two
properties together insist that the new framework F ′ should admit a unique
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extension E′ having the same conclusions as the original extension E.
Table 4.4 summarises results pertaining to ABA.
Property/Extension Grounded Ideal Sta-
ble
Pre-
ferred
Com-
plete
SCEPTICAL STRICT
CUT
X X X X X
CREDULOUS STRICT
CUT
X X X X X
SCEPTICAL STRICT
MON
X X X X X
CREDULOUS STRICT
MON
X X X X X
Table 4.4: STRICT CUT and STRICT MON in ABA
Only grounded semantics allows for safely strengthening information.
However, as the grounded extension of a given ABA framework can be empty
(e.g. Example 4.6), other semantics may be needed to make decisions. In
that case, ideal semantics, for instance, guarantees that no new conclusions
will be attained after strengthening information, yet some important ones
may be lost: in Example 4.6, neither semantics allows to decide whom to
dine with, because α, β, δ 6∈ Cn ′(E1 ∩ E2). Stable, preferred and complete
semantics provide even less certainty (or more flexibility—depending on the
way one intends to use it) unless one has a procedure allowing to pick the
extension with the same conclusions as the extension to begin with (such
an extension is guaranteed to exist due to satisfaction of the CREDULOUS
properties).
ASM Setting: Confirmation of Information
Assumption setting (ASM setting henceforth) concerns conclusions which are
themselves assumptions being confirmed. Given ψ ∈ Cn(E) ∩ A, define
F ′ = (L,R ∪ {ψ ← >},A \ {ψ},¯¯).4 (Note that the assumption ψ being
confirmed and added as a fact no longer needs to be an assumption; hence
its removal from A. On the one hand, this seems reasonable from the
knowledge representation point of view. On the other hand, this ensures
4For brevity reasons, the same symbol ¯¯ is used for the contrary mappings of both F
and F ′, and in the new framework F ′, the contrary mapping ¯¯ is implicitly restricted
to A \ {ψ}.
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that F ′ is flat, whence the relationships among ABA semantics ease the
analysis of the properties in question.) The properties are as follows:
SCEPTICAL ASM CUT :
For all σ extensions E′ of F ′ we have Cn ′(E′) ⊆ Cn(E);
CREDULOUS ASM CUT :
There is a σ extension E′ of F ′ with Cn ′(E′) ⊆ Cn(E);
SCEPTICAL ASM MON :
For all σ extensions E′ of F ′ we have Cn(E) ⊆ Cn ′(E′);
CREDULOUS ASM MON :
There is a σ extension E′ of F ′ with Cn(E) ⊆ Cn ′(E′).
The difference between F and F ′ is that deductions S `R ϕ in F with
S ⊆ A, R ⊆ R and ψ ∈ S are replaced by deductions S \ {ψ} `R′∪{ψ←>} ϕ
in F ′ with R′ ⊆ R ⊆ R consisting of rules whose bodies do not contain ψ.
We first establish an auxiliary result. (Throughout the proofs in this
section, we use the following notation. Let E be an admissible extension of
F = (L,R,A,¯¯), fix ψ ∈ Cn(E) \ A, and let F ′ = (L,R ∪ {ψ ← >},A \
{ψ},¯¯). For ease of reference, we will denote respectively by  and  ′ the
attack relations in F and F ′.)
Lemma 4.17. Let F be a flat ABA framework. F fulfils CREDULOUS ASM
CUT and CREDULOUS ASM MON for admissible semantics.
Proof. We show that E \ {ψ} is an admissible extension of F ′. Clearly,
E \{ψ} is conflict-free in F ′. So we need to show that E \{ψ} defends itself
in F ′. Suppose that B  ′ E \ {ψ} for some B ⊆ A \ {ψ}. There are two
possibilities which we consider case by case.
• The attack B  ′ E\{ψ} uses the rule ψ ← >. That is, ∃B′ `R′∪{ψ←>}
α with B′ ⊆ B, R′ ⊆ R, and α ∈ E \ {ψ}. Then B′ ∪ {ψ} `R′∪{ψ} α.
This means B′ ∪ {ψ}  E \ {ψ}, and so B′ ∪ {ψ}  E. As E is
admissible in F , we have E  B′ ∪ {ψ}. As ψ ∈ E, it must be that
E  B′. Then, as ψ ∈ Cn ′(∅) ⊆ Cn ′(E), we have E \ {ψ} ′ B′ too,
and so E \ {ψ} ′ B.
• The attack B  ′ E\{ψ} does not use the rule ψ ← >. Thus, B′ `R′ α
for some B′ ⊆ B, R′ ⊆ R, α ∈ E\{ψ}. This means B′  E\{ψ}, and
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so B′  E\{ψ}, whence, as E is admissible in F , we find E  B′. As
ψ ∈ Cn ′(∅) ⊆ Cn ′(E), we have E \ {ψ} ′ B′ as well. Consequently,
E \ {ψ} ′ B.
In any case, E \{ψ} is admissible in F ′, and it is plain to see that Cn(E) =
Cn ′(E \ {ψ}).
Proposition 4.18. Let F be a flat ABA framework. F fulfils SCEPTICAL
ASM CUT and SCEPTICAL ASM MON for grounded semantics.
Proof. We show that the grounded extension G′ of F ′ is G\{ψ}, where G is
the grounded extension of F ′. Let Def and Def ′ denote the defence opera-
tors of F and F ′ respectively. We first prove by induction on construction
of G that G \ {ψ} ⊆ G′.
• For the base case, G0 = Def (∅) is the set of assumptions unattacked
in F , and it is clearly unattacked in F ′ either. Hence, G0 \ {ψ} ⊆ G′.
• As an induction hypothesis assume that Gi\{ψ} = Def i(∅)\{ψ} ⊆ G′
and consider Gi+1 = Def (Gi). As it is admissible in F , Gi+1 \ {ψ}
is admissible in F ′, by Lemma 4.17. As G′ is the least fixed point of
Def ′, we have that Gi+1 \ {ψ} ⊆ G′.
As (i) G =
⋃
i>0Gi, (ii) G0 \ {ψ} ⊆ G′, and (iii) Gi \ {ψ} ⊆ G′ implies
Gi+1\{ψ} ⊆ G′, by induction we have that G\{ψ} ⊆ G′. Plainly, Cn ′(G′) ⊆
Cn(G), which gives ASM MON.
To prove ASM CUT, we show G′ ⊆ G by induction on construction of G′.
• Let G′0 ⊆ G′ \ G be unattacked in F ′. As ψ ∈ G, G′0 cannot be
attacked in F either, whence G′0 ⊆ G (i.e. G′0 = ∅).
• For the inductive step, let G′i+1 ⊆ G′ \ G be attacked but defended
in F ′ by G, assuming G′i ⊆ G. As G defends G′i+1 in F ′ and ψ ∈ G,
we have that G defends G′i+1 in F too. Thus, as G is the least fixed
point of Def , we have G′i+1 ⊆ G (i.e. G′i+1 = ∅).
By induction, G′ =
⋃
i>0G
′
i ⊆ G, and clearly Cn(G) ⊆ Cn ′(G′), giving
ASM CUT.
Proposition 4.19. Let F be a flat ABA framework. F fulfils CREDULOUS
ASM CUT and CREDULOUS ASM MON for complete semantics.
Proof. Let E be a complete extension of F . We claim that E \ {ψ} is a
complete extension of F ′. That E \ {ψ} is admissible in F ′ follows from
Lemma 4.17. It thus suffices to show that E \ {ψ} contains every set of
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assumptions it defends in F ′. To this end, suppose E \ {ψ} defends A ⊆
A \ {ψ} in F ′, and suppose for a contradiction that A * E \ {ψ}. Then,
as E is complete in F , it does not defend A in F . That is, there is B  A
such that E 6 B. But note that as ψ ∈ Cn ′(∅), we have B  ′ A too, and
as E \{ψ} defends A in F ′, we find E \{ψ} ′ B. But as ψ ∈ E, we obtain
E  B too, which is a contradiction to E 6 B. Hence, by contradiction,
A ⊆ E \ {ψ}. Therefore, as E \ {ψ} is admissible in F ′ and contains every
set of assumptions it defends in F ′, we conclude that E \ {ψ} is a complete
extension of F ′. Clearly, Cn(E) = Cn ′(E \ {ψ}).
Proposition 4.20. Let F be a flat ABA framework. F fulfils CREDULOUS
ASM CUT and CREDULOUS ASM MON for preferred semantics.
Proof. Let E be a preferred extension of F . We claim that E \ {ψ} is a
preferred extension of F ′. Since admissibility follows as before from Lemma
4.17, suppose for a contradiction that E\{ψ} is not ⊆-maximally admissible
in F ′. Then, for some α ∈ (A\{ψ}) \ (E \ {ψ}) = A\E, (E \ {ψ})∪{α} is
admissible in F ′. We show that Eα = E ∪ {α} = (E \ {ψ}) ∪ {α} ∪ {ψ} is
admissible in F . It is plain that Eα is conflict-free in F , because Eα \{ψ} =
(E \ {ψ})∪{α} is conflict-free in F ′. So let B  Eα. If B  E, then, as E
is admissible in F , we find E  B, and so Eα  B. Else, assume B  {α}.
Whether or not this attack uses ψ, we find B  ′ {α} too. But then, as
Eα \ {ψ} is admissible in F ′, we have Eα \ {ψ} ′ B. As ψ ∈ E ⊆ Eα, we
find Eα  B too. Consequently, Eα = E ∪ {α} is admissible in F , and this
contradicts E being preferred in F . Hence, by contradiction, E \ {ψ} must
be preferred in F ′. Clearly, Cn(E) = Cn ′(E \ {ψ}).
Corollary 4.21. Let F be a flat ABA framework. F fulfils SCEPTICAL ASM
CUT for ideal semantics.
Proof. The ideal extension I of F is contained in every preferred extension
E of F , so that ψ ∈ E for every such E. Thus, as for every such E, E\{ψ} is
a preferred extension of F ′, by Proposition 4.20, the ideal extension I ′ of F ′,
being contained in every preferred extension E′ of F ′, must also be contained
in E \ {ψ} for every preferred extension E of F , so that I ′ ⊆ I \ {ψ} ⊆ I.
Finally, as ψ ∈ I, we have Cn ′(I ′) ⊆ Cn(I), as required.
Proposition 4.22. Let F be a flat ABA framework. F fulfils CREDULOUS
ASM CUT and CREDULOUS ASM MON for stable semantics.
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Proof. Let E be a stable extension of F . We claim that E \ {ψ} is a stable
extension of F ′. Conflict-freeness follows from Lemma 4.17. So let β ∈ A\E.
Then E  {β}. Plainly, E \ {ψ}  ′ {β} too. Hence, E \ {ψ} is stable in
F ′, provided E is stable in F .
To show that the properties are violated under the remaining semantics,
we consider a situation where, in contrast to Example 4.6, one deduction is
supported by two assumptions, one of which is to be turned into a fact, as
follows.
Example 4.7 (ASM CUT and ASM MON violations). Consider F = (L,R,A,¯¯)
with
• R = {δ ← α, α← β, β ← α, δ},
• A = {α, β, δ}.
F can be depicted graphically as in Figure 4.5.
{δ}
{α}
{β}
{α, δ}
Figure 4.5: ABA framework F from Example 4.7 leading to violations of
ASM CUT and ASM MON
F has a unique preferred (also stable and ideal) extension E = {β, δ}
with Cn(E) = {α, β, δ}. Taking δ ∈ Cn(E) ∩ A and adding it to F results
in F ′ = (L,R ∪ {δ ← >},A \ {δ},¯¯), which can be depicted graphically as
in Figure 4.6.
{α}
{β}
Figure 4.6: ABA framework F ′ from Example 4.7 violating ASM CUT and
ASM MON
F ′ admits two preferred extensions: E′1 = {β} with Cn ′(E′1) = Cn(E) and
E′2 = {α} with Cn ′(E′2) = {α, β, δ} such that Cn(E) * Cn ′(E′2) * Cn(E).
The ideal extension is E′ = ∅ such that Cn(E) * Cn ′(E′) = {δ}.
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Compared to grounded and ideal semantics, the other three semantics
are more dynamic. Here, confirming δ results in retracting δ (as well as
α) under ideal semantics. Meanwhile, the same change effectively allows α
to generate an attack against β, hence enabling mutual acceptability of α
and δ, under, say, complete semantics. This allows for a possibly desirable
revision of conclusions.
Table 4.5 summarises results regarding ABA in the ASM setting.
Property/Extension Grounded Ideal Sta-
ble
Pre-
ferred
Com-
plete
SCEPTICAL ASM
CUT
X X X X X
CREDULOUS ASM
CUT
X X X X X
SCEPTICAL ASM
MON
X X X X X
CREDULOUS ASM
MON
X X X X X
Table 4.5: ASM CUT and ASM MON in ABA
Confirmation of some defeasible information can lead to an increased
number of options under stable, preferred and complete semantics. This
could be desirable if, for instance, one of the choices (like α Example 4.7) is
not acceptable to begin with ({α} does not defend against {β}), but becomes
viable as soon as an assumption (δ) that allows for a defence of that choice is
confirmed (δ ← >). Meanwhile, if confirming information widens the array
of ‘credulous’ choices, then a ‘sceptical’ reasoner (using grounded or ideal
semantics) could opt for fewer—more certain—conclusions, as witnessed by
the ideal semantics satisfying ASM CUT but failing ASM MON.
While conceptually the two types of information change—STRICT and
ASM settings—are different, we have shown that technically they lead to the
same outcomes in the sense of a property being satisfied in either both or
neither of the two settings, under a particular semantics. Consequently,
irrespective of the knowledge representation in ABA and the nature of the
anticipated changes in information, one can choose semantics best suited
for the application, depending on the desirable properties of the reasoner.
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Stable, preferred and complete semantics violate the SCEPTICAL versions
of properties. This is expected, due to presence of choice between extensions
that share conclusions. Meanwhile, the CREDULOUS versions are satisfied un-
der these three semantics. This essentially says that ABA frameworks do
not lose the extension based on which a change in knowledge occurs. We
also identify a certain provocative aspect of our findings: even when a sta-
ble/preferred extension to begin with is unique, changing (even strengthen-
ing) information in ABA can lead to more than one stable/preferred exten-
sion afterwards (Examples 4.6, 4.7). We believe this phenomenon deserves
further study in terms of characterisation of ABA frameworks and/or se-
mantics for which it occurs, and we leave it for future work.
In terms of grounded and ideal semantics, intuitively, grounded semantics
(being the most ‘sceptical’) satisfies all the properties. This is because
grounded extensions commit to the most certain conclusions to begin with,
and changing the way they are represented in ABA frameworks does not
influence their (and other assumptions’) acceptance. Somewhat surprisingly,
ideal semantics fails MON, yet fulfils CUT. Such a behaviour is present because
changes in information can increase the number of, particularly, preferred
extensions, whence their intersection shrinks, resulting in violation of MON,
at the same time satisfying CUT.
We next extend our investigations to flat ABA+ with WCP.
STRICT and ASM Settings in ABA+
The non-monotonic inference properties CUT and MON can be readily applied
to ABA+. Take F to be an ABA+ framework (L,R,A,¯¯,6), let E be its
<-σ extension, and given ψ ∈ Cn(E), define F ′ as follows:
• STRICT setting: F ′ = (L,R∪ {ψ ← >},A,¯¯,6);
• ASM setting: F ′ = (L,R ∪ {ψ ← >},A \ {ψ},¯¯,6′), where 6′ is a
restriction of 6 to A \ {ψ}.
We can then analyse whether the non-monotonic inference properties in
question are satisfied in ABA+. Trivially, as ABA+ is a conservative ex-
tension of ABA, properties violated in ABA will remain violated in ABA+.
Therefore, we will focus on those that are satisfied in ABA; in particular,
the CREDULOUS versions (which coincide with the SCEPTICAL ones under <-
grounded and <-ideal semantics) except for MON under <-ideal semantics.
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As an illustration of the properties in ABA+, consider the following sit-
uation in our Referendum example.
Example 4.8. Suppose that after Zed made the decision to trust Bob
and Carl, but not Ann, the referendum actually happened and that the
Netherlands stayed in the EU. Zed infers that to begin with, either Ann was
wrong, or Bob was right. The first case could be seen as strengthening Zed’s
knowledge that Ann cannot be trusted, whereas the second case could be
seen as confirming Zed’s belief about Bob. The two cases can be separately
regarded as instances of non-monotonic inference properties in STRICT and
ASM settings, formalised next.
First, recall that the ABA+ framework F+C (that satisfies WCP) from
Example 3.5 has a unique <-σ extension {β, γ} with Cn({β, γ}) = {α, β, γ}.
Let F = F+C . Then consider the following.
• STRICT setting: take α and let F ′ = (L,R∪ {α← >},A,¯¯,6). Then
F ′ has a unique <-σ extension {β, γ}.
• ASM setting: take β and let F ′ = (L,R∪{β ← >},A\{β},¯¯,6′) with
α <′ γ. Then F ′ has a unique <-σ extension {β, γ}.
As conclusions of extensions of both F and F ′ are actually the same,
the CREDULOUS versions of the properties are in this case satisfied in both
settings. That is, after any of the two changes in information, Zed would
draw the same conclusions, under any semantics. We will see that this is
not true in general, under all but <-stable semantics.
We first show that ABA+ inherits the behaviour from ABA with re-
spect to the non-monotonic inference properties under <-stable semantics.
(Throughout the proofs in this section, we will denote respectively by  <
and  ′< the attack relations in F and F ′.)
Proposition 4.23. Let F = (L,R,A,¯¯,6) be a flat ABA+ framework
satisfying WCP. F fulfils CREDULOUS STRICT CUT and CREDULOUS STRICT
MON for <-stable semantics.
Proof. Let E be a <-stable extension of F and let ψ ∈ Cn(E) \ A. Define
F ′ = (L,R ∪ {ψ ← >},A,¯¯,6). We claim that E is a <-stable extension
of F ′.
Suppose for a contradiction that E is not <-conflict-free in F ′. Then E
is not conflict-free in (L,R∪{ψ ← >},A,¯¯), by Theorem 3.5. But then, as
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ψ ∈ Cn(E), E is not conflict-free in (L,R,A,¯¯) either. Hence, by Theorem
3.5, E is not <-conflict-free in F , which is a contradiction. Thus, E is
<-conflict-free in F ′.
Now let β ∈ A\E be arbitrary. We aim to show that E  ′< {β}. To this
end, as E is <-stable in F , we know that E  < {β}. We split into cases.
• Suppose E  < {β} via normal attack. Then A `R β,A ⊆ E,R ⊆ R
and ∀α ∈ A α 6< β. If this deduction does not involve ψ, then clearly
we have A  ′< {β} via normal attack. Else, we can find A′ ⊆ A and
R′ ⊆ R∪ {ψ ← >} such that A′ `R′ β, whence clearly A′  ′< {β} via
normal attack too.
• Suppose E  < {β} via reverse attack. Then {β} ` ε for some ε ∈ E
such that β < ε. Since β 6∈ E and E is <-conflict-free, this <-attack
does not involve ψ. Hence, {ε} ′< {β} via reverse attack too.
In any event, E  ′< {β}, as required. Therefore, E is <-stable in F ′.
Proposition 4.24. Let F = (L,R,A,¯¯,6) be a flat ABA+ framework
satisfying WCP. F fulfils CREDULOUS ASM CUT and CREDULOUS ASM MON for
<-stable semantics.
Proof. Let E be a <-stable extension of F and let ψ ∈ Cn(E) ∩ A. Define
F ′ = (L,R ∪ {ψ ← >},A \ {ψ},¯¯,6′), where 6′ is a restriction of 6 to
A \ {ψ}. We show that E \ {ψ} is <-stable in F ′.
Suppose for a contradiction that E\{ψ} is not <-conflict-free in F ′. Then
E \{ψ} is not conflict-free in (L,R∪{ψ ← >},A\{ψ},¯¯), by Theorem 3.5.
But then, as ψ ∈ Cn(E), E is not conflict-free in (L,R,A,¯¯). Hence, by
Theorem 3.5, E is not <-conflict-free in F , which is a contradiction. Thus,
E \ {ψ} must be <-conflict-free in F ′.
Now let β ∈ A\ (E∪{ψ}) be arbitrary. We aim to show that E \{ψ} ′<
{β}. To this end, as E is <-stable in F , we know that E  < {β}.
• Suppose E  < {β} via normal attack. Then A `R β,A ⊆ E,R ⊆ R
and ∀α ∈ A α 6< β. If ψ 6∈ A, then we have A  ′< {β} via normal
attack. Else, we find A\{ψ} `R β, so that A\{ψ} ′< {β} via normal
attack.
• Suppose E  < {β} via reverse attack. Then {β} ` ε for some ε ∈ E
such that β < ε. If ε 6= ψ, then this <-attack does not involve ψ, and
so we have {ε} ′< {β} via reverse attack, where {ε} ⊆ E \{ψ}. Else,
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{β} ` ψ and β < ψ, so WCP guarantees that, in F , we have A ` β
for some A ⊆ {ψ}. But then, in F ′, we find ∅ ` β.
In any event, E \ {ψ} ′< {β}, as required. Therefore, E \ {ψ} is <-stable
in F ′. Finally, note that Cn(E) = Cn ′(E \ {ψ}).
In general, however, ABA+ does not inherit all the properties from ABA.
In particular, CUT and MON can in general be violated in both STRICT and ASM
settings under all but <-stable semantics. The following examples illustrate
such violations.
Example 4.9 (STRICT MON violation). Consider F = (L,R,A,¯¯,6) with
• A = {α, β, p, q, ε, x},
• R = {ψ ← p, q, ε← β, x, ψ, α← β, x, p, β ← α, x, p, x← x},
• β < α.
This flat ABA+ framework F satisfies WCP. It can be depicted graphi-
cally as in Figure 4.7.
{x}
{α, x, p}
{β, x, p}
{β, x, p, q}
{α}
{β}
{p}
{q}
{ε}
Figure 4.7: Flat ABA+ framework F from Example 4.9
F has a unique <-complete, and hence <-grounded/<-ideal/<-preferred,
(but not <-stable) extension E = {p, q, α, ε} with Cn(E) = {p, q, α, ψ, ε}.
Note that {α} <-defends {ε} from {β, x, p, q} by <-attacking the latter via
reverse attack, due to the rule α← β, x, p and the preference β < α.
Consider F ′ = (L,R∪ {ψ ← >},A,¯¯,6). It can be depicted graphically
as in Figure 4.8.
In F ′, {ε} is <-attacked by the self-<-attacking {β, x}, and no subset
of E can <-defend {ε} against this <-attack. Indeed, F ′ has a unique
<-complete (but not <-stable) extension E′ = {p, q, α} with conclusions
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{x}
{α, x, p}
{β, x, p}
{β, x, p, q}
{β, x}
{α}
{β}
{p}
{q}
{ε}
Figure 4.8: Flat ABA+ framework F ′ from Example 4.9
Cn ′(E′) = {p, q, α, ψ} + Cn(E). (Here and in further examples, Cn ′ is the
conclusions operator of F ′.) Hence, F does not fulfil STRICT MON under any
of the four semantics in question.
Example 4.10 (ASM MON violation). Consider F and E from Example 4.9.
Let F ′ = (L,R∪ {α← >},A \ {α},¯¯, ∅). It can be depicted graphically as
in Figure 4.9.
{x}
{x, p}
{β, x, p}
{β, x, p, q}
{β, x}
{β}
{p}
{q}
{ε}
Figure 4.9: Flat ABA+ framework F ′ from Example 4.10
In F ′, {ε} is <-attacked by the self-<-attacking {β, x, p, q}, and cannot
be <-defended by any set not containing x. Overall, F ′ has a unique <-
complete (but not<-stable) extension E′ = {p, q} with conclusions Cn ′(E′) =
{p, q, α, ψ} + Cn(E). Hence, F does not fulfil ASM MON under any of the
four semantics in question.
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Example 4.11 (ASM CUT violation). Consider F = (L,R,A,¯¯,6) with
• A = {α, β, p, q, ε, x},
• R = {ψ ← p, q, ε ← β, x, ψ, α ← β, x, p, β ← α, x, p, x ← x,
ψ ← >},
• β < α.
So F is simply F ′ from Example 4.9. It satisfies WCP and has a unique
<-complete (but not <-stable) extension E = {p, q, α} with Cn(E) =
{p, q, α, ψ}. Let F ′ = (L,R ∪ {p ← >},A \ {p},¯¯,6). It can be depicted
graphically as in Figure 4.10.
{x}
{α, x}
{β, x, q}
{β, x}
{α}
{β} {q}
{ε}
Figure 4.10: Flat ABA+ framework F ′ from Example 4.11
In F ′, given that p is a fact, the <-attacker {β, x} of {ε} is <-attacked
by {α} via reverse attack. Thus, {α} <-defends {ε}, and so E′ = {q, α, ε}
with Cn ′(E′) = {p, q, α, ψ, ε} * Cn(E) is a unique <-complete (but not
<-stable) extension of F ′. This shows that F does not fulfil ASM CUT under
any of the four semantics in question.
Example 4.12 (STRICT CUT violation). Consider F = (L,R,A,¯¯,6) with
• A = {α, β, p, q, ε, x},
• R = {ψ ← p, q, ε ← β, x, ψ, α ← β, x, y, y ← p, β ← α, x, p,
x← x, β ← α, x, ψ ← >},
• β < α.
(So, in contrast to the framework F from Example 4.9, there is an inter-
mediate non-assumption y deducible from {p} and replacing p in the rule
α ← β, x, p; we also have ψ as a fact (i.e. ψ ← >), and the rule β ← α, x
will be needed for WCP in the framework F ′ after the change.)
F can be depicted graphically as in Figure 4.11.
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{x}
{α, x, p}
{β, x, p}
{β, x, p, q}
{α, x}
{β, x}
{α}
{β}
{p}
{q}
{ε}
Figure 4.11: Flat ABA+ framework F from Example 4.12
F satisfies WCP and has a unique <-complete (but not <-stable) ex-
tension E = {p, q, α} with conclusions Cn(E) = {p, q, α, ψ, y}. Let F ′ =
(L,R∪ {y ← >},A,¯¯,6). It can be depicted graphically as in Figure 4.12.
{x}
{α, x, p}
{β, x, p}
{β, x, p, q}
{α, x}
{β, x}
{α}
{β}
{p}
{q}
{ε}
Figure 4.12: Flat ABA+ framework F ′ from Example 4.12
(Note that in F ′ we have {β, x} ` α with β < α, but the rule β ← α, x
guarantees that F ′ satisfies WCP.) Similarly to the situation in Example
4.11, {α} <-defends {ε}, and F ′ has a unique <-complete (but not <-stable)
extension E′ = {p, q, α, ε} with Cn ′(E′) = {p, q, α, ψ, y, ε} * Cn(E). Hence,
F does not fulfil STRICT CUT under any of the four semantics in question.
Table 4.6 summarises results pertaining to ABA+ in both STRICT and
ASM settings.
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Prop-
erty/Extension
<-
grounded
<-
ideal
<-
stable
<-
preferred
<-
complete
SCEPTICAL
STRICT CUT
X X X X X
CREDULOUS
STRICT CUT
X X X X X
SCEPTICAL
STRICT MON
X X X X X
CREDULOUS
STRICT MON
X X X X X
SCEPTICAL ASM
CUT
X X X X X
CREDULOUS ASM
CUT
X X X X X
SCEPTICAL ASM
MON
X X X X X
CREDULOUS ASM
MON
X X X X X
Table 4.6: CUT and MON in ABA+
We see that the way preferences are dealt with in ABA+ significantly
influences the behaviour of ABA+ semantics as regards non-monotonic in-
ference (cf. Tables 4.4 and 4.5), in that they behave more dynamically than
in ABA. Behaving more dynamically means that the change from an ABA+
framework to begin with to one where information is added, is more sig-
nificant than the change from an ABA framework to begin with to one
where information is added. Thus, the presence of preference information
intensifies the distinction between framework before and after the change
of information. We leave investigations of circumstances in which such be-
haviour is desirable for future work.
While many NMR formalisms have been analysed with respect to non-
monotonic inference properties, including Cumulative Transitivity (CUT)
and Cautious Monotonicity (MON) among others (see e.g. [Bre91, GP92,
KLM90, Mak88]), the same cannot be said about argumentation formalisms
(but see e.g. [BKRvdT13] for work on AA regarding labelling-based and
preferential inference). To the best of our knowledge, the two most re-
lated works to ours, investigating Cumulative Transitivity and Cautious
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Monotonicity of argumentation, are Hunter’s [Hun10] and Dung’s [Dun16b].
The former investigates non-monotonic inference properties with respect to
argument–claim entailment in logic-based argumentation systems. Given
various base logics, Hunter defines argument construction-mimicking entail-
ment operators to produce claims from knowledge bases, and examines those
operators against non-monotonic inference properties (Cumulative Transi-
tivity and Cautious Monotonicity among them). This approach differs sig-
nificantly from ours in that we are instead interested in inferences from
extensions.
Meanwhile, Dung analyses, among other aspects, (credulous) cumulativ-
ity (i.e. Cumulative Transitivity plus Cautious Monotonicity) of ASPIC+
under stable semantics. The main concern there is that confirmation of
some conclusions in an extension should strengthen other conclusions in
that extension. To formalise this, Dung introduces two axioms—a variant
of credulous cumulativity and another one regarding attack monotonicity.
Dung then shows that stable semantics with respect to either of the main
four ASPIC+ attack relations does not satisfy at least one of those axioms.
On the other hand, Dung’s proposed normal attack relation (to be discussed
in Section 6.1.4) leads to satisfaction of credulous cumulativity with respect
to complete semantics, under certain conditions (e.g. contraposition).
Our work differs from [Dun16b] in several aspects. First, we consider
Cumulative Transitivity and Cautious Monotonicity as two separate prop-
erties, rather than one. Also, our reformulations of the properties concern
two types of information change—strengthening (STRICT) and confirmation
(ASM)—and cover all ABA+ semantics. Finally, we do not insist that prop-
erties have to be necessarily fulfilled, but maintain that their satisfaction
is conditional on applications. We have shown that under <-stable seman-
tics, ABA+ adheres to Dung’s intuitions (satisfaction of CREDULOUS STRICT
CUT, CREDULOUS STRICT MON, CREDULOUS ASM CUT, CREDULOUS ASM MON),
but that under other semantics this is not the case. In the future, it would
be interesting to compare the behaviour of ABA+, ASPIC+ and Dung’s nor-
mal attack regarding the non-monotonic inference properties in question.
Many other works, e.g. [BB15, DHL+15, CMKMM15, BGL14, BBC+14],
fall into the area of research covering addition of new information to AA
frameworks. Broadly speaking, those works concern revision of AA frame-
works by, for instance, adding new arguments and/or attacks, or investi-
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gating changes required to enforce arguments or sets of arguments to be
accepted by a particular semantics. While that research focuses (mostly)
on AA, it would nonetheless be interesting to investigate the overlap and
possible applications to structured argumentation, particularly ABA+, in
the future.
4.2.4 Summary
In this section (Section 4.2), we considered flat ABA+ frameworks satisfy-
ing WCP. We proved that the Fundamental Lemma holds for these frame-
works and that their extensions under different semantics are related in the
same way as those of flat ABA frameworks. These results allowed us to
prove that flat ABA+ frameworks satisfying WCP fulfil additional desirable
preference handling principles. Furthermore, we studied non-monotonic in-
ference properties of Cautious Monotonicity and Cumulative Transitivity
of such frameworks and showed that without preferences (i.e. as flat ABA
frameworks) they satisfy some instances of the properties, while in general
they violate the same properties under all but <-stable semantics.
In the future, we plan to examine whether WCP can be further relaxed
while retaining the same desirable properties. It would also be interesting
to study the non-monotonic inference properties in non-flat ABA+.
In this chapter, we advanced WCP and studied ABA+ subject to WCP. In
particular, focusing on a distinguished class of ABA+ frameworks, namely
flat ABA+ frameworks satisfying WCP, we showed that they satisfy addi-
tional desirable properties regarding relationships among semantics as well
as preference handling. We also examined satisfaction of non-monotonic
inference properties in flat ABA+ with WCP. In the next chapter (Chapter
5), we will see how properties that WCP guarantees for flat ABA+ pave the
way to implementing ABA+.
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5 ABAplus: Implementing Flat
ABA+ with WCP
In this chapter, we take first steps towards implementing ABA+ and present
ABAplus: a proof-of-concept software system that implements computa-
tion, visualisation and comparison of extensions of flat ABA+ frameworks,
subject to WCP.1 ABAplus is freely available at github.com/zb95/2016-
ABAPlus as a stand-alone system, as well as a web application at www-
abaplus.doc.ic.ac.uk.
First, in Section 5.1, we briefly illustrate what ABAplus does. In Section
5.2, we provide theoretical underpinnings that ensure the correctness of im-
plementation of flat ABA+ with WCP in ABAplus. We give descriptions of
ABAplus front-end and back-end in Section 5.3. In Section 5.4, we propose
an event scheduling application of ABA+ and ABAplus. Finally, we sum-
marise in Section 5.5. Throughout this chapter, unless stated otherwise, we
assume as given a flat ABA+ framework.
5.1 ABAplus
In this section, we briefly describe and illustrate with a simple example what
ABAplus does, reserving a more detailed exposition for sections to come.
ABAplus takes as input (L,R,A,¯¯,6) and yields as output its exten-
sions together with their conclusions under all <-σ semantics, as well as
a graphical visualisation of (L,R,A,¯¯,6) with the possibility to highlight
and compare different extensions. More specifically, the user has to specify
(L,R,A,¯¯,6) in a Prolog-like format (details in Section 5.3). ABAplus
then checks, in particular, whether (L,R,A,¯¯,6) satisfies WCP, and if not,
1ABAplus is the outcome of a project proposed for the Undergraduate Research Op-
portunities Programme at Imperial College London. The project was undertaken by
Ziyi Bao in the summer of 2016, then a 2nd year undergraduate student, following the
specification provided in this chapter.
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allows the user to choose to automatically enforce WCP on (L,R,A,¯¯,6)
(as in Section 4.1.2). After that, the system determines <-σ extensions of
the (possibly modified) framework by way of mapping the ABA+ frame-
work to an AA framework, called assumption graph (details in Section 5.2),
and using an AA solver to determine σ extensions of the latter. ABAplus
uses the same assumption graph to visualise the ABA+ framework and to
contrast its extensions graphically.
As an example, consider (L,R,A,¯¯,6) from Example 3.6, rewritten using
latin characters as follows:
• L = {a, b, c, x, y, z};
• R = {y ← a, c};
• A = {a, b, c};
• a = x, b = y, c = z;
• a < b < c.
Giving F = (L,R,A,¯¯,6) as input to ABAplus and choosing to auto-
matically enforce WCP yields output as shown in Figure 5.1.2
2In Section 5.3.1, we provide larger, sharper and more detailed figures illustrating
ABAplus output.
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Figure 5.1: A screenshot of ABAplus outcome for the input ABA+ frame-
work from Example 3.6
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The top part of the screenshot in Figure 5.1 shows an editable window
with the specification of (L,R,A,¯¯,6) (details in Section 5.3). To the right
of the window, it is indicated that ABAplus enforced WCP on (L,R,A,¯¯,6)
by adding the enforcing rule x ← b, c (which in the output appears as
x← {b, c}) to get a new framework, call it F ′, that satisfies WCP.
The middle part of Figure 5.1 shows a graphical illustration of F ′ via its
assumption graph. The legend at the top left corner of the window explains
the different types of arrows utilised in the graphical illustration: dotted
arrows indicate reverse attacks, dashed arrows indicate normal attacks, and
solid arrows indicate <-attacks that are both normal and reverse.3
The bottom part of the figure lists <-σ extensions (where the prefix ‘<’ is
omitted) of F ′ together with their conclusions (called ‘derivable sentences’)
in the form ‘E ` Cn(E)’ for E a <-σ extension of F ′. The drop-down
selection options below allow the user to choose any one extension to be
highlighted in the assumption graph. In this case, the <-grounded extension
{b, c} is highlighted, with nodes holding sets of assumptions contained (with
respect to ⊆) in {b, c} coloured green, and the other nodes coloured red.4
In addition, the user can choose any other extension (under any, possibly
different, semantics) to be compared with the highlighted one.
The correctness of ABAplus implementation depends crucially on the
mapping from ABA+ to AA. This mapping constructs an assumption graph
from a flat ABA+ framework (L,R,A,¯¯,6) satisfying WCP. The assump-
tion graph is used to both determine <-σ extensions of (L,R,A,¯¯,6), and
to visualise it as well as to compare its extensions. The issue here is de-
vising a mapping from ABA+ to AA that not only preserves semantic cor-
respondence (for the class of flat ABA+ frameworks satisfying WCP), but
also achieves this generally more efficiently than by, for instance, using all
sets of assumptions (i.e. the powerset ℘(A)) as arguments and <-attacks
among them as the attack relation. We provide one such mapping, used in
ABAplus, in the next section.
3This deviates from the notation utilised in the graphical illustrations of ABA+ frame-
works in this thesis, because we wanted to use different arrows to depict <-attacks in
ABA+ and attacks in ABA and AA: e.g. solid double-tipped arrows for <-attacks that
are both normal and reverse versus solid (single-tipped) arrows for attacks in ABA.
4In black and white print, red and green colours appear as dark grey and light grey,
respectively.
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5.2 Assumption Graphs
In this section, we describe assumption graphs—AA frameworks obtained
from flat ABA+ frameworks satisfying WCP, that underpin the implemen-
tation of ABAplus and also allow for concise graphical representations of
ABA+ frameworks. In particular, we want to show that in order to graphi-
cally depict a flat ABA+ framework satisfying WCP, as well as to compute
its extensions, we need to consider only certain sets of assumptions, rather
than the whole powerset ℘(A). More precisely, we will show that it suffices
to consider all the singleton sets of assumptions, as well as the sets of as-
sumptions that support deductions for contraries of assumptions. (While
we have already informally adopted such a convention in some examples
from earlier chapters, we will now prove formally that this convention is
sound.) To this end, given a flat (L,R,A,¯¯,6) that satisfies WCP, we con-
struct its assumption graph—an AA framework with distinguished sets of
assumptions as arguments and the attack relation  < restricted to those
sets, and prove that σ extensions of the assumption graph correspond to the
<-σ extensions of (L,R,A,¯¯,6). The formal setting is as follows. (Unless
stated otherwise, we assume (L,R,A,¯¯,6) is flat and satisfies WCP.)
Definition 5.1. Let D be the collection of sets of assumptions that support
deductions of contraries of assumptions, i.e.
D = {S ⊆ A : S ` α for some α ∈ A}.
The assumption graph of (L,R,A,¯¯,6) is an AA framework (Args, ↪→)
with
• Args = D ∪ {{α} : α ∈ A},
• ↪→= < ∩ (Args ×Args),
where  < is the <-attack relation of (L,R,A,¯¯,6).
For the remainder of this chapter, we assume (Args, ↪→) to be the as-
sumption graph of (L,R,A,¯¯,6), unless stated otherwise.
To prove semantic correspondence between (L,R,A,¯¯,6) and (Args, ↪→),
we will make use of the following result, which says that complete extensions
of an assumption graph are ‘sub-argument closed’.
Lemma 5.1. Let (L,R,A,¯¯,6) be a flat ABA+ framework that satisfies
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WCP. Let E ⊆ Args be a complete extension of (Args, ↪→) and let A ∈ Args
be such that A ⊆ ⋃ E. Then A ∈ E.
Proof. As E is complete, it suffices to prove that E defends A. First let
A = {α} for some α ∈ ⋃ E . Suppose B ↪→ {α}. Then B  < {α}, and so
B < C for any C ⊆ A such that α ∈ C. Now note that as α ∈
⋃ E , there
must be C ∈ E (so C ⊆ A) such that α ∈ C. Hence, B  < C, and thus
B ↪→ C. As E is admissible, we find E ↪→ B. Since B ↪→ {α} was arbitrary,
E defends {α}.
Now suppose A is not a singleton. Let B ↪→ A. Then B < A.
If B  < A via normal attack, then B  < {α} for some α ∈ A, so that
B ↪→ {α}, whence E ↪→ B, as established for singleton arguments above.
Else, B  < A via reverse attack only. We can thus without loss of
generality assume that B = {β}, for some β ∈ A. Then A′ ` β, A′ ⊆ A and
∃α1 ∈ A′ such that α1 < β. By WCP, for some 6-minimal such α1 we find
B1 ` α1, B1 ⊆ (A′ \ {α1})∪{β} and ∀x ∈ B1 x 6< α1. Note also that as E is
admissible and contains all singleton arguments {α} with α ∈ ⋃ E , the fact
that α1 ∈ A′ ⊆ A ∈ E implies that β ∈ B1 (otherwise, A∗ ↪→ {α1} for some
A∗ ⊆ A′ \ {α1} ⊆ A ∈ E , so that E ↪→ A∗, and this would lead, (using WCP
if needed) to E ↪→ {ε} for some ε ∈ ⋃ E). So B1 ↪→ {α1} and β ∈ B1. As
α1 ∈
⋃ E , we have {α1} ∈ E , so that E ↪→ B1, as above. Hence, ⋃ E  < B1.
1. Say
⋃ E  < B1 via normal attack. That is, ∃A∗ ∈ E such that A∗ ↪→ B1
and A∗  < B1 via normal attack. Then from the facts that B1 \ {β} ⊆
A ⊆ ⋃ E , E contains {α} for every α ∈ A and E is conflict-free, we must
have A∗ ↪→ {β}, whence E ↪→ B, as required.
2. Else,
⋃ E  < B1 via reverse attack only. So Br1 ` ε1, ε1 ∈ ⋃ E , Br1 ⊆
B1 ⊆ (A′ \ {α1}) ∪ {β} and ∃α2 ∈ Br1 with α2 < ε1. Note that ε1 6= α1,
because otherwise α2 < α1, contrary to α1 being 6-minimal in A′ with
α1 < β, or yielding β < β (from α2 < ε1 = α1 < β). As above, we must
also have β ∈ Br1. Now, by WCP, for some 6-minimal such α2 we find
B2 ` α2, B2 ⊆ (Br1 \ {α2}) ∪ {ε1} ⊆ (((A′ \ {α1}) ∪ {β}) \ {α2}) ∪ {ε1},
and ∀x ∈ B2 x 6< α2.
a) Suppose α2 = β. Then B2  < {β} via normal attack, B2 ⊆
⋃ E , and
β < ε1. If B2 ∈ E , then from B2 ↪→ {β} it follows that E ↪→ B, as
required. Else, suppose B2 6∈ E . This means E does not defend B2, so
that there is C ∈ Args such that C ↪→ B2, but E 6↪→ C. Since B2 ⊆
⋃ E ,
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we must have C  < B2 only via reverse attack. Without loss of
generality, we can take C = {β′}, for some β′ ∈ A. So consider A2 ` β′
with A2 ⊆ B2 ⊆ (A′ \ {α1}) ∪ {ε1} and such that for some α3 ∈ A2
6-minimal with α3 < β′ we have B3 ` α3 with B3 ⊆ (A2 \ {α3})∪{β′}
and ∀x ∈ B3 x 6< α3. Note that we must have β′ 6= β, for otherwise
β′ = β yields α3 < β′ = β = α2, so that α3 < α2, contrary to α3 ∈ A2
and ∀x ∈ B2 ⊇ A2 x 6< α2. So B3 ⊆ (A′ \ {α1, α3}) ∪ {ε1, β′} is
such that B3  < {α3} via normal attack and (due to conflict-freeness
of E , as before) β′ ∈ B3. Thus, we are again in the situation where
B3 ↪→ {α3} and {α3} ∈ E , so that E ↪→ B3. This is dealt with as in
the case for E ↪→ B1 above.
b) Else, α2 6= β, so that α2 ∈ A1 \ {α1} ⊆ A ∈ E , and as B2  < {α2}
via normal attack, we must have β ∈ B2. We thus have B2 ⊆ (A′ \
{α1, α2}) ∪ {β, ε1} such that B2 ↪→ {α2}, so that we are likewise back
to the case where E ↪→ B2.
For the sake of clarity, we describe how the process would continue
further.
i. If
⋃ E  < B2 via normal attack, then again, due to conflict-freeness
of E and as {ε} ∈ E for any ε ∈ A ∪ {ε1}, we find E ↪→ {β}, so that
E ↪→ B, as required.
ii. Else,
⋃ E  < B2 via reverse attack only. So Br2 ` ε2, ε2 ∈ ⋃ E ,
Br2 ⊆ B2 ⊆ (A′ \ {α1, α2}) ∪ {β, ε1}, β ∈ Br2, and for some α3 ∈ Br2
6-minimal with α3 < ε2 we find B3 ` α3, B3 ⊆ (Br2 \ {α3})∪{ε2} ⊆
(((A′ \ {α1, α2}) ∪ {β, ε1}) \ {α3}) ∪ {ε2}, and ∀x ∈ B3 x 6< α3.
• Suppose α3 = β. Then B3  < {β} via normal attack, B3 ⊆
⋃ E ,
and β < ε2. If B3 ∈ E , then from B3 ↪→ {β} it follows that E ↪→ B,
as required. Else, suppose B3 6∈ E . This means E does not defend
B3, so that there is C ∈ Args such that C ↪→ B3, but E 6↪→ C.
Since B3 ⊆
⋃ E , we must have C  < B3 only via reverse attack.
Without loss of generality, we can take C = {β′}, for some β′ ∈ A.
So consider A3 ` β′ with A3 ⊆ B3 ⊆ (A′ \ {α1, α2}) ∪ {ε1, ε2}
and such that for some α4 ∈ A3 6-minimal with α4 < β′ we
have B4 ` α4 with B4 ⊆ (A3 \ {α4}) ∪ {β′} and ∀x ∈ B4 x 6<
α4. Note that we must have β
′ 6= β, because otherwise A3 3
α4 < β
′ = β = α3 contradicts ∀x ∈ B3 ⊇ A3 x 6< α3. So
B4 ⊆ (A′ \ {α1, α2, α4})∪{ε1, ε2, β′} is such that B4  < {α4} via
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normal attack and (as before) β′ ∈ B4. Thus, we are again in the
situation where B4 ↪→ {α4} and {α4} ∈ E , so that E ↪→ B4. This
is dealt with as in the case for E ↪→ B1 above.
• Else, α3 6= β, so that α3 ∈ (A2 \ {α1, α2}) ∪ {ε1} ⊆
⋃ E , and as
B3  < {α3} via normal attack, we must have β ∈ B3. We thus
have B3 ⊆ (A′ \ {α1, α2, α3}) ∪ {β, ε1, ε2} such that B3 ↪→ {α3},
so that we are likewise back to the case where E ↪→ B3.
Since deductions in ABA+ are finite, arguments in Args are finite sets, so the
process described above would eventually have to terminate with E ↪→ B.
Thus, E defends A, and hence A ∈ E , as required.
The correspondence semantics-wise between (L,R,A,¯¯,6) and (Args, ↪→)
is stated thus.
Theorem 5.2. Let (L,R,A,¯¯,6) be a flat ABA+ framework that satisfies
WCP. Let (Args, ↪→) be the assumption graph of (L,R,A,¯¯,6).
• If E ⊆ A is a <-σ extension of (L,R,A,¯¯,6), then
{S ∈ D : S ⊆ E} ∪ {{α} : α ∈ E}
is a σ extension of (Args, ↪→);
• If E ⊆ Args is a σ extension of (Args, ↪→), then ⋃ E is a <-σ extension
of (L,R,A,¯¯,6).
Proof. Suppose first that E is a <-σ extension of (L,R,A,¯¯,6), and put
E = {S ∈ D : S ⊆ E} ∪ {{α} : α ∈ E}. We need to show that E is a σ
extension of (Args, ↪→).
σ = complete. We show that E is conflict-free, defends itself, and contains
every argument it defends.
• Suppose for a contradiction that E is not conflict-free. Then A ↪→ B
for some A,B ∈ E . Thus, A  < B. By construction of E , we have
A,B ⊆ E, so that E  < E, which is a contradiction.
• Let B ↪→ A for some A ∈ E and B ∈ Args \ E . Then B  < A, and so
E  < B, as E is <-admissible. If E  < B via normal attack, then
there are A′ ` β, A′ ⊆ E, β ∈ B such that ∀α′ ∈ A′ α′ 6< β. So
A′ ∈ Args with A′ ↪→ B, and by construction of E , we have A′ ∈ E .
Otherwise, if E  < B via reverse attack, then there are B′ ` α,
B′ ⊆ B, and β′ ∈ B′ such that β′ < α. So {α} ↪→ B by definition of ↪→
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and Lemma 3.3, and by construction of E we have {α} ∈ E . In any
event, E ↪→ B. Hence, E defends itself.
• Suppose E defends A ∈ Args. We will show that E <-defends A. So
let B  < A. If it is a normal attack, then there are B′ ` α, B′ ⊆ B,
α ∈ A such that ∀β′ ∈ B′ β′ 6< α. So B′ ↪→ {α}, and thus B′ ↪→ A,
whence E ↪→ B′. But this means E  < B′, and hence E  < B. Else,
if B  < A via reverse attack, then there are A′ ` β, A′ ⊆ A, β ∈ B
and α′ ∈ A′ such that α′ < β. So {β} ↪→ A′, and thus B ↪→ A, whence
E ↪→ B. Again, this means E  < B. Consequently, E <-defends A,
and as E is <-complete, we have A ⊆ E. Therefore, A ∈ E . Hence, E
is complete.
σ = preferred. As E is <-preferred, it is <-complete, by Theorem 4.7.
Hence, by the case for σ = complete above, E is complete. To prove
that E is preferred, suppose for a contradiction that E is not ⊆-
maximally admissible. Then E ∪ {B} is admissible, for some B ∈
Args \ E . As B 6∈ E and E is complete, it must be that E does not
defend B. However, E ∪ {B} does defend B. This means that B de-
fends itself. Hence, unless B ↪→ B, it must be that ∅ defends B, and so
B ∈ E , which is a contradiction. On the other hand, if B ↪→ B, then
E ∪ {B} cannot be admissible, which is a contradiction too. In any
event, we obtain a contradiction, so that E is preferred.
σ = stable. As E is <-stable, it is <-complete, by Theorem 3.6. So E is
complete, as before. To show that it is stable, let B ∈ Args \ E . Then
∃β ∈ B \E. As E is <-stable, we find E  < {β}. Therefore, we have
E ↪→ {β}, and so E ↪→ B. Consequently, E is stable.
σ = ideal. We show that E is admissible, contained in every preferred ex-
tension of (Args, ↪→), and is ⊆-maximal such.
• As E is <-ideal, it is <-complete, by Theorem 4.7, and so E is com-
plete, and in particular, admissible.
• Suppose for a contradiction that there is a preferred extension P of
(Args, ↪→) such that E * P. By Lemma 5.1, ⋃ E * ⋃P. By the
case σ = preferred below in the proof of the second claim of this
theorem,
⋃P is a <-preferred extension of (L,R,A,¯¯,6). But then
E =
⋃ E * ⋃P contradicts E being contained in every <-preferred
extension. Hence, by contradiction, E is contained in every preferred
extension of (Args, ↪→).
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• Finally, suppose for a contradiction that E is not ⊆-maximal among
admissible sets contained in every preferred extension of (Args, ↪→).
In particular, there is an ideal E ′ ⊆ Args with E ( E ′. Then E ′
is complete [DMT07], so that
⋃ E ′ is <-complete in (L,R,A,¯¯,6),
and, in particular, <-admissible, by σ = complete below in the proof
of the second claim of this theorem. By Lemma 5.1 and cases for
σ = preferred above as well as below in the proof of the second claim
of this theorem, E =
⋃ E ( ⋃ E ′ and ⋃ E ′ is contained in every
<-preferred extension of (L,R,A,¯¯,6). This contradicts E being
<-ideal. Therefore, by contradiction, E must be ⊆-maximal among
admissible sets contained in every preferred extension of (Args, ↪→).
σ = grounded. As E is <-grounded, it is <-complete, by Theorem 4.7, and
so E is complete. If it were not ⊆-minimally complete, some E ′ ⊆ Args
with E ′ ( E would be complete, whence ⋃ E ′ would be <-complete,
by the case for σ = complete below. But as
⋃ E ′ ( ⋃ E = E due to
Lemma 5.1, E would not be the intersection of <-complete extensions
of (L,R,A,¯¯,6), which is a contradiction to E being <-grounded.
So E is ⊆-minimally complete, and hence the grounded extension of
(Args, ↪→).
Now suppose that E ⊆ Args is a σ extension of (Args, ↪→).
σ = complete. We show that
⋃ E is <-conflict-free, <-defends itself, and
contains every set of assumptions it <-defends.
• Suppose for a contradiction that⋃ E is not <-conflict-free. Then there
are A ` β, A ⊆ ⋃ E , β ∈ ⋃ E . Clearly, A, {β} ∈ Args. By Lemma 5.1,
A, {β} ∈ E . Now, depending on whether ∃α ∈ A such that α < β or
not, we have {β}  < A via reverse attack or A  < {β} via normal
attack, so that either {β} ↪→ A or A ↪→ {β}. In any case, E is not
conflict-free, which is a contradiction.
• To show that⋃ E <-defends itself, let B  < ⋃ E for some B ⊆ A. If it
is a normal attack, then B′ ` α, B′ ⊆ B, α ∈ ⋃ E , and ∀β′ ∈ B′ β′ 6< α.
Thus, B′, {α} ∈ Args and B′ ↪→ {α}, where {α} ∈ E by Lemma 5.1.
Hence, E ↪→ B′. But this means ⋃ E  < B′, and so ⋃  < B. If, on
the other hand, B  <
⋃ E via reverse attack, then A ` β, A ⊆ ⋃ E ,
β ∈ B, and ∃α ∈ A with α < β. Thus, A, {β} ∈ Args and {β} ↪→ A,
where A ∈ E by Lemma 5.1. Hence, E ↪→ {β}, which means that⋃ E  < {β}, and so ⋃ E  < B. Therefore, ⋃ E <-defends itself.
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• Finally, to show that ⋃ E contains every set of assumptions it <-
defends, suppose
⋃ E <-defends A ⊆ A. This implies that ⋃ E <-
defends {α} for every α ∈ A. In particular, for any α ∈ A, if B ↪→ {α},
then B  < {α}, and so
⋃ E  < B, which means that E ↪→ B. So E
defends, and thus contains, due to completeness, {α} for every α ∈ A.
Thus clearly A ⊆ ⋃ E , as required.
We conclude that
⋃ E is a <-complete extension of (L,R,A,¯¯,6).
σ = preferred. As a preferred extension of (Args, ↪→), E is also complete
[Dun95b]. So, as per case for σ = complete above in the proof of
the first claim of this theorem,
⋃ E is <-complete, and, in particular,
<-admissible. Therefore, by Theorem 3.6, (L,R,A,¯¯,6) has a <-
preferred extension E′ such that
⋃ E ⊆ E′. To show that ⋃ E is
<-preferred, it thus suffices to show that
⋃ E = E′. So suppose for a
contradiction that
⋃ E ( E′. As E′ is <-preferred, the set E ′ = {S ⊆
E′ : S ` α, α ∈ A} ∪ {{α} : α ∈ E′} is a preferred extension of
(Args, ↪→), as per case for σ = preferred above in the proof of the first
claim of this theorem. But note that as
⋃ E ( E′, it must be that
E ( E ′, which contradicts E being a preferred extension of (Args, ↪→).
Thus, by contradiction,
⋃ E = E′, and so ⋃ E is a <-preferred.
σ = stable. As a stable extension of (Args, ↪→), E is also complete [Dun95b],
so that
⋃ E is <-complete. To show that it is <-stable, let β ∈ A\⋃ E .
Then {β} ∈ Args \ E , so that E ↪→ {β}. Consequently, ⋃ E  < {β},
and hence
⋃ E is <-stable.
σ = ideal. As the ideal extension of (Args, ↪→), E is also complete [DMT07],
so that
⋃ E is <-complete, and, in particular, <-admissible. By
Lemma 5.1 and cases for σ = preferred above and below,
⋃ E must be
contained in every <-preferred extension of (L,R,A,¯¯,6): if P ⊆ A
is <-preferred and
⋃ E * P , then P = {S ⊆ P : S ` α, α ∈
A} ∪ {{α} : α ∈ P} is preferred in (Args, ↪→) and E * P, con-
tradicting E being ideal. Similarly, if ⋃ E is not ⊆-maximal among
<-admissible sets contained in every <-preferred extension, then there
is an <-ideal extension E′ ⊆ A with ⋃ E ( E′. By Theorem 4.7, E′
is <-complete, so E ′ = {S ⊆ E′ : S ` α, α ∈ A} ∪ {{α} : α ∈ E′}
is complete, hence admissible, in (Args, ↪→). By Lemma 5.1 and cases
for σ = preferred above and below, E ( E ′ and E ′ is contained in every
preferred extension of (Args, ↪→), which is a contradiction to E being
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ideal. We conclude that
⋃ E is <-ideal.
σ = grounded. For any <-complete extension E′ of (L,R,A,¯¯,6), the set
E ′ = {S ⊆ E′ : S ` α, α ∈ A} ∪ {{α} : α ∈ E′} is complete in
(Args, ↪→), so if ⋃ E * E′ for some <-complete E′, then, by Lemma
5.1, E * E ′, contrary to E being ⊆-minimally complete. Hence, ⋃ E is
contained in every <-complete extension of (L,R,A,¯¯,6), and so in
the intersection of all the <-complete extensions. Since E is complete
as the grounded extension of (Args, ↪→) [Dun95b], ⋃ E is <-complete,
and hence cannot be properly contained in the intersection of all the
<-complete extensions. Therefore,
⋃ E is the intersection of all the
<-complete extensions, that is, the <-grounded extension.
The claims are proven, as required.
This result tells us that in order to find the extensions of (L,R,A,¯¯,6)
it suffices to consider only a part of all the assumption sets and <-attacks
among them. In particular, one needs to consider only the singleton sets
of assumptions as well as the sets of assumptions supporting deductions for
contraries of assumptions.
Observe that WCP is necessary for the semantic correspondence: if the
assumption graph (Args, ↪→) were constructed for the flat ABA+ framework
(L,R,A,¯¯,6) from Example 3.6 (which does not satisfy WCP), there would
be arguments {α}, {β}, {γ} and {α, γ}, with the only attack {β} ↪→ {α, γ},
and so {{α}, {β}, {γ}} would be a unique complete extension of (Args, ↪→),
while (L,R,A,¯¯,6) has no <-complete extensions.
Note also that flatness cannot be dispensed with either. That is, if for a
non-flat ABA+ framework (L,R,A,¯¯,6) its assumption graph (Args, ↪→)
were constructed by taking arguments to be closed sets supporting deduc-
tions of either assumptions or contraries of assumptions, the extensions of
(Args, ↪→) would not coincide with those of (L,R,A,¯¯,6). Indeed, consider
(L,R,A,¯¯,6) with R = {γ ← α, β, γ ← γ}, A = {α, β, γ} and 6= ∅
(note that due to absence of preferences, (L,R,A,¯¯,6) trivially satisfies
WCP). The assumption graph would have Args = {{α}, {β}, {γ}, {α, β, γ}}
and {γ} ↪→ {γ}, {γ} ↪→ {α, β, γ}, {α, β, γ} ↪→ {γ}, {α, β, γ} ↪→ {α, β, γ}.
Then, for instance, {{α}, {β}} is a complete extension of (Args, ↪→), but
{α, β} is not a <-complete extension of (L,R,A,¯¯,6).
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Now that we have a solution to the methodological issue of mapping flat
ABA+ frameworks satisfying WCP to AA, we can describe the workings of
ABAplus in the next section.
5.3 System Description
In this section, we give a description (Section 5.3.1) of the ABAplus front-
end, accompanied with illustrations from the web application, and then give
a description of the ABAplus back-end in Section 5.3.2. But first, we list the
tools used to implement ABAplus, which we will refer to when describing
front- and beck-ends of ABAplus.
The following tools and libraries are used in ABAplus:
• Programming language Python: 3.4.3
• Python web server Gunicorn: 19.6
• Clingo (clasp answer set solver + Gringo grounder): 4.5.4
• DLV (deductive database system): Version 17/12/2012
• Encodings of various semantics: adm.dl, stable.dl, ideal.dl, comp.dl,
prefex gringo.lp, ground.dl from (as of 18/07/2016)
www.dbai.tuwien.ac.at/research/project/argumentation/systempage
• Programming language JavaScript with its D3 (graph visualisation)
library: 3.5.17
5.3.1 Front-end
We here describe the front-end of ABAplus, illustrating with screenshots of
the web application www-abaplus.doc.ic.ac.uk.
The ABAplus web application, running on Gunicorn, takes a single ABA+
framework as input specified in the following Prolog-like format:
• myAsm(a). specifies that a is an assumption from A;
• contrary(a, x). specifies that x ∈ L is the contrary a of assumption a;
• myRule(h, [b1, . . . , bn]). specifies that h← b1, . . . , bn is a rule from R;
• myPrefLT(b, a). specifies, for assumptions a, b, that b < a;
• myPrefLE(b, a). specifies, for assumptions a, b, that b 6 a.
The framework can either be entered directly in a textbox or uploaded as
a file (with the .pl extension). Figure 5.2 shows a screenshot of ABAplus
main page where an ABA+ framework can be given as an input.
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Figure 5.2: A screenshot of ABAplus main page where an ABA+ framework
can be given as an input
There are restrictions on specifications of ABA+ frameworks that ABAplus
takes as valid: an assumption must have a unique contrary; no assumption
can be the contrary of any assumption; contraries can be declared only
for assumptions; no assumption can appear in the head of any rule (as a
simple way ensuring flatness); preferences can be specified only over assump-
tions; the strict counterpart of the preference preorder has to be asymmet-
ric, i.e. for no assumption a it can hold that a < a. If the given ABA+
framework is not valid in the above sense, ABAplus raises an appropriate
error message. Some of these restrictions reflect the definitions of ABA+
(e.g. unique contraries). Some restrictions are imposed in order to simplify
the implementation (e.g. an assumption cannot be the contrary of another
assumption), but are in general made without loss of generality. We leave
addressing and discussing such restrictions for future work.
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We next illustrate the ABAplus output for a valid (in the above sense)
ABA+ framework with the following example.
Example 5.1. Consider F = (L,R,A,¯¯,6) with
• L = {a, b, c, d, x, y, z, w},
• R = {y ← a, c, x← d, z ← d, w ← c},
• A = {a, b, c, d},
• a = x, b = y, c = z, d = w,
• a < b < c.
The screenshot in Figure 5.3 shows the specification of F as an input to
ABAplus.
Figure 5.3: A screenshot of the specification of F from Example 5.1 as an
input to ABAplus
Note that F does not satisfy WCP: {a, c} ` b is an instance of WCP
with a unique witness a (see Section 4.1.2). ABAplus detects this while
163
pre-processing F (see Section 5.3.2) and informs the user, as well as offers
to automatically enforce WCP, as shown in Figure 5.4.
Figure 5.4: A screenshot of ABAplus detecting that F does not satisfy WCP
and offering to automatically enforce WCP on F
Clicking on the ‘Enforce WCP’ button results in ABAplus enforcing WCP
on F , as described in Section 4.1.2, and yielding a new framework F ′ =
(L,R ∪ {x ← b, c},A,¯¯,6) that satisfies WCP. This part of the output is
shown in Figure 5.5, where the input F is specified in the editable window
and the enforcing rule, in the form x← {b, c}, is listed next to it.
Figure 5.5: A screenshot of the specification of F ′ from Example 5.1 as part
of the ABAplus output
ABAplus employs the JavaScript D3 library to visualise F ′ by depicting
its assumption graph (Args, ↪→), as shown in Figure 5.6. There, circular
nodes with labels next to them represent arguments from Args and arrows
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represent attacks with respect to ↪→= < ∩ (Args × Args). In addition,
the legend in the top left corner indicates that attacks are differentiated by
type and colour (i.e. shade of grey) of arrows as follows: lightest grey dot-
ted arrows represent reverse attacks; medium grey dashed arrows represent
normal attacks; dark grey solid arrows represent <-attacks that are both
normal and reverse.
Figure 5.6: A screenshot of the assumption graph of F ′ from Example 5.1
as part of the ABAplus output
ABAplus also determines and lists the <-σ extensions of F ′, together with
their conclusions, written in the form ‘E ` Cn(E)’, for E a <-σ extension
of F ′. This part of the output is shown in Figure 5.7, where extensions
under all <-σ semantics are listed in columns (omitting the prefix ‘<’) and
the drop-down selection lists offer to highlight and/or compare extensions.
Choosing to highlight an extension prompts ABAplus to redraw the as-
sumption graph and colour green the nodes labelled by the sets of assump-
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Figure 5.7: A screenshot of the extensions (and their conclusions) of F ′ from
Example 5.1 listed as part of the ABAplus output
tions that are subsets of the extension, and colour red the nodes labelled by
the sets of assumptions that are not subsets of the extension. Choosing to
compare extensions prompts ABAplus to replace the assumption graph with
two copies of the assumption graph highlighted accordingly. For instance,
comparison of the <-grounded extension {b} and a <-complete extension
{b, c} of F ′ is shown in Figure 5.8.
To improve readability, nodes of assumption graphs in the graphical visu-
alisations provided by ABAplus can be rearranged with arrows being auto-
matically adjusted, resulting in possibly visually different depictions of the
same assumption graph, as can be seen in Figure 5.8.
Example 5.1 illustrates various features of the ABAplus web application
front-end. We next discuss the back-end.
5.3.2 Back-end
We here discuss the back-end of ABAplus as used in both the stand-alone
system and web application.
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Figure 5.8: A screenshot of the <-grounded and a <-complete extension of
F ′ from Example 5.1 compared as part of the ABAplus output
ABAplus back-end uses the mapping from ABA+ frameworks to their as-
sumption graphs and employs an off-the-shelf AA implementation, namely
the ASPARTIX solver [DGWW11, EGW10, GMR+15], to determine σ ex-
tensions of assumption graphs, thus determining <-σ extensions of ABA+
frameworks. As <-σ extensions of (L,R,A,¯¯,6) satisfying WCP are in one-
to-one correspondence with σ extensions of (Args, ↪→) (Theorem 5.2), such
strategy is sound and complete, as long as ASPARTIX correctly determines
σ extensions of assumption graphs.
The following is a high-level summary of how ABAplus back-end works.
• The input (L,R,A,¯¯,6) is pre-processed (details below).
• Generation of Args goes thus:
– For every assumption α ∈ A, store {α} in Args.
– For every assumption α ∈ A, generate all the deductions for α and
store the supports of those deductions in Args.
• Generation of ↪→ goes thus:
– For every α ∈ A, for each deduction B ` α, check whether ∃β ∈ B
such that β < α:
∗ if not, store B ↪→ {α};
∗ else, store {α} ↪→ B;
– For any A′,B′ ∈ Args such that {α} ⊆ A′ and B ⊆ B′,
∗ if B ↪→ {α}, store B′ ↪→ A′;
∗ if {α} ↪→ B, store A′ ↪→ B′.
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• The assumption graph (Args, ↪→) thus constructed is given as an input
to the ASPARTIX solver and for each semantics σ ∈ {grounded, ideal,
stable, preferred, complete}, σ extensions of (Args, ↪→) are computed.
• For every σ extension E of (Args, ↪→), the <-σ extension E = ⋃ E of
(L,R,A,¯¯,6) is stored.
We next provide a more fine-grained description of how the tasks listed
above are performed.
ABAplus back-end uses the following three Python modules that deal
with computations related to ABA+.
• Abap parser.py contains functions for generating ABA Plus (see next
item) objects from files and strings. In particular, it is used to parse
the input in the format specified in Section 5.3.1 into the format used by
other back-end modules.
• Aba plus .py contains an ABA Plus class that represents an ABA+ frame-
work as well as other classes to represent different components of the
framework (assumptions, rules, preferences and attacks). The ABA Plus
class provides various functions that deal with computations related di-
rectly to the pre-processing of the framework, including the following.
– Checking that no assumptions appear as heads of rules (for flatness).
– Calc transitive closure(): Calculates the transitive closure 6′ of the
given preference relation 6 and updates 6 with 6′ (the input need
not have 6 transitive). Preferences are first represented via a relation
matrix and then a modified version of the Floyd-Warshall algorithm
[CLR90] is used to get the strictest relations among assumptions.
– Checking if the strict counterpart < of 6′ is asymmetric.
– Generate all deductions(S): Based on the rules in R, returns the set of
all sentences, namely Cn(S), that can be deduced from the input set
of sentences S. A bottom-up approach is used to find the deductions.
– Check and partially satisfy WCP(): Checks whether (L,R,A,¯¯,6) sat-
isfies WCP; if not, enforces WCP on (L,R,A,¯¯,6) as in Proposition
4.2. (Note that this already involves computing deductions for con-
traries of assumptions.)
The ABA Plus class also provides the following functions that pertain to
the generation of assumption graphs.
– Generate arguments(ϕ): Based on the rules in R, returns the set of
all sets of assumptions that deduce the input sentence ϕ, i.e. returns
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{S ⊆ A : S ` ϕ}. A top-down recursive procedure is used to find the
sentences that could label deduction trees until assumptions are found.
– Generate arguments and attacks for contraries(): Generates sets sup-
porting deductions for contraries of assumptions as well as attacks
among such sets.
• Aspartix interface.py contains a class ASPARTIX Interface that acts
as an interface between an ABA Plus object and both clingo and DLV,
thus enabling the computation of extensions (through the encodings of
various semantics mentioned at the beginning of Section 5.3). Its main
function is the following.
– Generate input file for clingo(filename): Generates from the ABA+ ob-
ject a file ‘filename’ that can be fed into clingo (for complete, preferred,
stable and grounded semantics) or DLV (for ideal semantics). The re-
sult of generate arguments and attacks for contraries() is used to write
to the specified file ‘filename’ in which arguments and attacks from
(Args, ↪→) are represented via ASPARTIX format Prolog-like sentences:
∗ arg(A). represents an argument A ∈ Args;
∗ att(A, B). represents an attack A ↪→ B.
– Functions such as calculate complete extensions(filename) are used to
compute, in this case, the complete extensions of (Args, ↪→), by passing
the file ‘filename’ to the function in question.
This completes the description of the ABAplus back-end.
In this section, we described the front- and back-ends of the ABAplus sys-
tem. In the next section, we propose an application of ABA+ and ABAplus.
5.4 Event Scheduling Application
We illustrate applicability of ABA+ and its proof-of-concept implementa-
tion ABAplus by means of a simple automatic scheduler of events. The idea
behind a scheduler is that it could act as an intermediary between a user’s
calendar and, for instance, a Doodle poll. The scheduler would receive a
Doodle poll regarding scheduling of a new event and would try to automat-
ically allocate the best time(s) depending on the user’s calendar as well as
information it holds about the user and the user’s preferences learnt by the
scheduler.
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For the illustration of the scheduler, we will work in a setting where
preferences qualify a different type of information than in the examples
considered so far in this thesis. Specifically, preference information will
be used to qualify the relative desirability of certain features of reasoning
outcomes, in contrast to qualifying, for instance, trust or bias in a source of
information. So, for example, we may consider a preference of scheduling
one event over another event. In other words, preferences in this section
can be seen to qualify goals, rather than beliefs.
That said, we model goals in ABA+ through assumptions, so that pref-
erences will be over assumptions, as usual. Assumptions representing goals
amount to assuming defeasibly that a goal can be achieved. For instance, we
may (defeasibly) assume that we can schedule an event. In situations where
goals conflict and not all can be achieved simultaneously, this is captured
by arguing against acceptability of assumptions. For example, if two events
cannot happen at the same time, then the two corresponding assumptions
cannot be mutually acceptable. The relative preference of goals thus simply
renders the relative preference of assumptions, so that one goal being pre-
ferred over another amounts to a bias between the respective assumptions.
In a dialectical setting, different (sets of) goals can be seen as competing to
be achieved. For instance, we can argue with ourselves taking (sets of) goals
as positions of imaginary proponent(s) and opponent(s). Our preferences
over the goals, and hence over the assumptions representing them, can then
help to decide on goals best to fulfil, just like when preferences arbitrate
over defeasible information in, for example, a dialogue (see Example 1.3).
We acknowledge that there is a general distinction between the mean-
ings of a preference over beliefs and over goals, as understood in NMR and
decision theory, respectively. For example, in NMR, preferences over be-
liefs allow to determine a more accurate viewpoint of the situation, whereas
in decision theory, preferences over goals allow to determine the desirable
reasoning outcomes (see e.g. [BNT08b, DHKP11]). In argumentation, this
distinction is less frequently emphasised, as the meaning and use of pref-
erence information is left as an instantiation and knowledge representation
issue (see e.g. [PTV15]). Here, we consider precisely such an instantiation
of ABA+ where goals and preferences over them are expressed via assump-
tions and preferences over them. Whether these types of preference can
in general be modelled interchangeably at the same time preserving their
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meaning, is an open issue discussion of which is beyond the scope of this
work (but see e.g. [BNT08b]).
Now, for the illustration of the scheduler, consider the following scenario.
Suppose that on a particular working day you have a meeting 10:00–12:00
(on your calendar), and that by default you are having lunch at 12:30–13:30
and taking a coffee break at 13:30–14:30. Imagine that at the start of the
day you receive a Doodle poll with a request to schedule a one-hour meeting
today at either 11, or 12, or 13:30. Assume also that having lunch for you
is at least as important as attending the meeting, but that the meeting
has preference over having coffee as usual. Arguably then, you should not
reschedule the morning meeting nor should you push your lunch; rather,
you should have coffee at some other time of the day. An automatic event
scheduler would thus schedule the new meeting at 13:30 and inform you
that you should have coffee some other time.
Let us now see how such a scheduler, based on ABA+, could work.
Suppose the scheduler can generate the set AC comprising the following
assumption from the user’s calendar:
• cal(meeting)(10:00-12:00)
This assumption indicates that the user has a meeting scheduled from 10
to 12 in the morning.
Suppose in addition that the scheduler can generate the setAP comprising
the following assumptions about the user’s default agenda of the day:
• pers(lunch)(12:30-13:30)
• pers(coffee)(13:30-14:00)
These assumptions indicate that the user usually has lunch at half-past
twelve, and takes coffee after lunch at half-past one.
Suppose now that the scheduler can generate the set AD comprising the
following assumptions from a Doodle poll:
• doo(meeting)
• doo(11:00-12:00)
• doo(12:00-13:00)
• doo(13:30-14:30)
The first assumption represents the possibility to actually schedule the
meeting requested by Doodle, while the other assumptions represent possi-
ble time slots for that meeting, as suggested by the Doodle poll.
Let now A = AC ∪AP ∪AD be the set of all assumptions. Suppose that
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the following are user’s preferences that the scheduler has:
• pers(coffee)(13:30-14:00)) < doo(meeting)
• doo(meeting) 6 pers(lunch)(12:30-13:30)
That is, scheduling the meeting takes precedence over having coffee, but
lunch is at least as important as having the meeting.
Now, the scheduler generates the set R consisting of the following rules
based on the time-wise incompatibility of events:
1. doo(meeting)← doo(11:00-12:00), doo(12:00-13:00), doo(13:30-14:30)
2. doo(11:00-12:00)← cal(meeting)(10:00-12:00)
3. doo(12:00-13:00)← pers(lunch)(12:30-13:30)
4. doo(13:30-14:30)← pers(coffee)(13:30-14:00)
Rule 1 says that if none of the time slots proposed in the Doodle poll are
acceptable, then the new meeting cannot be scheduled. Rules 2–4 specify
which time slots are not acceptable, based on the existing calendar arrange-
ments and the user’s usual agenda.
Using our usual conventions, A, 6 and R specify an ABA+ framework
(L,R,A,¯¯,6). Note that it is flat, but does not satisfy WCP: the unique
assumption in the body of the rule 4 is strictly less preferred than the
assumption whose contrary the head of rule 1 is, i.e.
pers(coffee)(13:30-14:00) < doo(meeting),
where pers(coffee)(13:30-14:00) is contained in the support of a deduction
for doo(meeting); however, no deduction for pers(coffee)(13:30-14:00) exists.
The scheduler can thus enforce WCP by adding the following enforcing
rule to R:
5. pers(coffee)(13:30-14:00)← cal(meeting)(10:00-12:00),
pers(lunch)(12:30-13:30), doo(meeting).
The resulting ABA+ framework, call it F ′, has a unique <-σ extension
{cal(meeting)(10:00-12:00), pers(lunch)(12:30-13:30),
doo(meeting), doo(13:30-14:30)}
with conclusions
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{cal(meeting)(10:00-12:00), pers(lunch)(12:30-13:30), pers(coffee)(13:30-14:00),
doo(meeting), doo(13:30-14:30), doo(11:00-12:00), doo(12:00-13:00)}.
This extension together with its conclusions represents the state of affairs
where the requested Doodle meeting is scheduled at half-past one, and the
less preferred after-lunch coffee ritual is dropped instead.
The screenshot in Figure 5.9 shows the (partial) output of ABAplus for
the input framework (L,R,A,¯¯,6) after automatically enforcing WCP and
highlighting the <-grounded extension of F ′. There, the contrary a of an as-
sumption a ∈ A is specified as C(a), e.g. pers(coffee)(13:30-14:00) is specified
as C(pers(coffee)(13:30-14:00)). Since the extension is unique, the screen-
shot is cropped to hide the listed extensions and drop-down selection lists
for highlighting and comparison.
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Figure 5.9: A screenshot of the (partial) ABAplus output for the ABA+
framework (L,R,A,¯¯,6) from Section 5.4
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5.5 Summary
In this chapter, we presented a proof-of-concept system ABAplus that im-
plements flat ABA+ with WCP. Specifically, ABAplus takes a flat ABA+
framework (L,R,A,¯¯,6), enforces WCP on (L,R,A,¯¯,6) if (L,R,A,¯¯,6)
does not already satisfy WCP, and then visualises (L,R,A,¯¯,6), deter-
mines and allows to visualise and compare its <-σ extensions. To both vi-
sualise and determine extensions of flat ABA+ frameworks satisfying WCP,
ABAplus utilises AA frameworks called assumption graphs, which we intro-
duced in Section 5.2, where we also provided theoretical underpinnings of
ABAplus. In Section 5.3, we described both the front-end and the back-end
of ABAplus, illustrating the former with an example, through ABAplus web
application. Finally, we illustrated the applicability of ABA+ and ABAplus
via an illustration of an automatic event scheduler in Section 5.4.
In addition to providing means to compute extensions in ABA+, Theorem
5.2 allows for a concise graphical representation of flat ABA+ frameworks
satisfying WCP, namely via their assumption graphs. Graphical represen-
tation of ABA+ frameworks via assumption graphs has ramifications to
the graphical representation of ABA frameworks too. More precisely, any
flat ABA framework trivially satisfies WCP, so can be represented via its
assumption graph, which provides a more concise representation than the
standard representation through AA frameworks (see e.g. [Ton14]), because
the latter representation requires to depict (as arguments) deductions that
have the same support but different conclusions.
Graphical representations of ABA frameworks have been recently studied
in other settings too. The most similar work to the approach presented in
Section 5.2 is [ST15], where a graphical representation of flat ABA frame-
works by using sets of assumptions supporting deductions is proposed. That
work is however restricted to complete semantics, and moreover, it focuses
on labellings (see e.g. [BCG11]) rather than extensions. Another work on
graphical representation of flat ABA frameworks is that of [CT16a]. There,
ABA frameworks are represented in terms of arguments (i.e. deductions) as
graphs which account for certain issues regarding the so-called flabbiness
and bloatedness of ABA frameworks. Roughly speaking, the former con-
cerns the fact that the same sentences can be deduced from a supporting set
of assumptions in potentially many different ways depending on the rules
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used, and the latter concerns sentences that can be deduced from differ-
ent sets of assumptions. It would be interesting to analyse whether and
how those issues pertain to assumption graphs regarding the efficiency of
their construction. More generally, we leave it for future work to investi-
gate whether the mapping from ABA+ to AA given in Section 5.2 could be
extended to deal with ABA+ frameworks that do not satisfy WCP and/or
are non-flat.
In terms of future work regarding the ABAplus system, we discern sev-
eral broad directions. One involves scalability, i.e. testing and improving
the size of ABA+ frameworks that ABAplus can handle and how fast; so
far, we have used ABAplus only with small size toy examples. Another
concerns extending the scope of ABAplus, in the sense of enabling it to
deal with ABA+ frameworks that do not satisfy WCP and/or are non-flat.
Still further, many technical features relating to ABAplus front-end, such
as query-based interface and improved graphical visualisation, are to be
implemented.
The current version of ABAplus is a first step towards implementing
ABA+ and it is a research tool under development. With this in mind, we
discuss ABAplus in the context of several systems of argumentation with
(and without) preferences in the next chapter, where we compare ABA+ to
several formalisms of argumentation with preferences.
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6 Comparison
In this chapter, we first compare ABA+ to other formalisms of argumen-
tation with preferences, and then discuss several systems of argumentation
with (and without) preferences in relation to ABAplus. Specifically, in
Section 6.1, we consider the three formalisms mostly related to to ABA+,
namely Preference-based Argumentation frameworks (PAFs) [AV14], p ABA
[Wak14], and ASPIC+ [Pra10, MP13]. In addition, we consider Dung’s vari-
ant of ASPIC+ [Dun16b], ABA with implicit preferences, as well as several
other formalisms. In Section 6.2, we discuss several implementations of
formalisms of argumentation with preferences. In particular, we consider
TOAST [SR12] as an implementation of ASPIC+, Gorgias-B as an imple-
mentation of Gorgias [KM03], as well as several other related systems.
6.1 Formalisms of Argumentation with
Preferences
In this section, we compare ABA+ to formalisms of argumentation with pref-
erences most closely related to ABA+. In particular, we focus on: PAFs
(Section 2.3.3) as the only other argumentation formalism to use attack re-
versal (to the best of our knowledge); p ABA (Section 2.3.1) as the only
other formalism extending ABA with explicit preferences; and ASPIC+
(Section 2.3.2) as a well known structured argumentation formalism that
incorporates preferences, and that without preferences has been shown to
both capture flat ABA [MP13, Pra10] as well as to be captured in ABA
[HS16]. We also discuss Dung’s normal attack [Dun14, Dun16a, Dun16b]
in ASPIC+ (Section 6.1.4), as well as several approaches to ABA with im-
plicit preferences as in [KT96, Ton08, FT13, TL14] (Section 6.1.5), and
finally touch upon (Section 6.1.6) several other related formalisms, such as
ASPIC− [CMO14] and Gorgias [KM03].
Unless stated otherwise, in this section, we focus on flat ABA+. This
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restriction makes sense with respect to each formalism in question. In-
deed, p ABA extends (with preferences) flat ABA frameworks, but does
not, to the best of our knowledge, extend (with preferences) generic ABA
frameworks. Similarly, ASPIC+ captures flat ABA frameworks as instances
and ASPIC+ frameworks (without preferences) are captured as flat ABA
frameworks. Still further, PAFs is an AA-based formalism and AA frame-
works can both be instantiated with, and seen as instances of, flat ABA
frameworks [DMT07, Ton12]. Finally, all approaches to ABA with implicit
preferences concern only flat ABA.
6.1.1 PAFs
We begin by comparing ABA+ to PAFs. In particular, we show how ABA+
generalises (i.e. admits as instances) PAFs and argue that ABA+ frame-
works cannot be easily seen as instances of PAFs. Using PAFs as instances
of ABA+ frameworks, we then outline satisfaction of preference handling
principles in PAFs. We also discuss an extension of PAFs, namely Rich
PAFs. See Section 2.3.3 for background on (Rich) PAFs.
ABA+ Generalises PAFs
Following the way ABA generalises AA [Ton12], we show how ABA+ readily
generalises PAFs. In what follows, we assume a PAF (Args, ,4) as given,
unless stated otherwise.
To instantiate an ABA+ framework with a PAF (Args, ,4), we map
each argument A ∈ Args into an assumption A ∈ A, together with a new
symbol A for the contrary, and map each attack A B into a rule B← A.
The preference ordering 4 is transferred as is to constitute 6. Formally:
Definition 6.1. The ABA+ framework corresponding to (Args, ,4)
is (L,R,A,¯¯,6) such that:
• L = Args ∪ {A : A ∈ Args, A 6∈ Args};
• R = {B← A : A B};
• A = Args;
• for A ∈ A, its contrary is A;
• 6=4.
Note that the ABA+ framework corresponding to (Args, ,4) is flat.
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Trivially, attacks in a given PAF are in a one-to-one correspondence with
<-attacks in the corresponding ABA+ framework, as follows:
Lemma 6.1. Let (L,R,A,¯¯,6) be the flat ABA+ framework corresponding
to (Args, ,4) and let A,B ∈ Args. Then A ↪→ B iff {A} < {B}.
Proof. A ↪→ B ⇔ (i) either A B and A ⊀ B
(ii) or B A and B ≺ A
⇔ (i) either ∃ B← A ∈ R and A 6< B
(ii) or ∃ A← B ∈ R and B < A
⇔ {A} < {B}.
From Lemma 6.1 and the construction of the ABA+ framework corre-
sponding to (Args, ,4), we obtain the following correspondence result,
which says that, under any semantics σ, every PAF is an instance of ABA+.
Theorem 6.2. Let (L,R,A,¯¯,6) be the flat ABA+ framework correspond-
ing to (Args, ,4) and let E ⊆ Args. Then E is a σ extension of (Args, ,4)
iff E is a <-σ extension of (L,R,A,¯¯,6).
Proof. We first show that E is admissible in (Args, ,4) iff it is<-admissible
in (L,R,A,¯¯,6).
• Suppose first E ⊆ Args is admissible. Then E is conflict-free in
(Args, ↪→), so it is <-conflict-free in (L,R,A,¯¯,6), by construction
of (L,R,A,¯¯,6) and Lemma 6.1. Now let B  < E for some B ⊆ A.
By construction of (L,R,A,¯¯,6), ∃B ∈ B such that {B} < {A} for
some A ∈ E. By Lemma 6.1, B ↪→ A. As E is admissible, we find
A′ ∈ E with A′ ↪→ B. Again, by Lemma 6.1, {A′}  < {B}. Conse-
quently, E  < B. Thus, E <-defends itself, and so is <-admissible.
• Suppose now E ⊆ A is <-admissible. Then it is <-conflict-free,
so conflict-free in (Args, ↪→), by construction of (L,R,A,¯¯,6) and
Lemma 6.1. Now let B ↪→ E for some B ∈ Args. Then B ↪→ A for
some A ∈ E, so {B} < {A}, by Lemma 6.1. As E is <-admissible, we
find E  < {B}, and, in particular, by construction of (L,R,A,¯¯,6),
{A′} < {B} for some A′ ∈ E. Then A′ ↪→ B, and so E defends itself
in (Args, ↪→). Consequently, E is admissible in (Args, ,4).
It now suffices to prove additional properties as required for each σ se-
mantics. We do this case by case.
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σ = complete.
• Suppose E is a complete extension of (Args, ,4). Let E <-defend
A ⊆ A. Then E <-defends {A} for every A ∈ A, so that E defends
every A ∈ A in (Args, ↪→), by Lemma 6.1. As E is complete, we find
A ⊆ E. Thus, E is a <-complete extension of (L,R,A,¯¯,6).
• Suppose E is a <-complete extension of (L,R,A,¯¯,6). Let E defend
A ∈ Args. Then E <-defends {A}, and as E is <-complete, we have
A ∈ E. Consequently, E is a complete extension of (Args, ,4).
σ = preferred.
• Suppose E is preferred and for a contradiction suppose that E is not
⊆-maximally <-admissible. Then, by construction of (L,R,A,¯¯,6),
E ∪ {A} is <-admissible, for some A ∈ A \ E. But then E ∪ {A}
is admissible in (Args, ,4), so that E is not preferred, which is a
contradiction. By contradiction, E must be <-preferred.
• Suppose E is <-preferred, but not preferred in (Args, ,4). Then
E ∪ {A} is admissible, for some A ∈ Args \ E. But then E ∪ {A} is
<-admissible, which is a contradiction. Hence, by contradiction, E
must be preferred.
σ = stable.
• Suppose E is stable. If E 6 < {B} for some B ∈ A\E, then E 6↪→ B, by
Lemma 6.1, contradicting stability of E. Thus, E must be <-stable.
• Suppose E is <-stable. Then E  < {B} for every B ∈ A \E, so that
E ↪→ B for every B ∈ Args \ E, whence E is stable.
σ = ideal.
• Suppose E is ideal. As E is contained in every preferred exten-
sion P of (Args, ,4), and since preferred extensions of (Args, ,4)
are in one-to-one correspondence with the <-preferred extensions of
(L,R,A,¯¯,6), as per proofs for σ = preferred above, we conclude that
E is contained in every <-preferred extension P of (L,R,A,¯¯,6).
Clearly, E must be ⊆-maximal such, as otherwise E would not be
ideal in (Args, ,4).
• Suppose E is <-ideal. Due to correspondence between preferred ex-
tensions of (Args, ,4) and <-preferred extensions of (L,R,A,¯¯,6),
and because of E’s ⊆-maximality in (L,R,A,¯¯,6), E must be ideal.
σ = grounded.
• Suppose E is grounded. Then E is the ⊆-minimally complete exten-
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sion of (Args, ↪→) and, in particular, the intersection of all complete
extensions of (Args, ↪→) [Dun95b]. Thus, E is the intersection of all
<-complete extensions of (L,R,A,¯¯,6), due to correspondence be-
tween complete extensions of (Args, ,4) and <-complete extensions
of (L,R,A,¯¯,6), as per proof for σ = complete above. Consequently,
E is <-grounded.
• Suppose E is <-grounded. As the intersection of all <-complete ex-
tensions, E is contained in the intersection of all complete extensions
of (Args, ,4). We now claim that E is <-complete. Indeed, suppose
for a contradiction that E <-defends some B ⊆ A such that B * E.
Then E <-defends {B} for every B ∈ B. So pick B ∈ B such that
B 6∈ E. Plainly, E defends B in (Args, ↪→). As E is contained in the
intersection of all complete extensions of (Args, ,4), B is defended
by, and thus must be in, every complete extension of (Args, ,4).
Due to correspondence between complete and <-complete extensions,
B ∈ E. But this is a contradiction. So E must be <-complete after
all. Thus, E is complete, and the ⊆-least such, as the intersection of
all complete extensions. That is, E is grounded.
Thus, ABA+ can be seen to generalise PAFs, similarly to how ABA gen-
eralises AA [Ton12].
ABA+ Frameworks as PAFs
We now investigate whether flat ABA+ frameworks can be seen as instances
of PAFs. It is known that flat ABA frameworks are instances of AA frame-
works [DMT07]. Indeed, following a standard mapping from flat ABA to AA
[DMT07], we can instantiate an AA framework (Args, ) with a flat ABA
framework (L,R,A,¯¯) thus. Choose arguments of the form A : A ` ϕ
(where A names the argument A ` ϕ). For arguments A : A ` ϕ and
B : B ` ψ, define attack A  B whenever ϕ = β for some β ∈ B. Then
there is a correspondence between extensions of the two frameworks, ex-
pressed thus: if S ⊆ Args is a σ extension of (Args, ), then the collection
of assumptions appearing in any of the supports of arguments in S forms a
σ extension of (L,R,A,¯¯); conversely, if E is a σ extension of (L,R,A,¯¯),
then the collection of arguments supported by subsets of E forms a σ ex-
tension of (Args, ) (see e.g. [DMT07, Ton12, Ton14]).
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Let us see whether flat ABA+ frameworks are similarly instances of PAFs.
In addition to the instantiation of arguments and attacks as above, we
need to define a preference ordering 4 over arguments. To this end, given
a preference relation 6 on A, we can, for example, utilise the following
argument comparison principles, based on the comparison principles defined
in ASPIC+ (Definitions 2.24, 2.26, 2.25).
• A ≺Eli B if ∃α ∈ A such that ∀β ∈ B we find α < β;
• A ≺DEli B if ∃α ∈ A \B such that ∀β ∈ B \A we find α < β;
• A 4Dem B if ∀α ∈ A we find β ∈ B with α 6 β;
(as usual, A ≺Dem B if A 4Dem B and B 64Dem A).
Note that we do not claim that any of these principles is of practical sig-
nificance; we merely employ them as commonly used argument comparison
principles.
In general, it is fairly easy to construct an ABA+ framework which, when
used to instantiate an AA framework with any of the above argument com-
parison principles, does not admit correspondence extension-wise:
Example 6.1. Consider (L,R,A,¯¯,6) with
• R = {α← β, x← α, β},
• A = {α, β},
• β < α.
It has a unique <-σ extension {α} with Cn({α}) = {α}. In ABA (ignor-
ing the preferences), the following (named) arguments can be obtained:
A : {α} ` α; B : {β} ` β; B′ : {β} ` α; X : {α, β} ` x.
There are two attacks among these arguments: B′  A and B′  X.
Using 4Eli, 4Dem and 4DEli respectively, we focus on the pairs of arguments
involving attacks and obtain
B′ ≺Eli A, B′ ≺DEli A, B′ ≺Dem A, B′ ≺Dem X.
Thus, with respect to any comparison principle, B′  A is reversed into
the defeat A ↪→ B′, whence A defends X, so that {A,B,X} is a unique σ
extension of (Args, ,4), with conclusions {α, β, x}. Clearly, this extension
does not correspond to the extension {α} in ABA+.
Note that (L,R,A,¯¯,6) from Example 6.1 does not satisfy WCP. This
is the reason why, for instance, the argument B unattacked in (Args, )
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remains undefeated in (Args, ↪→), even though the argument B′ supported
by the same set of assumptions is defeated in (Args, ↪→) by A. Indeed, if an
argument is neither attacked nor attacks any other argument to begin with,
then it will neither defeat nor be defeated by other arguments after account-
ing for preferences. Subject to WCP, however, this is no longer the case:
if WCP is enforced on (L,R,A,¯¯,6) from Example 6.1 by adding the rule
β ← α, then an additional argument A′ : {α} ` β can be constructed that
defeats all of B,B′,X, so that {A,A′} is obtained as the unique σ extension,
which corresponds to the extension in ABA+.
However, we show next that, even subject to WCP, PAFs instantiated
with ABA+ frameworks need not admit correspondence between extensions.
Example 6.2. Consider (L,R,A,¯¯,6) with
• R = {ε← β, β′, β ← ε, β′, β′ ← ε, β, β ← β, β′ ← β′, α← β, β′,
β ← α, β′, β′ ← α, β},
• A = {α, β, β′, ε},
• β < ε.
This ABA+ framework is flat and satisfies WCP. Its assumption graph
(i.e. sets of assumptions that support deductions, together with <-attacks
among them; see Section 5.2) is depicted graphically in Figure 6.1 (highlights
are to improve readability):
{ε}
{ε, β}
{ε, β′}
{β}
{β′}
{α, β}
{α, β′}
{β, β′}
{α}
Figure 6.1: Flat ABA+ framework from Example 6.2 for non-
correspondence between ABA+ and PAFs instantiated with
ABA+ frameworks
In essence, disregarding the other deductions, the self-<-attacking set
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{β, β′} deduces the contraries of both α and ε, but, importantly, β is less
preferred than ε. Therefore, the set {ε} <-attacks {β, β′} (via reverse at-
tack). Consequently, {ε} effectively <-defends {α} from {β, β′}. Overall,
(L,R,A,¯¯,6) has a unique <-complete extension S = {ε, α}, which is, by
Theorem 4.7, <-preferred, <-grounded and <-ideal, and has conclusions
Cn(S) = {ε, α}.
In ABA (ignoring the preferences), the following (named) arguments can
be obtained:
• E : {ε} ` ε;
• B : {β} ` β;
• B′ : {β′} ` β′;
• A : {α} ` α;
• Xε : {β, β′} ` ε;
• EB′ : {ε, β′} ` β;
• EB : {ε, β} ` β′;
• B : {β} ` β;
• B′ : {β′} ` β′;
• Xα : {β, β′} ` α;
• AB′ : {α, β′} ` β;
• AB : {α, β} ` β′.
These arguments together with attacks among them instantiate an AA
framework (Args, ), which is depicted graphically below in Figure 6.2.
E
EB
EB′
B
B
B′
B′
AB
AB′
Xα
Xε
A
Figure 6.2: AA framework (Args, ) instantiated with (L,R,A,¯¯,6) from
Example 6.2
Since the only preference information is β < ε, in the three resulting
PAFs (employing 4Eli, 4Dem and 4DEli, respectively) it suffices to check
only whether attacks on E succeed as defeats. There is only one such attack,
namely Xε  E. We find Xε ≺Eli E and Xε ≺DEli E, while Xε ⊀Dem E.
With respect to the Elitist and Disjoint Elitist comparison principles, the
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attack Xε  E is reversed into the defeats E ↪→Eli Xε and E ↪→DEli Xε respec-
tively. However, the argument E does not defend A in either (Args, ↪→Eli)
or (Args, ↪→DEli) (because Xα  A and neither E 6 Xα nor Xα  E). This
is in contrast to ABA+, where after attack reversal, {ε} <-defends {α}.
Overall, here {E} is a unique complete extension of both (Args, ↪→Eli) and
(Args, ↪→DEli), and hence of both (Args, ,4Eli) and (Args, ,4DEli). The
‘conclusion set’ of {E} is {ε}.
With respect to the Democratic comparison principle, we find Xε ↪→Dem E,
so that E defends neither itself nor A. Thus, ∅ is a unique complete extension
of ((Args, ↪→Dem) and) (Args, ,4Dem), with empty ‘conclusion set’.
In any event, we see that acceptable assumptions in ABA+ do not corre-
spond to acceptable arguments in PAFs, as ∅ ( {ε} ( {ε, α} = Cn(S).
What happens in Example 6.2 is essentially due to the fact that in ABA+,
<-attacks are among sets of assumptions, whereas in PAFs attacks are
among arguments. What this entails is that reversing an attack in ABA+
yields an <-attack on a set of assumptions, whereas reversing an attack
in PAFs yields an attack on a particular argument, but not on arguments
build from the same assumptions. As a consequence, reversing an attack
in ABA+ from one set of assumptions to another may lead to the former
set <-defending other sets of assumptions that were originally attacked by
the latter set: e.g. {ε} <-defends {α} from {β, β′}. By contrast, reversing
an attack in PAFs from one argument to another need not lead to the for-
mer argument defending other arguments that were originally attacked by
arguments built from the premises of the latter argument: e.g. E does not
defend A from Xα.
Example 6.2 establishes a distinction between ABA+ and PAFs instanti-
ated with ABA+ frameworks using three argument comparison principles,
under all but (<-)stable semantics (note that (<-)stable extensions do not
exist in Example 6.2). We leave it for future work to investigate whether
instantiating PAFs with ABA+ while preserving semantic correspondence
is feasible under <-stable semantics. We also leave it for future work to
investigate if other argument comparison principles can preserve semantic
correspondence under any semantics.
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Preference Handling in PAFs
We here briefly discuss the preference handling principles from Section 3.3
in the context of PAFs. In particular, using Theorem 6.2 and results per-
taining to satisfaction of the preference handling principles in ABA+, we
can outline the satisfaction of (appropriately formulated versions of) the
preference handling principles in PAFs.
We first note that [AV14] show that PAFs fulfil the Principle of Conflict
Preservation for complete, preferred, stable and grounded semantics, and
the Principle of Maximal Elements for preferred, stable and grounded se-
mantics; our results additionally show that PAFs fulfil the Principle of Con-
flict Preservation for ideal semantics and the Principle of Maximal Elements
for complete semantics (the latter can be shown for ideal semantics too, but
formally this would require showing that enforcing WCP on ABA+ frame-
works corresponding to PAFs does not change their (<-ideal) extensions,
which is beyond the scope of this work.) Next, Proposition 3.11 indicates
that PAFs fulfil the Principle of Empty Preferences for any σ semantics.
Still further, Proposition 3.13 indicates that PAFs fulfil the First BE Prin-
ciple for stable semantics, whereas Example 3.9 shows that the principle is
not satisfied in PAFs under other semantics: (L,R,A,¯¯,6) from Example
3.9 can be seen as the ABA+ framework corresponding to (Args, ,4) with
Args = {α, α′, β}, β  β, β  α and α′ ≺ α.
The Second BE Principle concerns reasoning with rules, so is not applica-
ble to PAFs. On the other hand, satisfaction of the Principle of Tolerance
follows from the standard results regarding existence of extensions in AA:
PAFs fulfil the Principle of Tolerance for any σ semantics but stable; a
counterexample for stable semantics is Example 4.4, where (L,R,A,¯¯,6)
can be seen as the ABA+ framework corresponding to (Args, ,4) with
Args = {α, β, γ}, α  β, β  γ, γ  α, α  γ and α ≺ γ. Finally,
[AV14] discussed some conditions on PAFs (such as attack relation being
symmetric) that relate extensions of PAFs to extensions of their underly-
ing AA frameworks under preferred and stable semantics, which amounts to
analysing restricted versions of the Principle of Reduction. From our results,
we can see that, in general, PAFs do not fulfil the Principle of Reduction
for any σ semantics: (L,R,A,¯¯, ∅) and (L,R,A,¯¯,6) from Example 3.14
can be seen as the ABA+ frameworks corresponding to (Args, , ∅) and
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(Args, ,4) with Args = {α, β}, α β and α ≺ β, respectively.
ABA+ versus Rich PAFs
We here discuss Rich PAFs—an addendum of PAFs employed to select
among extensions PAFs by using preferences.
In [AV14], the authors make the case for Rich PAFs that are supposed to
provide more intuitive reasoning outcomes than PAFs, as illustrated next.
Example 6.3. Consider (Args, ,4) with
• Args = {A,B,C,D},
• A B, B C, C D, D A,
• B ≺ A, D ≺ C.
The underlying AA framework (Args, ) coincides with the repaired
framework (Args, ↪→) and is depicted in Figure 6.3.
D
A B
C
Figure 6.3: A rich PAF from Example 6.3
(Args, ↪→) has two stable/preferred extensions: {A,C} and {B,D}. How-
ever, note that every argument of {B,D} is less preferred than some argu-
ment from {A,C}, and no argument from {A,C} is less preferred than any
one from {B,D}. Hence, in the opinion of [AV14], {A,C} should be intu-
itively preferred over {B,D}. To obtain this outcome, the authors employ
the following comparison of extensions: for E,E′ ⊆ Args,
E′ E E iff ∀A′ ∈ E′ \ E ∃A ∈ E \ E′ such that A′ ≺ A.
Then (Args, ,4,E) yields {A,C} as a unique stable/preferred extension.
We argue against this intuition. Indeed, as discussed in the Introduction
and in Chapter 3, we believe that using preferences to select among exten-
sions is incompatible with the dialectical nature of argumentation. Using
preferences in two phases to first modify the attack relation and then to se-
lect among the extensions seems to suffer from the same problem. Instead,
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we maintain that preferences help to resolve conflicts, and thus that both the
attack and the preference relations (over arguments in AA, or assumptions
in ABA+) should be accounted for simultaneously. In the case of Example
6.3, the preference of A over B (and likewise of C over D) should not compro-
mise the attack of B against C (D A respectively). Indeed, B successfully
refutes C, and likewise, D successfully refutes A, so the argument pair {B,D}
is well equipped to counter {A,C}. One can insist that, for instance, A re-
instates C by successfully attacking B, but then likewise D reinstates B by
successfully attacking A. And so on, in a cycle. The upshot is that pref-
erences help to resolve conflicts only between arguments/assumptions that
they qualify over.
In this section (6.1.1), we compared ABA+ with PAFs. In particular, we
showed how ABA+ admits PAFs as instances, analogously to how ABA ad-
mits AA frameworks as instances. We also attempted to instantiate PAFs
with ABA+ using a standard way of instantiating AA with ABA+, employ-
ing several widely used argument comparison principles, but saw that such
approach does not deliver semantic correspondence: not all attacks stem-
ming from arguments with the same supporting sets of assumptions are
reversed, whereas in ABA+ attacks are reversed between sets of assump-
tions (supporting possibly multiple deductions). In addition, we considered
preference handling principles in PAFs and extended existing results with
new ones by using ABA+ as a generalisation of PAFs. Finally, we discussed
Rich PAFs.
6.1.2 p ABA
In this section, we discuss p ABA as a formalism extending ABA with
explicit preferences. In particular, we show by way of examples, how p ABA
differs from ABA+ and argue that reasoning outcomes in ABA+ are more
desirable than in p ABA. We also analyse preference handling principles in
p ABA and show that it satisfies a different set of these than ABA+ does.
See Section 2.3.1 for background on p ABA.
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ABA+ versus p ABA
As discussed in the Introduction and Chapter 2, p ABA takes a standard
LP/NMR approach to preferences and uses preference information to select
among extensions. That is, p ABA merely discriminates among extensions
of the underlying ABA frameworks: in Example 2.5, the unique σ extension
{α} of the underlying ABA framework (L,R,A,¯¯) is a unique σ P-extension
of the p ABA framework (L,R,A,¯¯,4), disregarding the preference α ≺ β.
We have argued that the use of preferences to select among extensions goes
against the dialectical nature of argumentation, and that preference infor-
mation should instead help to resolve local conflicts among assumptions, as
it is done in ABA+.
To see another considerable difference between ABA+ and p ABA (as
well as ABA), let us consider odd cycles. In AA and ABA, for instance,
odd cycles frequently prevent existence of, in particular, stable extensions,
and may lead to empty grounded extensions. However, when preference
information is present, it can break cycles. We illustrate with the following
variant of the well known example of a ‘3-cycle’.
Example 6.4. Consider (L,R,A,¯¯,6) with
• R = {β ← α, γ ← β, α← γ},
• A = {α, β, γ},
• γ < β < α.
In ABA, ignoring the preferences, there is an odd cycle of attacks: {α} 
{β}  {γ}  {α}. Hence, (L,R,A,¯¯) has no stable extensions, and ∅ is
its unique complete (hence grounded, ideal and preferred) extension.
Thus, the p ABA framework (L,R,A,¯¯,4) with 4=6 has no stable P-
extensions either, and ∅ is its unique P-extension under other semantics.1
That is, preferences do not really play a role in p ABA, in this example. By
way of contrast, in ABA+, (L,R,A,¯¯,6) has a unique <-σ extension {α}.
The situation is illustrated graphically in Figure 6.4.
Still further, in settings where stable extensions of the underlying ABA
framework exist and extensions under other semantics are non-empty, ABA+
discriminates between extensions differently than p ABA, as shown next.
1By convention, we use 4 in tuples denoting p ABA frameworks in order to differentiate
them from ABA+ frameworks.
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(p )ABA
{γ}
{β}
{α}
ABA+
{γ}
{β}
{α}
Figure 6.4: (p )ABA vs ABA+. 3-cycle
Example 6.5. Consider (L,R,A,¯¯,6) with
• R = {α← δ, β ← α, γ ← β, δ ← γ, γ ← δ},
• A = {α, β, γ, δ},
• δ < α, γ < β.
In ABA, ignoring the preferences, (L,R,A,¯¯) has two stable/preferred
extensions, E = {α, γ} and E′ = {β, δ}, and the grounded/ideal extension
∅. In p ABA, both E and E′ are stable/preferred P-extensions, and ∅ is
the grounded/ideal P-extension, of the p ABA framework (L,R,A,¯¯,4)
with 4=6. In contrast, E is a unique <-stable/<-preferred/<-ideal/<-
grounded extension of (L,R,A,¯¯,6) in ABA+. (The situation is illustrated
graphically in Figure 6.5.)
(p )ABA
{δ}
{α} {β}
{γ}
ABA+
{δ}
{α} {β}
{γ}
Figure 6.5: (p )ABA vs ABA+
Given that α is objected against only by δ, but due to the preference
δ < α this objection is refuted, α is effectively <-unattacked. Hence, ABA+
accepts α, and hence γ, which, conceivably, is the correct outcome: for
instance, in a dialectical setting, information α cannot be validly objected
against due to preferences, and so is justifiably acceptable; in turn, infor-
mation γ, although being objected by both β and δ, is reinstated by α.
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Preference Handling in p ABA
In terms of the preference handling principles, we apply (appropriately re-
formulated versions of) them to p ABA and obtain the following results.
We start with the results that are the same for both ABA+ and p ABA.
In what follows, unless stated differently, we assume a fixed but otherwise
arbitrary p ABA framework (L,R,A,¯¯,4).
First, (L,R,A,¯¯,4) fulfils the Principle of Conflict Preservation, because
p ABA ‘selects’ among ABA extensions, which are conflict-free to begin
with. Second, (L,R,A,¯¯,4) fulfils the Principle of Empty Preferences: if 4
= ∅, thenv= {(E,E) : E ∈ E , E is the set of σ extensions of (L,R,A,¯¯)},
so each σ extension of (L,R,A,¯¯) is a σ P-extension of (L,R,A,¯¯,4). On
the other hand, (L,R,A,¯¯,4) does not fulfil the First BE Principle for
either grounded, ideal, preferred or complete semantics: in Example 2.5,
(L,R,A,¯¯,4) has a unique complete P-extension {α}, while {β} is conflict-
free with α ≺ β. Still further, (L,R,A,¯¯,4) does not fulfil the Second
BE Principle for any σ semantics but—possibly—stable: in Example 3.11,
(L,R,A,¯¯) has a unique complete extension {α} (that is not stable), which
is thus a unique complete (but not stable) P-extension of (L,R,A,¯¯, ∅),
while {α} is not admissible in the underlying ABA framework of F ′, so
cannot be a P-extension of F ′ either. It would be interesting to study if,
as in ABA+, the Second BE Principle is satisfied in p ABA under stable
semantics. Finally, (L,R,A,¯¯,4) does not fulfil the Principle of Reduction
for either stable, preferred or complete semantics: in Example 6.5, without
the preference γ ≺ β, E′ would be neither stable nor complete P-extension.
We continue with principles with respect to which p ABA behaves dif-
ferently than ABA+. First, (L,R,A,¯¯,4) does not fulfil the Principle of
Maximal Elements for any σ semantics, and does not fulfil the First BE
Principle for stable semantics: in Example 2.5, (L,R,A,¯¯,4) has a unique
σ P-extension {α}; yet, β is a unique4-maximal assumption, {β} is conflict-
free and α ≺ β. On the other hand, (L,R,A,¯¯,4) fulfils the Principle of
Tolerance for any σ semantics, because σ P-extensions of (L,R,A,¯¯,4) are
v-maximal σ extensions of (L,R,A,¯¯), and so exist as long as the latter
do. Finally, (L,R,A,¯¯,4) fulfils the Principle of Reduction for grounded
and ideal semantics, because grounded and ideal extensions of (L,R,A,¯¯)
are unique, so no matter what preferences are added, grounded and ideal
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P-extensions will be those of (L,R,A,¯¯).
To summarise, in contrast to ABA+, p ABA accommodates preferences
in order to discriminate among extensions of the underlying ABA frame-
work. This may lead to preference information being ineffective in resolving
conflicts (cf. Examples 2.5, 6.4) and/or the outcomes unintuitive in a di-
alectical setting (cf. Examples 2.5, 6.5). Thus, as expected, p ABA satisfies
a different set of preference handling principles than ABA+.
6.1.3 ASPIC+
ASPIC+ is an expressive argumentation formalism, encompassing many key
elements of structured argumentation with preferences (such as strict and
defeasible rules, general contrariness functions, various forms of attack as
well as preferences). It was shown in [Pra10, MP13] that flat ABA frame-
works can be seen as instances of ASPIC+ frameworks (i.e. as a class of
ASPIC+ frameworks without preferences). In the other direction, it was
shown in [HS16] that ASPIC+ frameworks without preferences can be seen
as instances of flat ABA frameworks. In light of those results, perhaps one
of the most notable features of ASPIC+ is its management of preferences.
In this section, we aim to show that ABA+ manages preferences differently,
and that a natural preference-involving extension of the mapping from ABA
into ASPIC+ (without preferences) does not preserve semantic correspon-
dence between ABA+ and ASPIC+ frameworks.
In order for ASPIC+ frameworks to behave well in general (in the sense
of satisfying various formal properties, such as the Fundamental Lemma or
the rationality postulates), various requirements have to be met, depending
on the definition of conflict-freeness (see Definition 2.29). For instance, con-
traposition (see Definition 2.22, Example 2.6) is used; preferences also have
to satisfy certain reasonableness conditions (see Section 2.3.2). The main
focus of this section is to exhibit an example which adheres to the standard
requirements imposed on ASPIC+ frameworks, but is treated differently
in ABA+ and ASPIC+. In addition, we also discuss preference handling
principles in ASPIC+. See Section 2.3.2 for background on ASPIC+.
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Mapping ABA+ to ASPIC+
To exhibit an example that yields different reasoning outcomes in ABA+
and ASPIC+, we first extend the mapping from ABA to ASPIC+ (without
preferences) provided in [Pra10] to a mapping from ABA+ to ASPIC+(with
preferences). We then consider a particular ABA+ framework that, when
thus mapped into an ASPIC+ framework, satisfies the standard ASPIC+
requirements, but is semantically different from its image in ASPIC+. The
mapping is given as follows.
Definition 6.2. Let (L,R,A,¯¯,6) be a flat ABA+ framework with the
contrary mapping ¯¯ : A → L such that α = αc, where αc ∈ L \ A, for any
α ∈ A.2 The ASPIC+ framework corresponding to (L,R,A,¯¯,6) is
(L, C,Rs,Kp,6p) with:3
• L = L ∪ {¬s : s ∈ L \ A, ¬s 6∈ L, and s 6= αc for any α ∈ A};
• C : L → ℘(L) is such that:
– if α ∈ A, then C(α) = {αc},
– if s = αc for some α ∈ A, then C(s) = {α},
– if s ∈ L \ A and s 6= αc for any α ∈ A, then C(s) = {¬s} and
C(¬s) = {s};
• Rs = {ϕ1, . . . , ϕm → ϕ0 : ϕ0 ← ϕ1, . . . , ϕm ∈ R};
• Kp = A;
• 6p =6.
The following remark regarding the contrariness function is in place. For
any α ∈ A, α and αc are contradictories (i.e. −α is αc and −αc is α); and
otherwise, s and ¬s are contradictories (i.e. −s is ¬s and −¬s is s). We need
to use contradictories, because otherwise preferences do not play a role, in
the sense that undermining attacks always succeed as defeats, whatever the
preferences. For instance, in Example 2.6, if ¬α and ¬β were contraries,
rather than contradictories, of the premises α and β, respectively, then the
attack B′  A would succeed as a defeat under any argument comparison
principle, irrespective of the preference relation over premises.
Due to lack of defeasible rules, all attacks in the ASPIC+ framework
2The condition on the contrary mapping is imposed without loss of generality, see Section
4.1.3.
3Note that the components Rd and 6d containing defeasible rules and preferences over
them are empty, and thus omitted.
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corresponding to (L,R,A,¯¯,6) are undermining attacks (no undercut or
rebut). In particular, simplifying Definition 2.21, for A,B ∈ Args,
A B iff Conc(A) = βc for some β ∈ Prem(B) ∩ Kp.
Also, simplifying Definitions Definitions 2.24, 2.26, 2.25 and 2.27, argument
orderings relevant to the attacks can be given as follows. For A,B ∈ Args
with A = Prem(A) ∩ Kp and β ∈ Prem(B) ∩ Kp:
• A ≺Eli [β] iff A ≺DEli [β] iff ∃α ∈ A such that α <p β;4
• A ≺Dem [β] iff ∀α ∈ A we find α 6p β and if A 6= ∅, then β 6 p α for
some α ∈ A.5
The following example shows that ASPIC+ deals with preferences dif-
ferently from ABA+, in the sense that the extensions of the given ABA+
framework (L,R,A,¯¯,6) have conclusions different from the conclusions
of the extensions of the ASPIC+ framework (L, C,Rs,Kp,6p) correspond-
ing to (L,R,A,¯¯,6), even though (L, C,Rs,Kp,6p) satisfies the standard
ASPIC+ requirements (see Section 2.3.2, particularly Definition 2.22).
Example 6.6. Recall the ABA+ framework (L,R,A,¯¯,6) from Exam-
ple 6.2. Note that it satisfies the Axiom of Contraposition. The ASPIC+
framework (L, C,Rs,Kp,6p) corresponding to (L,R,A,¯¯,6) is thus closed
under contraposition. It is easy to see that (L, C,Rs,Kp,6p) is therefore
well defined (Definition 2.22).
Now, we obtain the following ASPIC+ arguments (similar to those in
Example 6.2, and with the same names, except for X−α and X−ε):
• E = [ε];
• B = [β];
• B′ = [β′];
• A = [α];
• X−ε = [B,B′ → −ε];
• EB′ = [E,B′ → −β];
• EB = [E,B→ −β′];
• B = [B→ −β];
• B′ = [B′ → −β′];
• X−α = [B,B′ → −α];
• AB′ = [A,B′ → −β];
• AB = [A,B→ −β′].
The AA framework (Args, ) generated by (L, C,Rs,Kp,6p) is repre-
sented graphically in Figure 6.6. It has a unique complete extension ∅,
which is thus preferred, ideal and grounded.
4Since {β} is singleton, the condition ‘∀β′ ∈ {β} α <p β′’ becomes ‘α <p β’.
5Since {β} is singleton, the condition ‘A 4Dem {β} and {β} 64Dem A’ is equivalent to
‘∀α ∈ A α 6p β and ∃β′ ∈ {β} with β′ 6 p α for some α ∈ A’, which is in turn
equivalent to ‘∀α ∈ A α 6p β and if A 6= ∅, then β 6 p α for some α ∈ A’.
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Figure 6.6: The AA framework (Args, ) from Example 6.6, generated by
the ASPIC+ framework (L, C,Rs,Kp,6p) corresponding to the
ABA+ framework from Example 6.2
As in Example 6.2, since the only preference information is β <p ε, it suf-
fices to check only whether attacks on E succeed as defeats. With respect to
the Elitist comparison principle, we obtain X−ε ≺Eli E, so that X−ε 6↪→Eli E.
Therefore, (Args, ↪→Eli) has a unique complete extension {E} (which is like-
wise preferred, ideal and grounded) with conclusions (somewhat abusing
the notation) Conc({E}) = ⋃A∈{E} Conc(A) = {ε}. With respect to the
Disjoint Elitist comparison principle, we also obtain X−ε ≺DEli E, whence
(Args, ↪→DEli) has a unique complete/preferred/ideal/grounded extension
{E} too. With respect to the Democratic comparison, X−ε ⊀Dem E be-
cause β′ 6 p ε, so that ↪→Dem = , and so (Args, ↪→Dem) has a unique com-
plete/preferred/ideal/grounded extension ∅ with Conc(∅) = ∅.
As in Example 6.2, (L,R,A,¯¯,6) has a unique <-complete/<-preferred/
<-ideal/<-grounded extension {ε, α}, and Cn({ε, α}) = {ε, α}. Therefore,
under any of the three argument comparison principles, conclusions of the
unique extension (under any semantics bar (<-)stable) of the ABA+ frame-
work and the ASPIC+ framework corresponding to it are different. This
happens due to attack reversal in ABA+, which allows {ε} to <-defend both
itself and {α} against {β, β′}, because β < ε. By contrast, in ASPIC+, the
two arguments X−ε and X−α have the same premises {β, β′}, but only X−ε
attacks E, while X−α attacks A. Hence, even though X−ε  E does not re-
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sult into a defeat (under Elitist and Disjoint Elitist comparison principles)
due to the preference β <p ε, the attack X−α  A does result into a defeat.
In particular, E cannot defend A against the argument X−α that has the
same premises as the argument X−ε against which E defends itself.
In effect, since <-attacks in ABA+ are among sets of assumptions rather
than among arguments as deductions as in ASPIC+, attack reversal in
ABA+ allows sets of assumptions not only to counter-attack their attackers
due to preferences, but also to <-defend other sets of assumptions that are
attacked by those attackers. It seems intuitive that using preferences to
counter-argue against some particular information means arguing against
that information in general, and thus has consequences on the acceptability
of other information too. This is not reflected in ASPIC+ in the same way
as it is in ABA+, due to diverging intuitions on how preference information
should be accounted for and also due to differences in the technicalities of
the two formalisms. Consequently, semantic correspondence between ABA+
and ASPIC+ frameworks is not attained using a natural mapping from
ABA+ to ASPIC+, even under standard ASPIC+ requirements, as shown
in Example 6.6. Whether any correspondence is possible under (<-)stable
semantics, and whether other mappings from ABA+ to ASPIC+ would al-
low to establish a correspondence for some restricted class of frameworks,
is a line of future research.
Preference Handling in ASPIC+
It would be interesting to formulate the preference handling principles from
Section 3.3 to be applicable to ASPIC+, where this has not been done yet
(cf. [Dun16b]). However, given that preferences in ASPIC+ frameworks can
be on both premises and defeasible rules, there may be many variants of the
principles. Also, their satisfaction would depend on the argument compari-
son principles used. We leave precise analysis for future work, but suggest
several informal remarks next (having in mind informal reformulations of
the principles in question).
On the one hand, it is known that depending on the definition of conflict-
freeness, ASPIC+ may or may not satisfy the Principle of Conflict Preser-
vation [MP13]. In particular, with the most commonly used definition of
defeat conflict-freeness (Definition 2.29), ASPIC+ needs, for instance, con-
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traposition, to ensure that extensions are conflict-free with respect to the
attack relation before accounting for preferences (see e.g. Example 2.6). On
the other hand, The Principle of Empty Preferences is satisfied in ASPIC+,
since without preferences the defeat relation is the same as the attack rela-
tion. With respect to the the Principle of Maximal Elements, the following
example indicates that satisfaction of the principle depends on the ordering
of arguments used.
Example 6.7. Consider (L,R,A,¯¯,6) withR = {β ← α, γ}, A = {α, β, γ}
and α < β, β 6 γ, γ 6 β. The ASPIC+ framework corresponding to
(L,R,A,¯¯,6) admits the following arguments and attacks: A = [α], B =
[β], C = [γ], A2 = [A,C → −β]; A2  B. With respect to the Demo-
cratic comparison principle, we find A2 ⊀Dem B, so that A2 ↪→Dem B. Hence,
(Args, ↪→Dem) has a unique σ extension S = {A,C,A2}, such that {β, γ} *
{α, γ,−β} = Conc(S), where {β, γ} is the set of 6p-maximal premises (and
{B,C} is conflict-free with respect to either  or ↪→Dem).
Note that (L,R,A,¯¯,6) does not satisfy the Axiom of Contraposition, so
the ASPIC+ framework corresponding to (L,R,A,¯¯,6) is not closed under
contraposition. So close the ASPIC+ framework under contraposition by
adding, for instance, the rules β, γ → −γ and β, γ → −α. Then there are
two additional arguments, namely A1 = [A,B→ −γ] and A3 = [B,C→ −α],
and the following attacks: A1  C,A2,A3, A2  B,A1,A3, A3  A,A1,A2.
We find A1 ⊀Dem C and A3 ⊀Dem A, in addition to A2 ⊀Dem B, whence
(Args, ↪→Dem) has three stable/preferred extensions, {A,B,A1}, {A,C,A2}
and {B,C,A3}, and a unique grounded/ideal extension ∅, with the set of
6p-maximal premises {β, γ} not being a subset of the conclusions of any of
{A,B,A1}, {A,C,A2} and ∅.
Similarly, [Dun16b] shows that satisfaction of the First BE Principle in
ASPIC+ depends on the chosen argument comparison principle: for exam-
ple, the (version of the) principle (concerning preferences over defeasible
rules) is not satisfied with respect to the Elitist (weakest-link6) argument
ordering, under stable semantics. Regarding the Second BE Principle, re-
sults in [Dun16b] show that ASPIC+ satisfies the principle with respect to
both Elitist and Democratic comparison principles, under stable semantics.
6See e.g. [MP13, Dun16b] for definition and details.
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Satisfaction of the Principle of Tolerance in ASPIC+, just like in PAFs,
follows from the standard results regarding existence of extensions in AA:
the principle is satisfied under all but stable semantics. Finally, ASPIC+
need not in general satisfy the Principle of Reduction: considering the
ASPIC+ framework closed under contraposition from Example 6.7, we find
that without preferences it (equivalently, (Args, )) admits a grounded,
ideal, complete extension ∅, while with preferences, both (Args, ↪→Eli) and
(Args, ↪→DEli) admit {B,C,A3} as a grounded, ideal, complete extension.
To summarise, it is plain that ABA+ differs conceptually from ASPIC+ in
that attacks in ABA+ are reversed due to preference information, while in
ASPIC+ attacks are discarded instead. We showed that, as a consequence,
even flat ABA+ frameworks satisfying the Axiom of Contraposition can
yield semantically different outcomes when mapped into ASPIC+ frame-
works (in a natural manner), due to the fact that <-attacks in ABA+ are
among sets of assumptions rather than among arguments as deductions as
in ASPIC+. We also informally discussed the preference handling princi-
ples in ASPIC+ and indicated that their satisfaction depends on the precise
formulations of the principles as well as argument orderings employed.
6.1.4 Dung’s Normal Attack
We here discuss Dung’s approach to ASPIC+ as in [Dun14, Dun16a, Dun16b].
In [Dun16b], Dung proposed a novel attack relation, called normal attack,
for rule-based structured argumentation formalisms with preferences, very
much in the spirit of ASPIC+. This notion of normal attack is presented
in a simplified ASPIC+ setting, where premises (i.e. Kp) are represented
as defeasible rules with empty bodies, similar to e.g. [CMO14]. In such a
setting, we can attempt to map ABA+ into ASPIC+ as in Section 6.1.3,
but with the following change in Definition 6.2: instead of having premises
as assumptions (Kp = A), we have
• set of defeasible rules Rd = {⇒ α : α ∈ A},
• an ordering 6d on Rd given by ⇒ α 6d ⇒ β iff α 6 β, and
• Kp = ∅ with 6p = ∅.
For our purposes, normal attack can be defined thus.7 Let A,B be
7This is the notion of a normal rebut in [Dun16a, Dun16b], sufficient for our purposes.
The normal attack also incorporates undercutting (see Definition 2.21).
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(ASPIC+) arguments. A normal-attacks B (at B′), written A  N B,
iff B′ = [⇒ β] ∈ Sub(B), Conc(A) = −β and @[⇒ α] ∈ Sub(A) such
that ⇒ α <d ⇒ β. Dung’s proposal is, given an ASPIC+ framework
(L, C,Rs,Rd,6d,Kp,6p), to generate ASPIC+ arguments Args and then
use directly the normal attack relation  N to construct AA frameworks
(Args, N ) and compute extensions.
With the change in the mapping from ABA+ to ASPIC+, and using the
normal attack described above, we next revisit Example 6.6 to illustrate the
difference between ABA+ and Dung’s approach.
Example 6.8. Mapping the ABA+ framework (L,R,A,¯¯,6) from Exam-
ple 6.6 into an ASPIC+ framework as discussed above, we obtain arguments
E = [⇒ ε], B = [⇒ β], B′ = [⇒ β′], A = [⇒ α], and otherwise X−ε, EB′, EB,
B, B′, X−α, AB′, AB as in Example 6.6. The normal attack relation  N
coincides with the Elitist defeat ↪→Eli, and so (Args, N ) has a unique com-
plete extension {E} with conclusions {ε}. Contrasting with ABA+, where
(L,R,A,¯¯,6) yields {ε, α} as a unique <-complete extension (see Example
6.2) with conclusions {ε, α}, we see the same behaviour in Dung’s approach
as that observed in ASPIC+ in Example 6.6.
We see that when focusing on the modified natural map from ABA+ to
ASPIC+ as in this section, Dung’s normal attack coincides with the Elitist
defeat, wherefore ABA+ differs from Dung’s approach for the same reasons
that ABA+ differs from ASPIC+. Whether any correspondence between
ABA+ and ASPIC+ with Dung’s normal attack can be established using
different mappings is a line of future research. Also for future investigations
we leave out Dung’s recently introduced canonical attack [Dun16a], which,
roughly, is the union of all the regular attack relations on a knowledge
base, and with respect to which stable extensions coincide with the stable
extensions with respect to the normal attack, subject to satisfaction of the
property of self-contradiction (see e.g. [Dun16b]). Still further, it would be
interesting to investigate preference handling principles with respect to all
of these attack relationships, where this has not been done yet.
6.1.5 ABA with Implicit Preferences
In this section, we briefly consider the approaches to reasoning with pref-
erences in ABA found in [KT96, Ton08, FT13, TL14]. We do not analyse
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these approaches in detail for two reasons. First, they deal with preferences
implicitly on the object level. That is, preferences are encoded within the
existing components (rules, assumptions and contraries) without modifying
the semantics. In contrast, ABA+ and other formalisms of argumentation
with preferences discussed in this work, handle preferences explicitly in that
preferences are assumed over existing components, and modify the seman-
tics. The latter approach facilitates inspection of how a formalism behaves
with and without preferences, and what preference handling features it ex-
hibits, thus allowing for comparison against other formalisms. The second
reason is that the approaches in question are highly specialised (particu-
larly [FT13, TL14], and, to a certain extent, [Ton08]) and/or have not been
investigated in depth.
Toni and Kowalski In the early beginnings of ABA [KT96], and later
in applying ABA to epistemic and practical reasoning [Ton08], preferences
among rules are dealt with by adding conditions (i.e. assumptions) to bodies
of rules expressing that the rules are not attacked by other higher preference
rules, by way of appropriately defining contraries of these assumptions. For
instance, given two ABA rules ϕ ← ϕ0, . . . , ϕm and ψ ← ψ0, . . . , ψn, if
a preference of the second rule over the first one is to be expressed, then
one could introduce new assumptions α and β with contraries α = ψ and
β = βc (where βc is a new symbol), and replace the two rules above with
the following rules: ϕ← ϕ0, . . . , ϕm, α and ψ ← ψ0, . . . , ψn, β.
More generally (as in [Ton08]), one can assume a naming function as-
signing distinguished names to elements (e.g. rules) of a given domain, and
given preferences over the elements of the domain, consider a language that
includes sentences expressing those preferences. For example, the two rules
ϕ ← ϕ0, . . . , ϕm, α and ψ ← ψ0, . . . , ψn, β can be given names r and r′ re-
spectively, and the language L would contain a ‘preference sentence’ r < r′
expressing that the second rule is preferred over the first one. Then, when
mapping the domain into an ABA framework, a rule ψ ← r < r′, β could
be added, so as to account for preferences, which could be stated e.g. via
a rule r < r′ ← >. This way, ABA can also account for dynamic pref-
erences, i.e. preferences that are themselves deducible using rules, possibly
from other assumptions. Note, however, that unlike ABA+, this approach
does not deal with preferences over assumptions.
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Thang and Luong Yet another way to deal with preferences in ABA on
the object level is used in [TL14] when translating Brewka’s preferred sub-
theories [Bre89] into ABA. To capture the interplay between classically in-
consistent sentences and partial preference information among them, [TL14]
introduce assumptions for representing sentences in the domain language as
well as for determining their acceptance status in the construction of pre-
ferred subtheories, and further introduce rules for: deriving sentences from
their corresponding assumptions; deriving contraries of the least preferred
elements of ⊆-minimally inconsistent subsets; enforcing (non-)acceptance
of an assumption iff the statuses of more preferred assumptions are deter-
mined. This is illustrated next.
Example 6.9. Let us rewrite the rules of the framework F+C from Example
3.5 as D = {α, γ → ¬β, β, γ → ¬α} (where → is material implication)
to constitute a default theory T = (D, <) with preferences α < β and
α < γ. This partial order < admits two extensions to total orders, namely
α < β < γ and α < γ < β, both of which result in the same preferred
subtheory of T , namely {β, γ}. (See [Bre89] for details.)
The domain can be mapped into an ABA framework (L,R,A,¯¯) with
A = {aα, aβ, aγ} ∪ {bα, bβ, bγ},
R = {α← aα, β ← aβ, γ ← aγ} ∪ {aα ← aβ, bβ, aγ , bγ}∪
{aα ← bα, aβ ← bβ, aγ ← bγ}∪
{bβ ← >, bγ ← >, bα ← aβ, bβ, aγ , bγ ,
bα ← aβ, bβ, aγ , bγ , bα ← aβ, bβ, aγ , bγ , bα ← aβ, bβ, aγ , bγ}.
This (L,R,A,¯¯) has a unique stable extension {aβ, aγ}, corresponding to
the unique preferred subtheory {β, γ} of T . Note also that this outcome
corresponds to the ABA+ outcome obtained in Example 3.5, where {β, γ}
is a unique <-stable extension of F+C .
Fan and Toni Another example of preferences dealt with in ABA within
the object level is to support decision making with preferences over goals
[FT13]. Differently from the other approaches overviewed in this section,
this method is specific to decision making settings, and uses preferences over
sentences (the goals) within decision criteria (e.g. various kinds of “domi-
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nance”, see [FT13]) for choosing “best” decisions.
6.1.6 Other Formalisms
In this section, we briefly discuss two related formalisms, namely ASPIC−
and Gorgias, and touch upon several other formalisms of argumentation
with preferences.
ASPIC−
In [CMO14], a simplified version of ASPIC+, called ASPIC−, with a varia-
tion of one ASPIC+ attack relation, called unrestricted rebut, was proposed.
In ASPIC−, axioms and premises are omitted and instead represented as
strict and defeasible rules, respectively. The new attack relation is based on
the idea that while (standard) rebut in ASPIC+ is allowed only on the con-
clusion of a defeasible rule, unrestricted rebut is allowed on the conclusion of
any rule. A major feature of ASPIC− is that so far it works only with total
preference orderings over defeasible rules, and if a preorder is used instead,
as in ABA+, then the extensions under various semantics need not satisfy
the rationality postulates of [CA07] or other desirable properties, as noted
in [CMO14]. (This can also be witnessed by analysing Example 6.8 using
the unrestricted rebut.) It would nonetheless be interesting to investigate
in the future the relation of ABA+ and a generalisation of ASPIC− to deal
with partial preference orderings.
Gorgias
Based on LP with acceptability semantics [KMD94] but without negation
as failure [DK95], and developed for decision making of autonomous agents
[KM03], Gorgias is
a general argumentation framework that combines the ideas of
preference reasoning and abduction in a way that preserves the
benefits of both of them. It can form the basis for reasoning
about adaptable preference policies in the face of incomplete
information from dynamic and evolving environments.8
8http://www.cs.ucy.ac.cy/∼nkd/gorgias/
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Gorgias frameworks9 consist of (extended) LP-type rules in the underly-
ing monotonic logic with the single inference rule of modus ponens. Gor-
gias incorporates preferences over rules expressed implicitly at the object
level, namely, assuming two named rules r1 and r2, preference of the former
over the latter is expressed via a (preference) rule with head h p(r1, r2).
Preferences in Gorgias are thus dynamic (also see e.g. [PS99, BW10]) and
context-dependent, in that preferences can be deduced and conditioned on
other information.
Arguments in Gorgias are sets of rules. Attacks among arguments are de-
fined whenever their subarguments deduce complementary literals, subject
to a particular condition regarding preferences: if the attacked argument
deduces that some rule in the attacker argument is less preferred than some
rule in the attacked argument, then the attacker argument must also de-
duce that some rule in the attacked argument is less preferred than some
rule in the attacker argument. Arguments are evaluated via admissibility
semantics, where admissibility is defined via consistency and the ability
to defend against attacks, and (credulous and sceptical) acceptability (or
consequence) is defined via ⊆-maximal admissibility.
The way preferences are dealt with in Gorgias seems very much different
from the way they are dealt with in ABA+. Also, Gorgias employs essen-
tially one semantics, that of preferred extensions, whereas ABA+ uses, in
addition to <-preferred semantics, four other semantics. Nonetheless, some
examples indicate that, possibly, there could be a correspondence between
the two formalisms for some classes of frameworks.10 It would be interesting
to investigate in the future whether this is indeed the case.
Other
Several other approaches to argumentation with preferences, such as the
early version of preference-based argumentation frameworks [AC02], Value-
based Argumentation [BC03, KvdT08], Deductive Argumentation [BH14]
and DeLP [GS14], use preferences to discard attacks from arguments less
preferred than the attackees. Similar in spirit are Abstract Dialectical Frame-
works [BES+13] (where an attack may fail if the attacked argument has a
supporting argument that is preferred over the attacker) as well as AA-based
9Called argumentation theories in [KM03].
10Personal communication with Antonis Kakas.
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formalisms representing preferences as attacks on attacks (e.g. Extended Ar-
gumentation Frameworks [Mod09], Argumentation Frameworks with Recur-
sive Attacks [BCGG11]). For reasons similar to those advocated regarding
the differences between ABA+ and ASPIC+, those formalisms are different
from ABA+, but a precise analysis of any correspondence is left for future
research.
In this section (Section 6.1), we compared ABA+ to formalisms of argu-
mentation with preferences most relevant to ABA+. In the next section, we
turn to ABAplus and discuss it in the context of other systems of argumen-
tation with preferences.
6.2 Systems of Argumentation with Preferences
In this section, we consider, in relation to ABAplus, several systems im-
plementing either argumentative reasoning with preferences or ABA. More
specifically, in Section 6.2.1, we consider TOAST [SR12] as an implementa-
tion of ASPIC+. In Section 6.2.2, we discuss Gorgias-B as an implementa-
tion of Gorgias. We also consider several other related systems in Section
6.2.3.
6.2.1 TOAST
TOAST [SR12] implements (an early version [Pra10] of) ASPIC+, and is
available as a web application at toast.arg-tech.org. For a given ASPIC+
framework, TOAST computes ASPIC+ arguments, attacks and extensions.
It also visualises arguments and attacks thus computed as an AA framework.
As an input, TOAST processes axioms and premises, strict and defeasi-
ble rules, contrariness function, as well as preferences over defeasible rules.
It can also ensure that the ASPIC+ framework in question is closed under
transposition (see Definition 2.22), and this is used instead of closure under
contraposition. TOAST can lift preferences from defeasible rules to argu-
ments by way of either last- or weakest-link ordering principles (see [Pra10]
for details), implicitly employing a variant of the Elitist comparison princi-
ple. The defeat relation among arguments is computed accordingly, and the
resulting AA framework can be evaluated under four semantics: grounded,
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preferred, stable and semi-stable. TOAST computes the number of exten-
sions under a chosen semantics, depicts the final AA framework with nodes
coloured green (accepted arguments) and red (non-accepted arguments),
and allows the user to choose any extension to be visualised. For conci-
sion, TOAST also allows to hide the so-called islands in the framework—
arguments that neither defeat, nor are defeated by other arguments.
In relation to ABAplus, it is interesting that TOAST accommodates pref-
erences over defeasible rules, but not over premises. That said, premises
and preferences over them could presumably be expressed through defea-
sible rules and preferences over them (see also Section 6.1.4). Another re-
lated feature of TOAST is the ability to transpose rules (see closure under
transposition, Definition 2.22). Even though in general transposition and
contraposition do not imply each other (see e.g. [Pra10]), any of the two
can be used in ASPIC+ to ensure desirable properties. Transposition, how-
ever, seems easier to check and implement, for it requires just transposing
the strict rules, without the need to generate deductions. ABAplus instead
allows for enforcing WCP, and by a simple modification can deal with (full)
contrapostion as well.
6.2.2 Gorgias-B
Gorgias-B is a stand-alone system in development based on Gorgias, avail-
able at gorgiasb.tuc.gr/index.html. Given an application scenario, Gorgias-
B guides the user through a decision problem by incremental refinements,
where the user is presented with several (usually conflicting) alternatives
and is asked for preference information in order to evaluate which alterna-
tive to follow.
The pipeline of using Gorgias-B is as follows. First, the user inputs the
so-called options, which roughly represent possible choices in a decision
problem. Complements (or negations) of options can then be automatically
specified as options, if needed. Arguments for options can then be added.
These amount to sets of rules, seen as deductions in the underlying mono-
tonic logic for literals. Arguments consist of (defeasible) rules for choosing
an option with or without conditions, and of (defeasible) rules with sup-
porting information, i.e. premises. The user can also specify non-defeasible
knowledge, i.e. facts, and defeasible knowledge, representing beliefs.
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Gorgias-B then goes into the arguing phase, where conflicts among options
are found, indicated, and presented to the user to state the preferences
over alternative options, possibly dependent on other conditions. Then,
given the arguments and user’s preferences, attacks are generated through
deductions of contrary literals subject to preferences. An important feature
of the arguing phase is its hierarchical structure: given conflicting options,
the user may specify conditional preferences; in particular, preferences can
be incompatible depending on the context; in such a case, a new conflict,
among preferences, arises, and is presented to the user on a higher level of
hierarchy to be solved by other preferences. Multiple levels on the hierarchy
may be needed to resolve all the conflicts, whence Gorgias-B can proceed
to its final phase.
The final phase of Gorgias-B is running the scenarios, which entails find-
ing arguments for declared options. There, the user can specify as facts
particular information applicable to the scenario in question. To make a
decision, the user can specify as goals queries for particular options, or can
explore all the options at once. Reasoning outcomes are presented as sets
of arguments (rules) that lead to the desired goal.
Apart from the differences between ABA+ and Gorgias as formalisms
of argumentation with preferences (see Section 6.1.6), the most significant
aspect in which Gorgias-B differs from ABAplus is that Gorgias-B is ‘inter-
active’ and both guides through, as well as asks the user for information,
about the scenario at work. By contrast, ABAplus takes user information
at once and provides reasoning outcomes, without the need for the user to
specify any further information. In particular, ABAplus resolves conflicts
at once accounting for the preferences, if any, while Gorgias-B requires the
user to give preferences for conflicts on the go. Nonetheless, with regards
to the possible application of ABAplus (Section 5.4), it could be a useful
feature of ABAplus to be able to query the user for preferences, in addition
to accounting for the already known preferences. We leave this for future
work. In addition, Gorgias-B allows for abductive reasoning, so that when
an agent has a goal in mind, it can try to abduce information that would
lead to the fulfilment of the goal. We aim to explore incorporation of goal
fulfilment capabilities in ABAplus in the future.
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6.2.3 Related Systems
We finally discuss several other related systems of argumentation with pref-
erences.
DeLP
DeLPclient, available at lidia.cs.uns.edu.ar/delp client, is a web applica-
tion implementing reasoning in DeLP [GS14]. It allows to specify logic
programs with strict and defeasible rules, and preferences over the latter,
which are accounted by discarding attacks. Given a program, DeLPclient
answers queries and can also provide explanations of the answers in terms
of arguments and counter-arguments for the warrant status of the query.
We will explore whether query-based explanations could be implemented in
ABAplus in the future.
Carneades
Carneades [GW16] implements the argumentation formalism Carneades
[GPW07], and is both a stand-alone system, available at carneades.github.io,
and a web application, available at carneades.fokus.fraunhofer.de/carneades.
The system supports weights on arguments (which are instantiations of ar-
gumentation schemes see e.g. [GW09, WBC07]), and employs proof stan-
dards and weighting functions to balance arguments and evaluate their
acceptance via grounded semantics. Carneades also visualises argument
graphs and indicates structural links within.
ConArg
ConArg [BRS16] implements Weighted Argumentation Frameworks (WAFs)
[BS10] and is both a stand-alone system and a web application, available
at hdmi.unipg.it/conarg. ConArg allows for specifying (via graphical in-
terface) WAFs—AA frameworks with weights on attacks—and computes
their extensions under various semantics. Weights on attacks are accounted
for by specifying budgets of how much conflict (within extensions) can be
tolerated and how much can defence be relaxed.
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6.3 Summary
In this chapter, we compared ABA+ to other formalisms of argumentation
with preferences, and discussed several systems of argumentation with pref-
erences in relation to ABAplus.
Specifically, in Section 6.1, we considered the three formalisms mostly
related to to ABA+, namely: PAFs, which employ attack reversal in AA;
p ABA, which extends ABA with explicit preferences; and ASPIC+, which
is a structured argumentation formalism closely related to ABA+. We saw
how these approaches relate to ABA+ and also sketched their preference
handling properties. In addition, we discussed Dung’s normal attack, several
approaches to ABA with implicit preferences, as well as several other related
formalisms, in relation to ABA+.
In Section 6.2, we discussed several implementations of formalisms of ar-
gumentation with preferences, in relation to ABAplus. In particular, we
considered TOAST as an implementation of ASPIC+, Gorgias-B as an im-
plementation of Gorgias, as well as several other related systems, such as
DeLP. We outlined some features of those systems that ABAplus could
benefit from.
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7 Conclusions and Discussion
In this chapter, we conclude the thesis with a summary of our contribu-
tions and an informal discussion on ABA+ regarding two broad themes in
argumentation and reasoning more generally. First, we give conclusions in
Section 7.1. Then, in Section 7.2, we provide an informal discussion on the
approaches that ABA+ takes to preferences and rationality (Sections 7.2.1
and 7.2.2). Finally, in Section 7.3, we summarise future work directions.
7.1 Conclusions
We have presented ABA+, a structured argumentation formalism that con-
servatively extends Assumption-Based Argumentation (ABA) with a mech-
anism to explicitly deal with preference information. ABA+ incorporates a
technique of reversing attacks due to preferences—this is a novelty in struc-
tured argumentation with preferences. Reversing attacks in ABA+ amounts
to recognising conflicts between (sets of) assumptions and using preference
information to resolve those conflicts. Preferences help to resolve conflicts
locally, in favour of the (sets of) assumptions that are challenged by less
preferred assumptions. This is done by taking into account the structure of
arguments (as deductions) into account, and is compatible with the dialec-
tical nature of argumentation.
One important feature of ABA+ is that it preserves the general asym-
metry of (the contrary mapping and hence) attacks. In particular, the way
attack reversal is incorporated in ABA+ does not amount to making attacks
symmetric and then using preferences to discard (some of) them. Another
salient aspect is that ABA+ assumes preferences on the object level (i.e. over
assumptions) and integrates them directly into the definition of attack,
rather than assuming preferences on the meta level (e.g. over arguments
or extensions). Preferences are therefore not lifted from the object level to
the meta level, thus circumventing the issue of not reversing attacks stem-
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ming from the same (sets of) assumptions. A further major attribute is that
preference information is on a par with other defeasible and non-defeasible
information in ABA+ frameworks, in that it is used to generate the attack
relation and thus generate extensions as reasoning outcomes, rather than
to select among extensions thus post-processing the outcomes of reasoning
without preferences, as common in approaches to LP/NMR with prefer-
ences. Yet another characteristic is that ABA+ allows for preferences in
generic ABA frameworks, as opposed to allowing for preferences only in flat
ABA frameworks [BDKT97], as in e.g. [KT96, Ton08, FT13, TL14, Wak14].
We have shown that ABA+ satisfies various desirable properties, includ-
ing but not limited to relationships among semantics, rationality postulates
and preference handling (Chapter 3). In particular, we have presented seven
preference handling principles applicable to ABA+, based on properties con-
sidered in [AV09, AV10, BTW10, Kac11, Sˇim14, Dun16b], and studied which
principles ABA+ frameworks fulfil under various semantics. We have argued
that it is a desirable feature of ABA+ frameworks that they either do or do
not fulfil particular principles under different semantics.
Another important contribution of this work is a new principle, the Ax-
iom of Weak Contraposition (WCP, see Chapter 4), that relaxes the well
known principle of contraposition (used e.g. in [MP13, Dun16b]). On the
one hand, WCP is a preference-dependent version of contraposition that
allows to identify the defeasible information responsible for conflicts and
further indicates how to modify the knowledge in order to successfully ar-
gue against that information. Importantly, such modification of knowledge
representation—called enforcing WCP—is more selective, and can thus be
less invasive, than enforcing contraposition. Enforcing WCP and reversing
attacks in ABA+ therefore does not amount to making attacks symmetric
and then using preferences to discard them.
On the other hand, WCP is a strictly weaker version of contraposition
that guarantees various additional desirable properties for ABA+. In partic-
ular, flat ABA+ with WCP exhibits additional desirable relationships among
semantics and satisfies additional desirable preference handling principles.
Subject to WCP, we have also discussed non-monotonic inference properties
of Cautious Monotonicity and Cumulative Transitivity in flat ABA+.
Still further, we have presented an implementation of (flat) ABA+ sub-
ject to WCP: the proof-of-concept system ABAplus provides a web interface
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to work with ABA+, can check and enforce WCP on (flat) ABA+ frame-
works, computes, visualises and allows for comparison of extensions under
five ABA+ semantics (Chapter 5). To develop ABAplus, we have advanced
a semantics-preserving mapping from flat ABA+ with WCP to abstract
argumentation (AA).
Regarding related work on argumentation with preferences, we have com-
pared ABA+ to several formalisms of argumentation with preferences and
discussed several systems of argumentation with (and without) preferences
in relation to ABAplus (Chapter 6). We have shown that ABA+ gen-
eralises Preference-based Argumentation Frameworks (PAFs) [AV14], dif-
fers from ABA Equipped with Preferences (p ABA) [Wak14] and devi-
ates from the majority of formalisms of argumentation with preferences
which discard attacks due to preference information (e.g. [AC02, BC03,
KvdT08, BES+13, BH14, CMO14, GS14, Dun16b]), particularly ASPIC+
[Pra10, MP13, MP14]. We have argued that the generalisation of PAFs
through ABA+ is a proper one and that attack reversal in ABA+ thus
takes into account the structure of arguments (as deductions). We have
argued that ABA+ improves upon p ABA as a formalism respecting the di-
alectical nature of argumentation while dealing with preferences. We have
seen that ABA+ reasoning outcomes are genuinely different from those of
e.g. ASPIC+, in that due to attacks in ABA+ being among sets of as-
sumptions, reversing attacks may lead to defence of assumptions that were
attacked by the same set of assumptions, whereas discarding attacks need
not lead to defence of arguments that were attacked by arguments stem-
ming from the same assumptions/premises. The significance here is that
preference information may help to reinstate other defeasible information
through attack reversal, as opposed to, for instance, just assessing the di-
alectical validity of attacks. We have also identified the main features that
distinguish ABAplus from other systems implementing either argumenta-
tion with preferences or ABA, as well as those features that would be of
interest to equip ABAplus with.
7.2 Informal Discussion
In this section, we survey in general terms the behaviour of ABA+ as re-
gards two broad themes in argumentation and reasoning with preferences
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more generally. To this end, we discuss what kind of interpretation of
preference information ABA+ employs, and deliberate about the kind of
reasoning that ABA+ aims to model. Specifically, we suggest, in Section
7.2.1, that ABA+ takes a descriptive, as opposed to prescriptive, approach
to preferences information. In Section 7.2.2, we propose that ABA+ takes
a descriptive, as opposed to normative, approach to rationality.
7.2.1 ABA+ as a Descriptive Approach to Preferences
In their survey and classification of formalisms of NMR with preferences
[DSTW04], the authors distinguish two interpretations of how preferences
are dealt with [DSTW04, pp. 312–313; emphasis original]:
In a prescriptive interpretation, the ordering < specifies the or-
der in which defaults are to be considered for application. Thus,
one applies (if possible) the most preferred default(s), the next
most preferred and so on. In a descriptive interpretation, the
preference order represents a ranking on desired outcomes: the
desirable (or preferred) situation is one where the most preferred
default(s) are applied.
In other words, in prescriptive approaches a preference ordering represents
the order in which objects subject to the preference relation (e.g. rules,
defaults, assumptions) are to be considered.1 In descriptive approaches,
on the other hand, one has to see the bigger picture and ensure that the
reasoning outcome adheres to the expressed preferences.2 An easy way to
discriminate between the two approaches is via a Default Logic example
given in [BE00], sometimes called the prioritised triangle. We reformulate
this example in ABA+, following the mapping of Default Logic into ABA
given in [BDKT97].
Example 7.1. Consider a default theory with no world knowledge and
three ordered defaults :aa <
:¬x
¬x <
a:x
x . (In Reiter’s notation, the defaults
1Prescriptive approaches are also called procedural in e.g. [SA14].
2Sometimes, prescriptive and descriptive approaches are also said to follow the last-
and weakest-link principles, respectively (personal communication with Leon van der
Torre); this is not to be confused with the last- and weakest-link ordering principles,
as used in e.g. [Pra10, MP13]; due to overloads of meaning, we use only the terms
prescriptive and descriptive.
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would be >:Maa ,
>:M¬x
¬x ,
a:Mx
x .) Informally, following [DSTW04], in a pre-
scriptive approach, the most preferred default a:xx is inapplicable, because
the antecedent a is lacking; nonetheless, the two next most preferred de-
faults are applicable, so the outcome is {a,¬x}. In a descriptive approach,
on the other hand, application of :aa allows to apply the most preferred
default, so the outcome is {a, x}.
Let us model this default theory in ABA+ via (L,R,A,¯¯,6) with
• R = {a← α, ¬x← β, x← a, γ},
• A = {α, β, γ},
• β = x, γ = ¬x,
• α < β < γ.
Note well that here, assumptions represent the defeasible applicability of
rules, as discussed in Section 3.1. Hence, preferences over assumptions in
effect represent preferences over rules. This way of introducing assumptions
that stand for applicability of rules so as to model preferences over rules is
similar to the way suggested in [KT96], as discussed in Section 6.1.5. The
difference is that in ABA+ we actually have an explicit preference relation
over assumptions, so that we do not need to introduce new contraries and/or
rules.
Now note that (L,R,A,¯¯,6) does not satisfy WCP. We have {γ} < {β}
via reverse attack, and also {α, γ}  < {β} via reverse attack. Both {α}
and {γ} are <-unattacked, {α, γ} is <-conflict-free, and since {α, γ}  <
{β} via reverse attack, we conclude that {α, γ} is a <-stable extension of
(L,R,A,¯¯,6), with Cn({α, γ}) = {α, γ, a, x}. (The assumption graph of
(L,R,A,¯¯,6) is depicted in Figure 7.1.) Since {γ} is <-unattacked and <-
attacks {β}, no set containing β is <-admissible, and hence {α, γ} is actually
a unique <-stable, as well as <-preferred, <-complete, <-ideal and <-well
founded extension. This indicates that ABA+ uses a descriptive approach
to preferences.
Now suppose that we want to enforce WCP on (L,R,A,¯¯,6). In order
to satisfy WCP, we need the following:
• B ` α for some B ⊆ {β, γ};
• C ` β for some C ⊆ {γ}.
Suppose we add some rules to R in order to guarantee existence of the
required deductions. Assuming either C = ∅ or C = {γ}, we check what
happens in every possible case.
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{α}
{β}
{α, γ}
{γ}
Figure 7.1: ABA+ framework from Example 7.1 indicating that ABA+ ex-
hibits a descriptive approach to preferences
1. B = ∅: we have ∅  < {α}, so {γ} is a unique <-σ extension, for
σ ∈ {grounded, ideal, stable, preferred, complete}.
2. B = {β}: we have {β} < {α}, but since {γ} < {β}, we still have
{α, γ} as a unique <-σ extension.
3. B = {γ}: we have {γ} < {α}, so that {γ} is a unique <-σ extension.
4. B = {β, γ}: we have {β, γ}  < {α}, but since {α, γ}  < {β} as
before, we have {α, γ} < {β, γ} too; also, since {γ} is <-unattacked
as before and <-attacks {β}, we know that {β, γ} cannot be <-
admissible; therefore, {α, γ} is a unique <-σ extension.3
We see that depending on how (L,R,A,¯¯,6) is modified to satisfy WCP,
in this example ABA+ never takes the prescriptive approach to preferences.
Indeed, in cases 2. and 4., the approach taken is descriptive, and, in par-
ticular, case 4. is the arguably most interesting situation where WCP is
enforced as in Section 4.1.2.
In general, ABA+ takes a ‘global’ view of preferences, in that less pre-
ferred assumptions can go hand-in-hand with more preferred assumptions,
excluding assumptions that are somewhere in between with respect to the
preference information. Particularly, the preference ordering does not spec-
ify the order in which assumptions have to be considered; rather, the exten-
sions depend on the global interaction between assumptions, their contraries
and preferences.
A great number of formalisms of NMR with preferences were classi-
fied in terms of prescriptive and descriptive interpretations of preferences
in [DSTW04]. Most were deemed to be prescriptive or semi-prescriptive
(i.e. largely prescriptive, yet exhibiting some flavour of the global view of
3Note that the case with B = {β, γ} and C = {γ} is the one where WCP is enforced as
in Section 4.1.2.
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preferences). Several, most notably [SI00]’s approach to ASP, were deemed
descriptive, and, in summary, use preferences to compare extensions of the
underlying frameworks without preferences. In the context of the fact that
ABA admits as instances various NMR formalisms [BDKT97], it is inter-
esting to see how ABA+ relates to NMR formalisms extended with prefer-
ences. On the one hand, regarding descriptive NMR formalisms that use
preferences to select among extensions of the underlying frameworks with-
out preferences, notably [SI00], we investigated the relationship between
ABA+ and p ABA (which is based directly on [SI00]’s approach) in Section
6.1.2, and saw that the two take very different approaches to preferences.
More generally, ABA+ deviates from such formalisms because it uses prefer-
ences not to compare (or select among) extensions, but to possibly generate
new ones (cf. the Principle of Tolerance and the Principle of Reduction in
Section 3.3). On the other hand, in the light of Example 7.1 which indi-
cates ABA+ as taking a descriptive rather than prescriptive approach to
preferences, ABA+ differs from prescriptive NMR formalisms too.
In summary, by virtue of our results and discussions, we take it that
ABA+ provides a new flavour of a descriptive interpretation of prefer-
ences in argumentation and NMR. It would nonetheless be interesting to
compare more formally our findings with those in related works on the
distinction between prescriptive and descriptive approaches to preferences,
e.g. [LOvdTV16].
7.2.2 ABA+ as a Descriptive Approach to Rationality
Decision theory is commonly classified into two branches: normative and de-
scriptive [Tve75].4 The first concerns making the best—rational—decisions,
whereas the latter studies how possibly irrational decisions are made. Ra-
tionality criteria are formally defined and reflect, for instance, the maximum
expected utility; see e.g. [KT79, MS11].
Argumentation formalisms, as well as KR paradigms more generally, can
also be similarly classified into normative and descriptive approaches: the
first are supposed to inform people how to reason in order to achieve the
best outcomes; the latter aim to model how people actually reason. (For
the distinction in informal argumentation, see e.g. [CH13].) Criteria for
4There is an unfortunate overload of the word ‘descriptive’; in this section, its meaning
is different from the one used in Section 7.2.1.
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best reasoning outcomes can also be formally defined: for instance, in argu-
mentation, one example is the rationality postulates of [CA07] (see Section
3.2.3); see also e.g. [BG07, Amg14] for other properties regarding ‘good’
argumentative reasoning. On the other hand, whether a formalism follows
actual human reasoning can be judged against one’s own intuitions and/or
experiments (see e.g. [RMB+10, CTO14]).
Even though ABA+ satisfies (the appropriate versions of) the rationality
postulates (see Section 3.2.3), it does not mean that ABA+ can be straight-
forwardly classified as a normative approach. Actually, some preference
handling properties can also be seen as rationality criteria for normative
reasoning,5 but they are not necessarily satisfied in ABA+ in general: for
instance, their satisfaction may depend on a particular semantics (see Sec-
tion 3.3). Indeed, we do not see ABA+ as (necessarily) a normative formal-
ism; in particular, its properties with respect to preference handling may
indicate more of a descriptive nature. In fact, to analyse whether this is
the case, we have conducted a small experiment, which we relate next. The
experiment and its connection to argumentative reasoning with preferences
is discussed in more detail in [Cˇyr16, Cˇyr17]. Here, we give an account
of its relation to ABA+ in terms of the distinction between normative and
descriptive approaches to rationality.
Consider the following scenario.
Example 7.2 (Cakes). There are three pieces of cakes on a table: a piece
of Almond cake, a Brownie, and a piece of Cheesecake. You want to get as
many cakes as possible, and the following are the ‘rules of the game’.
a) You can take cakes from the table in two ‘rounds’:
1. In the first round you can take at most two cakes;
2. In the second round you can take at most one cake.
b) If you take Almond cake and Cheesecake in the first round, Brownie
will not be available in the second round. (Nothing is known about
other possible combinations.)
Finally, very importantly, suppose that you prefer Brownie over Almond
cake. (No other preferences.)
Which pair(s) of cakes would you choose in the first round?
Obviously, {Almond cake, Cheesecake} is not a good option, because it
5Personal communication with Leon van der Torre.
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prevents one from getting the Brownie. Meanwhile, among pairs {Almond
cake, Brownie} and {Brownie, Cheesecake} both result in the desired out-
come. In addition, neither of the two is in conflict with the preference infor-
mation: on the one hand, since there are no preferences involving Cheese-
cake, {Almond cake, Brownie} does not violate the preference of Brownie
over Almond cake; on the other hand, {Brownie, Cheesecake} satisfies the
preference too, as along Cheesecake, the more preferred item is chosen in-
stead of the less preferred one.
Both choices {Almond cake, Brownie} and {Brownie, Cheesecake} seem
to be equally good, or ‘rational’, in the sense that both lead to the desired
outcome of obtaining all the cakes and both satisfy the preference relation.
As a decision, one could thus randomly choose between the two pairs.
However, upon the inception of the problem, it seemed as if the {Brownie,
Cheesecake} choice is somehow more intuitive, or preferred.6 We have there-
fore, with the hypothesis in mind that {Brownie, Cheesecake} is the pre-
ferred choice, conducted an anonymous survey with precisely the formula-
tion as in Example 7.3. There were four possible answers:
• {Almond cake, Brownie}
• {Brownie, Cheesecake}
• Indifferent between {Almond cake, Brownie}, and {Brownie, Cheesecake}
(I.e. randomly choose one of the two pairs)
• Other
The three concrete answer choices were presented in a random order for
each respondent, while the ‘Other’ choice, which allowed for a free text
specification, was always the last one.
In the survey, out of total 84 participants, 41 (i.e. 48.81 %) chose “Brownie
and Cheesecake”, and only 10 (11.90 %) chose “Almond cake and Brownie”,
while 32 (38.10 %) participants said they were indifferent between the two
pairs, and 1 (1.19 %) person suggested taking Almond cake and Cheesecake.7
So, not only did {Brownie, Cheesecake} dominate more than four times
{Almond cake, Brownie}; it also got 10 % more responses than the option
6This was initially confirmed by posing the problem to a handful of colleagues.
7 The survey results can be found at https://www.surveymonkey.com/results/SM-
GLNNBZ8Q/. We have surveyed PhD students at the Department of Computing,
Imperial College London. Invitations to take the survey were distributed by email
via the Department’s PhD students’ mailing list. We do not claim any statistically
significant findings; the survey was meant to support/undermine our belief in the way
preferences work in common-sense reasoning problems.
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of being indifferent between the two pairs. This suggests that Brownie and
Cheesecake is the more ‘intuitive’ choice in this problem.
There may presumably be multiple explanations for the mismatch be-
tween the results of the survey and the ‘rational’ solution delineated above.
We are not going to speculate on this issue, and instead will formalise this
scenario in ABA+ and show that, subject to WCP, ABA+ yields the ‘intu-
itive’ solution to the problem, thus indicating its descriptive nature.
The formalisation of the Cakes example in ABA+ is as follows.
Example 7.3. Consider an ABA+ framework F = (L,R,A,¯¯,6) with
• R = {β ← α, γ},
• A = {α, β, γ},
• α < β.
Here, the assumptions α, β and γ stand for the possibility to take the
cakes—Almond, Brownie and Cheesecake, respectively. The rule β ← α, γ
represents the ‘rule of the game’ that taking Almond cake and Cheesecake in
the first round eliminates the choice of Brownie in the second round. Finally,
the preference α < β indicates that Brownie is preferred over Almond cake.
Note well that preferences in this ABA+ framework can be seen to qualify
goals, where goals are modelled through assumptions. We have already seen
an example of and discussed such preferences in Section 5.4.
F can be depicted graphically as in Figure 7.2.
{α}
{β}
{γ}
{α, β}
{α, γ}
{β, γ}
Figure 7.2: ABA+ framework (not satisfying WCP) from the Cakes example
(Example 7.3)
Just like the ABA+ framework from Example 3.6 (which differs from
F only by the extra preference β < γ), F has {α, β} and {β, γ} as its
<-preferred extensions, neither of which is <-stable (or <-complete, for
that matter). These two <-preferred extensions correspond to the ‘rational’
solution to the problem.
Note that F does not satisfy WCP: {α, γ} ` β is an instance of WCP
with a unique witness α. So let us enforce WCP on F . Our standard way
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of doing this (Section 4.1.2) entails adding, for instance, the rule α ← β, γ
to R. The resulting ABA+ framework F ′ = (L,R ∪ {α ← β, γ},A,¯¯,6)
satisfies WCP. Its assumption graph is depicted in Figure 7.3.
{α}
{β}
{γ}
{α, β}
{α, γ}
{β, γ}
Figure 7.3: ABA+ framework (satisfying WCP) from the Cakes example
(Example 7.3)
F ′ has {β, γ} as a unique <-σ extension, which represents the ‘intuitive’
solution to the problem, under any semantics.
So, in the context of Example 7.3, ABA+ with WCP can be seen as a
descriptive approach (to rationality), in that it opts for the ‘intuitive’, rather
than the ‘rational’, reasoning outcome.
Our preliminary investigation opens up space for discussions on how to
deal with such reasoning problems involving preferences in argumentation,
as well as in AI more generally.
7.3 Future Work
In this section, we give future work directions and recap the ones mentioned
throughout the thesis.
Regarding properties pertaining to argumentation formalisms in general,
it would be interesting to define and study other semantics in ABA+, e.g. <-
semi-stable semantics (see Section 2.2.2), and to further investigate rational-
ity postulates and their satisfaction in ABA+, taking into account classical
negation (see Section 3.2.3).
In terms of preference handling principles (Section 3.3), we aim to for-
mulate and analyse additional principles, drawing from e.g. [Kac11, Sˇim14,
Dun16a, Dun16b]. It would be interesting to provide, for ABA+, different
formulations of some of the current principles too, e.g. the First BE Princi-
ple. We also plan to provide various formulations of, as well as to analyse,
the principles in other formalisms, e.g. ASPIC+.
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As regards WCP (Chapter 4), we will study further relaxations of the ax-
iom, and whether they guarantee the same desirable properties for ABA+
as WCP does, with respect to e.g. relationships among semantics and pref-
erence handling. We will analyse different ways of enforcing WCP too and
how this changes the reasoning outcomes. It would also be interesting to
research other possible relaxations of the Axiom of Contraposition that take
preferences into account, and whether they define classes of ABA+ frame-
works that exhibit similar properties to those exhibited by flat ABA+ with
WCP. Importantly, we aim to explore what effects both WCP and the Ax-
iom of Contraposition have on non-flat ABA+.
With respect to non-monotonic inference (Section 4.2.3), we will scruti-
nize the behaviour of flat ABA+ regarding the interaction of preferences and
information change. We plan to investigate related properties, e.g. attack
monotonicity [Dun16b], in ABA+ too. It would also be interesting to see
what the non-monotonic inference properties amount to in non-flat ABA+
and how non-flat ABA+ behaves regarding them. More generally, we could
also draw from studies regarding belief revision and information change in
argumentation (e.g. [BGL14, BBC+14, BB15, DHL+15, CMKMM15]), and
see if they are applicable to ABA+.
Concerning ABAplus (Chapter 5), we will test and improve the scalability
and efficiency of the system, in terms of the size of ABA+ frameworks it
can handle and the time it takes to determine and visualise extensions.
We are also planning to further develop the system to deal with ABA+
frameworks that are non-flat and/or do not satisfy WCP. This entails either
searching for novel mappings from ABA+ to AA or finding algorithmic
ways to determine ABA+ reasoning outcomes directly. On a smaller scale,
we will develop parametric ways to enforce WCP, interactive interface for
specifying preferences and/or rules, query-based computations. We also aim
to relax conditions which define a valid ABAplus input as well as to improve
features of ABAplus output, such as graphical visualisations. Regarding
graphical representations of ABA frameworks as assumption graphs, we
will relate them to other graphical representations of ABA frameworks,
e.g. [ST15, CT16a].
With regard to comparison of both ABA+ and ABAplus to, respectively,
formalisms of argumentation with preferences and systems of argumentation
(Chapter 6), we will further study the relationship of ABA+ to the afore-
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mentioned formalisms and will explore if features of other systems, such as
Gorgias-B, can be implemented in ABAplus. In particular, we will investi-
gate if PAFs can be instantiated with ABA+ frameworks, study additional
preference handling principles in p ABA, analyse various mappings between
ABA+ and ASPIC+ (and its variants), and formulate as well as study pref-
erence handling principles in ASPIC+ (and its variants). Moreover, we will
pursue a more detailed comparison between ABA+ and other formalisms,
such as Gorgias.
In terms of reasoning with preferences more generally (Section 7.2), we
will further explore ABA+ as taking a descriptive (as opposed to prescrip-
tive) approach to preferences as well as a descriptive (as opposed to nor-
mative) approach to rationality. We also aim to analyse more precise rela-
tionships of ABA+ to formalisms of NMR with preferences, as reviewed in
e.g. [DSTW04]. Moreover, we will explore if studies on preferences as they
appear in other areas of AI (see e.g. [DHKP11, PTV15] for overviews) can be
applied to argumentation with preferences in general, and ABA+ in partic-
ular. More generally, we aim to draw from studies on preferences in various
fields of related disciplines, such as legal reasoning (e.g. [Han06, Hor11]),
philosophy (e.g. [HGY12]), social choice (e.g. [KT79, MS11, DL13]), in or-
der to inform our research further.
Other future work directions include: analysing complexity of reason-
ing problems in ABA+, akin to analysis for ABA in [DNT02, Dun09];
studying whether computational mechanisms of ABA’s dispute derivations
[DKT06, DMT07, Ton13] can be adapted to ABA+; relating ABA+ to the
version of ABA where sets of arguments are seen as graphs [CT16a]; study-
ing whether and how dynamic preferences (see e.g. [KT96, PS99, BW10])
can be accommodated in ABA+.
221
Bibliography
[AB09] Leila Amgoud and Philippe Besnard. Bridging the Gap between Ab-
stract Argumentation Systems and Logic. In Llu´ıs Godo and Andrea
Pugliese, editors, Scalable Uncertainty Management - 3rd Interna-
tional Conference, pages 12–27, Washington, DC, 2009. Springer.
[ABC+06] Leila Amgoud, Lianne Bodenstaff, Martin Caminada, Peter McBur-
ney, Simon Parsons, Henry Prakken, Jelle van Veenen, and Gerard
Vreeswijk. ASPIC: Final Review and Report on Formal Argumen-
tation System. Technical report, 2006.
[AC02] Leila Amgoud and Claudette Cayrol. A Reasoning Model Based on
the Production of Acceptable Arguments. Annals of Mathematics
and Artificial Intelligence, 34(1-3):197–215, 2002.
[Amg14] Leila Amgoud. Postulates for Logic-Based Argumentation Systems.
International Journal of Approximate Reasoning, 55(9):2028–2048,
2014.
[Ant97] Grigoris Antoniou. Nonmonotonic Reasoning. MIT Press, 1997.
[AP09] Leila Amgoud and Henri Prade. Using Arguments for Making and
Explaining Decisions. Artificial Intelligence, Amgoud, L.(3-4):413–
436, 2009.
[AV09] Leila Amgoud and Srdjan Vesic. Repairing Preference-Based Ar-
gumentation Frameworks. In Craig Boutilier, editor, 21st Inter-
national Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 665–670,
Pasadena, 2009.
[AV10] Leila Amgoud and Srdjan Vesic. On the Role of Preferences in Ar-
gumentation Frameworks. In 22nd IEEE International Conference
on Tools with Artificial Intelligence, volume 1, pages 219–222, Arras,
2010. IEEE.
[AV11] Leila Amgoud and Srdjan Vesic. A New Approach for Preference-
Based Argumentation Frameworks. Annals of Mathematics and Ar-
tificial Intelligence, 63(2):149–183, 2011.
[AV14] Leila Amgoud and Srdjan Vesic. Rich Preference-Based Argumenta-
tion Frameworks. International Journal of Approximate Reasoning,
55(2):585–606, 2014.
[BB15] Ringo Baumann and Gerhard Brewka. AGM Meets Abstract Ar-
gumentation: Expansion and Revision for Dung Frameworks. In
Qiang Yang and Michael Wooldridge, editors, 24th International
Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 2734–2740, Buenos
Aires, 2015. AAAI Press.
222
[BBC+14] Pietro Baroni, Guido Boella, Federico Cerutti, Massimiliano Gia-
comin, Leendert van der Torre, and Serena Villata. On the In-
put/Output Behavior of Argumentation Frameworks. Artificial In-
telligence, 217:144–197, 2014.
[BC03] Trevor J M Bench-Capon. Persuasion in Practical Argument Us-
ing Value Based Argumentation Frameworks. Journal of Logic and
Computation, 13(3):429–448, 2003.
[BCA09] Trevor J M Bench-Capon and Katie Atkinson. Abstract Argumenta-
tion and Values. In Guillermo Ricardo Simari and Iyad Rahwan, edi-
tors, Argumentation in Artificial Intelligence, pages 45–64. Springer,
2009.
[BCD07] Trevor J M Bench-Capon and Paul E Dunne. Argumentation in Ar-
tificial Intelligence. Artificial Intelligence, 171(10-15):619–641, 2007.
[BCG11] Pietro Baroni, Martin Caminada, and Massimiliano Giacomin. An
Introduction to Argumentation Semantics. The Knowledge Engi-
neering Review, 26(4):365–410, 2011.
[BCGG11] Pietro Baroni, Federico Cerutti, Massimiliano Giacomin, and Gio-
vanni Guida. AFRA: Argumentation Framework with Recursive At-
tacks. International Journal of Approximate Reasoning, 52(1):19–37,
2011.
[BDKT97] Andrei Bondarenko, Phan Minh Dung, Robert Kowalski, and
Francesca Toni. An Abstract, Argumentation-Theoretic Approach
to Default Reasoning. Artificial Intelligence, 93(97):63–101, 1997.
[BE99] Gerhard Brewka and Thomas Eiter. Preferred Answer Sets for Ex-
tended Logic Programs. Artificial Intelligence, 109(1-2):297–356,
1999.
[BE00] Gerhard Brewka and Thomas Eiter. Prioritizing Default Logic. In
Steffen Ho¨lldobler, editor, Intellectics and Computational Logic, vol-
ume 19 of Applied Logic Series, pages 27–45. Kluwer, 2000.
[BES+13] Gerhard Brewka, Stefan Ellmauthaler, Hannes Strass, Johannes Pe-
ter Wallner, and Stefan Woltran. Abstract Dialectical Frameworks
Revisited. In Francesca Rossi, editor, 23rd International Joint Con-
ference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 803–809, Beijing, 2013. IJ-
CAI/AAAI.
[BG07] Pietro Baroni and Massimiliano Giacomin. On Principle-based Eval-
uation of Extension-based Argumentation Semantics. Artificial In-
telligence, 171(10-15):675–700, 2007.
[BG09] Pietro Baroni and Massimiliano Giacomin. Semantics of Abstract
Argument Systems. In Guillermo Ricardo Simari and Iyad Rah-
wan, editors, Argumentation in Artificial Intelligence, pages 25–44.
Springer, 2009.
223
[BGH+14] Philippe Besnard, Alejandro Javier Garc´ıa, Anthony Hunter, Sanjay
Modgil, Henry Prakken, Guillermo Ricardo Simari, and Francesca
Toni. Introduction to Structured Argumentation. Argument & Com-
putation, 5(1):1–4, 2014.
[BGL14] Pietro Baroni, Massimiliano Giacomin, and Beishui Liao. On
Topology-related Properties of Abstract Argumentation Semantics.
A Correction and Extension to Dynamics of Argumentation Sys-
tems: A Division-based Method. Artificial Intelligence, 212:104–115,
2014.
[BGL15] Pietro Baroni, Massimiliano Giacomin, and Beishui Liao. Deal-
ing with Generic Contrariness in Structured Argumentation. In
Qiang Yang and Michael Wooldridge, editors, 24th International
Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 2727–2733, Buenos
Aires, 2015. AAAI Press.
[BH95] Franz Baader and Bernhard Hollunder. Priorities on Defaults
with Prerequisites, and Their Application in Treating Specificity
in Terminological Default Logic. Journal of Automated Reasoning,
15(1):41–68, 1995.
[BH01] Philippe Besnard and Anthony Hunter. A Logic-based Theory of De-
ductive Arguments. Artificial Intelligence, 128(1-2):203–235, 2001.
[BH09] Philippe Besnard and Anthony Hunter. Argumentation Based on
Classical Logic. In Guillermo Ricardo Simari and Iyad Rahwan,
editors, Argumentation in Artificial Intelligence, pages 133–152.
Springer, 2009.
[BH14] Philippe Besnard and Anthony Hunter. Constructing Argument
Graphs with Deductive Arguments: A Tutorial. Argument & Com-
putation, 5(1):5–30, 2014.
[BKRvdT13] Richard Booth, Souhila Kaci, Tjitze Rienstra, and Leendert van der
Torre. Monotonic and Nonmonotonic Inference for Abstract Argu-
mentation. In Chutima Boonthum-Denecke and G. Michael Young-
blood, editors, 26th International Florida Artificial Intelligence Re-
search Society Conference, pages 597–602, St. Pete Beach, 2013.
AAAI Press.
[BL04] Ronald J Brachman and Hector J Levesque. Knowledge Represen-
tation and Reasoning. Elsevier, 2004.
[BNT08a] Gerhard Brewka, Ilkka Niemela¨, and Miros law Truszczyn´ski. Non-
monotonic reasoning. In Frank van Harmelen, Vladimir Lifschitz,
and Bruce W Porter, editors, Handbook of Knowledge Representa-
tion, volume 3 of Foundations of Artificial Intelligence, pages 239–
284. Elsevier, 2008.
[BNT08b] Gerhard Brewka, Ilkka Niemela¨, and Miros law Truszczyn´ski. Pref-
erences and Nonmonotonic Reasoning. AI Magazine, 29(4):69–78,
2008.
224
[Boc04] Alexander Bochman. A Causal Approach to Nonmonotonic Reason-
ing. Artificial Intelligence, 160(1-2):105–143, 2004.
[Bre89] Gerhard Brewka. Preferred Subtheories: An Extended Logical
Framework for Default Reasoning. In N. S. Sridharan, editor,
11th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages
1043–1048, Detroit, 1989. Morgan Kaufmann.
[Bre91] Gerhard Brewka. Cumulative Default Logic: In Defense of Non-
monotonic Inference Rules. Artificial Intelligence, 50(2):183–205,
1991.
[Bre94] Gerhard Brewka. Adding Priorities and Specificity to Default Logic.
In Craig MacNish, David Pearce, and Lu´ıs Moniz Pereira, editors,
Logics in Artificial Intelligence, European Workshop, volume 838
of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 247–260, York, 1994.
Springer.
[Bre95] Gerhard Brewka. Reasoning about Priorities in Default Logic. In
Barbara Hayes-Roth and Richard E Korf, editors, 12th National
Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 940–945, Seattle, 1995.
AAAI Press/MIT Press.
[Bre96] Gerhard Brewka. Well-Founded Semantics for Extended Logic Pro-
grams with Dynamic Preferences. Journal of Artificial Intelligence
Research, 4:19–36, 1996.
[BRS16] Stefano Bistarelli, Fabio Rossi, and Francesco Santini. ConArg:
A Tool for Classical and Weighted Argumentation. In Pietro Ba-
roni, Thomas Gordon, Tatjana Scheﬄer, and Manfred Stede, edi-
tors, Computational Models of Argument, volume 287 of Frontiers
in Artificial Intelligence and Applications, pages 463–464, Potsdam,
2016. IOS Press.
[BS10] Stefano Bistarelli and Francesco Santini. A Common Computational
Framework for Semiring-based Argumentation System. In Helder
Coelho, Rudi Studer, and Michael Wooldridge, editors, 19th Euro-
pean Conference on Artificial Intelligence, volume 215 of Frontiers
in Artificial Intelligence and Applications, pages 131–136, Lisbon,
2010. IOS Press.
[BTK93] Andrei Bondarenko, Francesca Toni, and Robert Kowalski. An
Assumption-Based Framework for Non-Monotonic Reasoning. In
Lu´ıs Moniz Pereira and Anil Nerode, editors, Logic Programming
and Non-monotonic Reasoning, 2nd International Workshop, pages
171–189, Lisbon, 1993. MIT Press.
[BTW10] Gerhard Brewka, Miros law Truszczyn´ski, and Stefan Woltran. Rep-
resenting Preferences Among Sets. In Maria Fox and David Poole,
editors, 24th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 273–
278, Atlanta, Georgia, 2010. AAAI Press.
[BW10] Gerhard Brewka and Stefan Woltran. Abstract Dialectical Frame-
works. In Fnagzhen Lin, Ulrike Sattler, and Miros law Truszczyn´ski,
225
editors, Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning,
12th International Conference, Toronto, 2010. AAAI Press.
[CA07] Martin Caminada and Leila Amgoud. On the Evaluation of Ar-
gumentation Formalisms. Artificial Intelligence, 171(5-6):286–310,
2007.
[Cam06] Martin Caminada. Semi-Stable Semantics. In Paul E Dunne and
Trevor J M Bench-Capon, editors, Computational Models of Argu-
ment, volume 144 of Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applica-
tions, pages 121–130, Liverpool, 2006. IOS Press.
[CˇFST] Kristijonas Cˇyras, Xiuyi Fan, Claudia Schulz, and Francesca Toni.
Assumption-Based Argumentation: Disputes, Explanations, Prefer-
ences. In Pietro Baroni, Dov M Gabbay, Massimiliano Giacomin,
and Leendert van der Torre, editors, Handbook Of Formal Argumen-
tation, to appear, volume 1. College Publications.
[CH13] Adam Corner and Ulrike Hahn. Normative Theories of Argu-
mentation: Are Some Norms Better Than Others? Synthese,
190(16):3579–3610, 2013.
[Cla78] Keith Clark. Negation as Failure. In Herve´ Gallaire and Jack Minker,
editors, Logic and Data Bases, pages 293–322. Springer, 1978.
[CLR90] Thomas T Cormen, Charles E Leiserson, and Ronald L Rivest. In-
troduction to Algorithms. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1990.
[CMKMM15] Sylvie Coste-Marquis, Se´bastien Konieczny, Jean-Guy Mailly, and
Pierre Marquis. Extension Enforcement in Abstract Argumenta-
tion as an Optimization Problem. In Qiang Yang and Michael
Wooldridge, editors, 24th International Joint Conference on Artifi-
cial Intelligence, pages 2876–2882, Buenos Aires, 2015. AAAI Press.
[CMO14] Martin Caminada, Sanjay Modgil, and Nir Oren. Preferences and
Unrestricted Rebut. In Simon Parsons, Nir Oren, Chris Reed, and
Federico Cerutti, editors, Computational Models of Argument, vol-
ume 266 of Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications,
pages 209–220, Atholl, 2014. IOS Press.
[CRS92] Claudette Cayrol, Ve´ronique Royer, and Claire Saurel. Manage-
ment of Preferences in Assumption-Based Reasoning. In Bernadette
Bouchon-Meunier, Llorenc¸ Valverde, and Ronald R Yager, editors,
4th International Conference on Processing and Management of
Uncertainty in Knowledge-Based Systems, volume 682 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 13–22, Palma de Mallorca, 1992.
Springer.
[CSAD13] Martin Caminada, Sa´ Samy, Joa˜o Alcaˆntara, and Wolfgang Dvorˇa´k.
On the Difference between Assumption-Based Argumentation and
Abstract Argumentation. In 25th Benelux Conference on Artificial
Intelligence, pages 25–32, Hasselt, 2013.
226
[CˇT15] Kristijonas Cˇyras and Francesca Toni. Non-Monotonic Inference
Properties for Assumption-Based Argumentation. In Elizabeth
Black, Sanjay Modgil, and Nir Oren, editors, Theory and Applica-
tions of Formal Argumentation - 3rd International Workshop, vol-
ume 9524 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 92–111,
Buenos Aires, 2015. Springer.
[CT16a] Robert Craven and Francesca Toni. Argument Graphs and
Assumption-Based Argumentation. Artificial Intelligence, 233:1–59,
2016.
[CˇT16b] Kristijonas Cˇyras and Francesca Toni. ABA+: Assumption-Based
Argumentation with Preferences. In Chitta Baral, James P Del-
grande, and Frank Wolter, editors, Principles of Knowledge Repre-
sentation and Reasoning, 15th International Conference, pages 553–
556, Cape Town, 2016. AAAI Press.
[CˇT16c] Kristijonas Cˇyras and Francesca Toni. Properties of ABA+ for
Non-Monotonic Reasoning. In 16th International Workshop on Non-
Monotonic Reasoning, pages 25–34, Cape Town, 2016.
[CTO14] Federico Cerutti, Nava Tintarev, and Nir Oren. Formal Arguments,
Preferences, and Natural Language Interfaces to Humans: an Em-
pirical Evaluation. In Torsten Schaub, Gerhard Friedrich, and Barry
O’Sullivan, editors, 21st European Conference on Artificial Intelli-
gence, volume 263 of Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Appli-
cations, pages 207–212, Prague, 2014. IOS Press.
[Cˇyr16] Kristijonas Cˇyras. Argumentation-Based Reasoning with Prefer-
ences. In Javier Bajo, Maria Jose´ Escalona, Sylvain Giroux, Patrycja
Hoffa-Dabrowska, Vicente Julia´n, Paulo Novais, Nayat Sa´nchez
Pi, Rainer Unland, and Ricardo Azambuja Silveira, editors, High-
lights of Practical Applications of Scalable Multi-Agent Systems. The
PAAMS Collection - International Workshops of PAAMS 2016, vol-
ume 616 of Communications in Computer and Information Science,
pages 199–210, Seville, 2016. Springer.
[Cˇyr17] Kristijonas Cˇyras. Rational versus Intuitive Outcomes of Reasoning
with Preferences: Argumentation Perspective. Inteligencia Artifi-
cial, 20(59):70–81, 2017.
[DGWW11] Wolfgang Dvorˇa´k, Sarah Alice Gaggl, Johannes Peter Wallner, and
Stefan Woltran. Making Use of Advances in Answer-Set Pro-
gramming for Abstract Argumentation Systems. In Hans Tompits,
Salvador Abreu, Johannes Oetsch, Jo¨rg Pu¨hrer, Dietmar Seipel,
Masanobu Umeda, and Armin Wolf, editors, Applications of Declar-
ative Programming and Knowledge Management - 19th International
Conference, volume 7773 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
pages 114–133, Vienna, 2011. Springer.
[DHKP11] Carmel Domshlak, Eyke Hu¨llermeier, Souhila Kaci, and Henri
Prade. Preferences in AI: An Overview. Artificial Intelligence, 175(7-
8):1037–1052, 2011.
227
[DHL+15] Martin Diller, Adrian Haret, Thomas Linsbichler, Stefan Rummele,
and Stefan Woltran. An Extension-Based Approach to Belief Re-
vision in Abstract Argumentation. In Qiang Yang and Michael
Wooldridge, editors, 24th International Joint Conference on Artifi-
cial Intelligence, pages 2926–2932, Buenos Aires, 2015. AAAI Press.
[Dix95] Ju¨rgen Dix. A Classification Theory of Semantics of Normal
Logic Programs: I. Strong Properties. Fundamenta Informaticae,
22(3):227–255, 1995.
[DK95] Yannis Dimopoulos and Antonis C Kakas. Logic Programming with-
out Negation as Failure. In John W. Lloyd, editor, International
Symposium on Logic Programming, pages 369–383, Portland, 1995.
MIT Press.
[DKT06] Phan Minh Dung, Robert Kowalski, and Francesca Toni. Dialec-
tic Proof Procedures for Assumption-Based, Admissible Argumen-
tation. Artificial Intelligence, 170(2):114–159, 2006.
[DKT09] Phan Minh Dung, Robert Kowalski, and Francesca Toni.
Assumption-Based Argumentation. In Guillermo Ricardo Simari
and Iyad Rahwan, editors, Argumentation in Artificial Intelligence,
pages 199–218. Springer, 2009.
[DL13] Franz Dietrich and Christian List. Where Do Preferences Come
From? International Journal of Game Theory, 42(3):613–637, 2013.
[DM16] Marcello D’Agostino and Sanjay Modgil. A Rational Account of
Classical Logic Argumentation for Real-World Agents. In Gal A
Kaminka, Maria Fox, Paolo Bouquet, Eyke Hu¨llermeier, Virginia
Dignum, Frank Dignum, and Frank van Harmelen, editors, 22nd Eu-
ropean Conference on Artificial Intelligence, volume 285 of Frontiers
in Artificial Intelligence and Applications, pages 141–149, Hague,
2016. IOS Press.
[DMT07] Phan Minh Dung, Paolo Mancarella, and Francesca Toni. Comput-
ing Ideal Sceptical Argumentation. Artificial Intelligence, 171(10-
15):642–674, 2007.
[DNK97] Yannis Dimopoulos, Bernhard Nebel, and Jana Koehler. Encoding
Planning Problems in Nonmonotonic Logic Programs. In Sam Steel
and Rachid Alami, editors, Recent Advances in AI Planning, 4th
European Conference on Planning, volume 1348 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, pages 169–181, Toulouse, 1997. Springer.
[DNT02] Yannis Dimopoulos, Bernhard Nebel, and Francesca Toni. On The
Computational Complexity of Assumption-Based Argumentation for
Default Reasoning. Artificial Intelligence, 141(1-2):57–78, 2002.
[DS95] Phan Minh Dung and Tran Cao Son. Nonmonotonic Inheritance,
Argumentation and Logic Programming. In V. Wiktor Marek and
Anil Nerode, editors, Logic Programming and Nonmonotonic Rea-
soning, 3rd International Conference, volume 928 of Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, pages 316–329, Lexington, 1995. Springer.
228
[DS97] James P Delgrande and Torsten H Schaub. Compiling Reasoning
with and about Preferences into Default Logic. In 15th International
Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 168–175, Nagoya,
1997. Morgan Kaufmann.
[DS00] James P Delgrande and Torsten H Schaub. Expressing Preferences
in Default Logic. Artificial Intelligence, 123(1-2):41–87, 2000.
[DSTW04] James P Delgrande, Torsten H Schaub, Hans Tompits, and Kewen
Wang. A Classification and Survey of Preference Handling Ap-
proaches in Nonmonotonic Reasoning. Computational Intelligence,
20(2):308–334, 2004.
[DT14] Phan Minh Dung and Phan Minh Thang. Closure and Consistency in
Logic-Associated Argumentation. Journal of Artificial Intelligence
Research, 49:79–109, 2014.
[Dun95a] Phan Minh Dung. An Argumentation-Theoretic Foundations for
Logic Programming. The Journal of Logic Programming, 22(2):151–
177, 1995.
[Dun95b] Phan Minh Dung. On the Acceptability of Arguments and its Funda-
mental Role in Nonmonotonic Reasoning, Logic Programming and
n-person Games. Artificial Intelligence, 77:321–357, 1995.
[Dun09] Paul E Dunne. The Computational Complexity of Ideal Semantics.
Artificial Intelligence, 173(18):1559–1591, 2009.
[Dun14] Phan Minh Dung. An Axiomatic Analysis of Structured Argumenta-
tion for Prioritized Default Reasoning. In Torsten Schaub, Gerhard
Friedrich, and Barry O’Sullivan, editors, 21st European Conference
on Artificial Intelligence, volume 263 of Frontiers in Artificial Intel-
ligence and Applications, pages 267–272, Prague, 2014. IOS Press.
[Dun16a] Phan Minh Dung. A Canonical Semantics for Structured Argumen-
tation with Priorities. In Pietro Baroni, Thomas F Gordon, Tat-
jana Scheﬄer, and Manfred Stede, editors, Computational Models
of Argument, volume 287 of Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and
Applications, pages 263–274, Potsdam, 2016. IOS Press.
[Dun16b] Phan Minh Dung. An Axiomatic Analysis of Structured Argumen-
tation with Priorities. Artificial Intelligence, 231:107–150, 2016.
[DW91] Jon Doyle and Michael Wellman. Impediments to Universal
Preference-Based Default Theories. Artificial Intelligence, 49(1-
3):97–128, 1991.
[EGW10] Uwe Egly, Sarah Alice Gaggl, and Stefan Woltran. Answer-set pro-
gramming encodings for argumentation frameworks. Argument &
Computation, 1(2):147–177, 2010.
[EK89] Kave Eshghi and Robert Kowalski. Abduction Compared with Nega-
tion by Failure. In Giorgio Levi and Maurizio Martelli, editors, Logic
Programming, the 6th International Conference, pages 234–254, Lis-
bon, 1989. MIT Press.
229
[FT13] Xiuyi Fan and Francesca Toni. Decision Making with Assumption-
Based Argumentation. In Elizabeth Black, Sanjay Modgil, and Nir
Oren, editors, Theory and Applications of Formal Argumentation -
2nd International Workshop, volume 8306 of Lecture Notes in Com-
puter Science, pages 127–142, Beijing, 2013. Springer.
[FT14] Xiuyi Fan and Francesca Toni. A General Framework for Sound
Assumption-Based Argumentation Dialogues. Artificial Intelligence,
216:20–54, 2014.
[GDS09] Alejandro Javier Garc´ıa, Ju¨rgen Dix, and Guillermo Ricardo Simari.
Argument-based Logic Programming. In Guillermo Ricardo Simari
and Iyad Rahwan, editors, Argumentation in Artificial Intelligence,
pages 153–171. Springer, 2009.
[Gef90] Hector Geffner. Causal Theories for Nonmonotonic Reasoning. In
Howard E Shrobe, Thomas G Dietterich, and William R Swartout,
editors, 8th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages
524–530, Boston, 1990. AAAI Press/MIT Press.
[GH11] Nikos Gorogiannis and Anthony Hunter. Instantiating Abstract Ar-
gumentation with Classical Logic Arguments: Postulates and Prop-
erties. Artificial Intelligence, 175(9-10):1479–1497, 2011.
[GL91] Michael Gelfond and Vladimir Lifschitz. Classical Negation in Logic
Programs and Disjunctive Databases. New Generation Computing,
9(3-4):365–385, aug 1991.
[GMR+15] Sarah Alice Gaggl, Norbert Manthey, Alessandro Ronca, Jo-
hannes Peter Wallner, and Stefan Woltran. Improved Answer-Set
Programming Encodings for Abstract Argumentation. Theory and
Practice of Logic Programming, 15(4-5):434–448, 2015.
[GP92] Hector Geffner and Judea Pearl. Conditional Entailment: Bridging
Wwo Approaches to Default Reasoning. Artificial Intelligence, 53(2-
3):209–244, 1992.
[GPW07] Thomas F Gordon, Henry Prakken, and Douglas Walton. The
Carneades Model of Argument and Burden of Proof. Artificial In-
telligence, 171(10-15):875–896, 2007.
[GS04] Alejandro Javier Garc´ıa and Guillermo Ricardo Simari. Defeasi-
ble Logic Programming: An Argumentative Approach. Theory and
Practice of Logic Programming, 4(2):95–138, 2004.
[GS14] Alejandro Javier Garc´ıa and Guillermo Ricardo Simari. Defeasible
Logic Programming: DeLP-servers, Contextual Queries, and Expla-
nations for Answers. Argument & Computation, 5(1):63–88, 2014.
[GW09] Thomas F Gordon and Douglas Walton. Proof Burdens and Stan-
dards. In Guillermo Ricardo Simari and Iyad Rahwan, editors, Ar-
gumentation in Artificial Intelligence, chapter 12, pages 239–258.
Springer, 2009.
230
[GW16] Thomas F Gordon and Douglas Walton. Formalizing Balancing Ar-
guments. In Pietro Baroni, Thomas F Gordon, Tatjana Scheﬄer,
and Manfred Stede, editors, Computational Models of Argument,
volume 287 of Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications,
pages 327–338, Potsdam, 2016. IOS Press.
[Han06] Jo¨rg Hansen. Deontic Logics for Prioritized Imperatives. Artificial
Intelligence and Law, 14(1-2):1–34, 2006.
[HGY12] Sven Ove Hansson and Till Gru¨ne-Yanoff. Preferences, 2012.
[Hor11] John Horty. Rules and Reasons in the Theory of Precedent. Legal
Theory, (17):1–33, 2011.
[HS16] Jesse Heyninck and Christian Straßer. Relations between
Assumption-Based Approaches in Nonmonotonic Logic and Formal
Argumentation. In 16th International Workshop on Non-Monotonic
Reasoning, pages 65–75, Cape Town, 2016.
[HTT90] John Horty, Richmond Thomason, and David Touretzky. A Skep-
tical Theory of Inheritance in Nonmonotonic Semantic Networks.
Artificial Intelligence, 42(2-3):311–348, mar 1990.
[Hun10] Anthony Hunter. Base Logics in Argumentation. In Pietro Baroni,
Federico Cerutti, Massimiliano Giacomin, and Guillermo Ricardo
Simari, editors, Computational Models of Argument, volume 216 of
Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications, pages 275–286,
Desenzano del Garda, 2010. IOS Press.
[Kac10] Souhila Kaci. Refined Preference-Based Argumentation Frame-
works. In Pietro Baroni, Federico Cerutti, Massimiliano Giacomin,
and Guillermo Ricardo Simari, editors, Computational Models of
Argument, volume 216 of Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Ap-
plications, pages 299–310, Desenzano del Garda, 2010. IOS Press.
[Kac11] Souhila Kaci. Working with Preferences. Less is More. Springer,
2011.
[KKT92] Antonis C Kakas, Robert Kowalski, and Francesca Toni. Abductive
Logic Programming. Journal of Logic and Computation, 2(6):719–
770, 1992.
[KL10] Souhila Kaci and Christophe Labreuche. Argumentation Framework
with Fuzzy Preference Relations. In Eyke Hu¨llermeier, Rudolf Kruse,
and Frank Hoffmann, editors, 13th International Conference on In-
formation Processing and Management of Uncertainty, volume 6178
of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 554–563, Dortmund,
2010. Springer.
[KLM90] Sarit Kraus, Daniel Lehmann, and Menachem Magidor. Nonmono-
tonic Reasoning, Preferential Models and Cumulative Logics. Arti-
ficial Intelligence, 44(1-2):167–207, 1990.
231
[KM03] Antonis C Kakas and Pavlos Moraitis. Argumentation Based Deci-
sion Making for Autonomous Agents. In 2nd International Joint
Conference on Autonomous Agents & Multiagent Systems, pages
883–890, Melbourne, 2003. ACM Press.
[KMD94] Antonis C Kakas, Paolo Mancarella, and Phan Minh Dung. The
Acceptability Semantics for Logic Programs. In Pascal Van Henten-
ryck, editor, 11th International Conference on Logic Programming,
pages 504–519, Santa Marherita Ligure, 1994. MIT Press.
[Kon88] Kurt Konolige. Hierarchic Autoepistemic Theories for Nonmono-
tonic Reasoning. In Howard E Shrobe, Tom M Mitchell, and Reid G
Smith, editors, 7th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence,
pages 439–443, St. Paul, MN, 1988. AAAI Press/MIT Press.
[KS86] Robert Kowalski and Marek Sergot. A Logic-based Calculus of
Events. New Generation Computing, 4(1):67–95, 1986.
[KT79] Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. Prospect Theory: An Anal-
ysis of Decision under Risk. Econometrica, 47(2):263–291, 1979.
[KT96] Robert Kowalski and Francesca Toni. Abstract Argumentation. Ar-
tificial Intelligence and Law, 4(3-4):275–296, 1996.
[KvdT08] Souhila Kaci and Leendert van der Torre. Preference-Based Argu-
mentation: Arguments Supporting Multiple Values. International
Journal of Approximate Reasoning, 48(3):730–751, 2008.
[Lif85] Vladimir Lifschitz. Computing Circumscription. In Aravind K Joshi,
editor, 9th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence,
pages 121–127, Los Angeles, 1985. Morgan Kaufmann.
[Lif86] Vladimir Lifschitz. On the Satisfiability of Circumscription. Artifi-
cial Intelligence, 28(1):17–27, feb 1986.
[LOvdTV16] Beishui Liao, Nir Oren, Leendert van der Torre, and Serena Villata.
Prioritized Norms and Defaults in Formal Argumentation. In Olivier
Roy, Allard Tamminga, and Malte Wille, editors, 13th International
Conference on Deontic Logic and Normative Systems, pages 139–
154, Bayreuth, 2016. College Publications.
[LS89] Fangzhen Lin and Yoav Shoham. Argument Systems: A Uniform
Basis for Nonmonotonic Reasoning. In Ronald J Brachman, Hec-
tor J Levesque, and Raymond Reiter, editors, 1st International Con-
ference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning,
pages 245–255, Toronto, 1989. Morgan Kaufmann.
[Mak88] David Makinson. General Theory of Cumulative Inference. In
Michael Reinfrank, Johan de Kleer, Matthew L. Ginsberg, and Erik
Sandewall, editors, 2nd International Workshop on Non-Monotonic
Reasoning, volume 346 of Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence,
pages 1–18, Grassau, 1988. Springer.
232
[MC09] Sanjay Modgil and Martin Caminada. Proof Theories and Algo-
rithms for Abstract Argumentation Frameworks. In Guillermo Ri-
cardo Simari and Iyad Rahwan, editors, Argumentation in Artificial
Intelligence, chapter 6, pages 105–129. Springer, 2009.
[McC80] John McCarthy. Circumscription—A Form of Non-Monotonic Rea-
soning. Artificial Intelligence, 13(1-2):27–39, 1980.
[McC86] John McCarthy. Applications of Circumscription to Formalizing
Common-Sense Knowledge. Artificial Intelligence, 28(1):89–116,
1986.
[McD80] Drew McDermott. Non-Monotonic Logic I. Artificial Intelligence,
13(1-2):41–72, 1980.
[McD82] Drew McDermott. Nonmonotonic Logic II: Nonmonotonic Modal
Theories. Journal of the ACM, 29(1):33–57, 1982.
[MH69] John McCarthy and Patrick Hayes. Some Philosophical Problems
from the Standpoint of Artificial Intelligence. In B Meltzer and
D Michie, editors, Machine Intelligence 4, pages 463–502. Edinburgh
University Press, 1969.
[Mod09] Sanjay Modgil. Reasoning About Preferences in Argumentation
Frameworks. Artificial Intelligence, 173(9-10):901–934, 2009.
[Moo84] Robert C Moore. Possible-World Semantics for Autoepistemic Logic.
In 1st International Workshop on Non-Monotonic Reasoning, pages
344–354, New Paltz, 1984.
[Moo85] Robert C Moore. Semantical Considerations on Nonmonotonic
Logic. Artificial Intelligence, 25(1):75–94, 1985.
[MP09] Peter McBurney and Simon Parsons. Dialogue Games for Agent
Argumentation. In Guillermo Ricardo Simari and Iyad Rahwan,
editors, Argumentation in Artificial Intelligence, chapter 13, pages
261–280. Springer, 2009.
[MP10] Sanjay Modgil and Henry Prakken. Reasoning About Preferences in
Structured Extended Argumentation Frameworks. In Pietro Baroni,
Federico Cerutti, Massimiliano Giacomin, and Guillermo Ricardo
Simari, editors, Computational Models of Argument, volume 216 of
Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications, pages 347–358,
Desenzano del Garda, 2010. IOS Press.
[MP13] Sanjay Modgil and Henry Prakken. A General Account of Argumen-
tation with Preferences. Artificial Intelligence, 195:361–397, 2013.
[MP14] Sanjay Modgil and Henry Prakken. The ASPIC+ Framework for
Structured Argumentation: A Tutorial. Argument & Computation,
5(1):31–62, 2014.
[MS99] Rob Miller and Murray Shanahan. The Event Calculus in Classi-
cal Logic - Alternative Axiomatisations. Electronic Transactions on
Artificial Intelligence, 3(A):77–105, 1999.
233
[MS11] Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber. Why Do Humans Reason? Argu-
ments for an Argumentative Theory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences,
34(2):57–74, 2011.
[Mue14] Erik T Mueller. Commonsense Reasoning: An Event Calculus Based
Approach. Morgan Kaufmann, 2014.
[Pea90] Judea Pearl. System Z: A Natural Ordering of Defaults with
Tractable Applications to Nonmonotonic Reasoning. In Rohit
Parikh, editor, 3rd Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Reason-
ing about Knowledge, pages 121–135, Pacific Grove, 1990. Morgan
Kaufmann.
[Pol92] John Pollock. How to Reason Defeasibly. Artificial Intelligence,
57(1):1–42, 1992.
[Poo85] David Poole. On the Comparison of Theories: Preferring the Most
Specific Explanation. In Aravind K. Joshi, editor, 9th International
Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 144–147, Los An-
geles, 1985. Morgan Kaufmann.
[Poo88] David Poole. A Logical Framework for Default Reasoning. Artificial
Intelligence, 36(1):27–47, 1988.
[Pra10] Henry Prakken. An Abstract Framework for Argumentation with
Structured Arguments. Argument & Computation, 1(2):93–124,
2010.
[Pra12] Henry Prakken. Some Reflections on Two Current Trends in Formal
Argumentation. In Alexander Artikis, Robert Craven, Nihan Kesim
Cicekli, Babak Sadighi, and Kostas Stathis, editors, Logic Programs,
Norms and Action, volume 7360 of Lecture Notes in Computer Sci-
ence, pages 249–272. Springer, 2012.
[PS99] Henry Prakken and Giovanni Sartor. A System for Defeasible Ar-
gumentation, with Defeasible Priorities. In Michael Wooldridge and
Manuela Veloso, editors, Artificial Intelligence Today, volume 1600
of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 365–379. Springer,
1999.
[PTV15] Gabriella Pigozzi, Alexis Tsoukia`s, and Paolo Viappiani. Prefer-
ences in Artificial Intelligence. Annals of Mathematics and Artificial
Intelligence, pages 1–41, 2015.
[Rei80] Raymond Reiter. A Logic for Default Reasoning. Artificial Intelli-
gence, 13(1-2):81–132, 1980.
[Rin94] Jussi Rintanen. Prioritized Autoepistemic Logic. In Craig MacNish,
David Pearce, and Lu´ıs Moniz Pereira, editors, Logics in Artificial
Intelligence, European Workshop, volume 838 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, pages 232–246, York, 1994. Springer.
[Rin98] Jussi Rintanen. Complexity of Prioritized Default Logics. Journal
of Artificial Intelligence Research, 9:423–461, 1998.
234
[RMB+10] Iyad Rahwan, Mohammed Iqbal Madakkatel, Jean-Franc¸ois Bon-
nefon, Ruqiyabi Naz Awan, and Sherief Abdallah. Behavioral Ex-
periments for Assessing the Abstract Argumentation Semantics of
Reinstatement. Cognitive Science, 34(8):1483–1502, 2010.
[Rot01] Hans Rott. Change, Choice and Inference: A Study of Belief Revi-
sion and Nonmonotonic Reasoning. Oxford University Press, 2001.
[RS09] Iyad Rahwan and Guillermo Ricardo Simari. Argumentation in Ar-
tificial Intelligence. Springer, 2009.
[SA14] Christian Strasser and Aldo Antonelli. Non-Monotonic Logic. In
Edward N. Zalta, editor, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Winter edition, 2014.
[Ser15] Marek Sergot. Logic Programming with Preferences and Priorities
(Talk at Imperial College London). 2015.
[SGCS03] Frieder Stolzenburg, Alejandro Javier Garc´ıa, Carlos Chesn˜evar, and
Guillermo Ricardo Simari. Computing Generalized Specificity. Jour-
nal of Applied Non-Classical Logics, 13:87–113, 2003.
[Sho87] Yoav Shoham. A Semantical Approach to Non-Monotonic Logics. In
Matthew L. Ginsberg, editor, Readings in Nonmonotonic Reasoning,
pages 227–250. Morgan Kaufmann, 1987.
[SI96] Chiaki Sakama and Katsumi Inoue. Representing Priorities in Logic
Programs. In Michael J. Maher, editor, Joint International Con-
ference and Syposium on Logic Programming, pages 82–96, Bonn,
1996. MIT Press.
[SI00] Chiaki Sakama and Katsumi Inoue. Prioritized Logic Programming
and Tts Application to Commonsense Reasoning. Artificial Intelli-
gence, 123(1-2):185–222, 2000.
[Sˇim14] Alexander Sˇimko. Logic Programming With Preferences On Rules.
PhD thesis, Comenius University in Bratislava, 2014.
[SL92] Guillermo Ricardo Simari and Ronald Prescott Loui. A Mathe-
matical Treatment of Defeasible Reasoning and Its Implementation.
Artificial Intelligence, 53(2-3):125–157, 1992.
[SR12] Mark Snaith and Chris Reed. TOAST: Online ASPIC+ Implemen-
tation. In Bart Verheij, Stefan Szeider, and Stefan Woltran, editors,
Computational Models of Argument, volume 245 of Frontiers in Ar-
tificial Intelligence and Applications, pages 509–510, Vienna, 2012.
IOS Press.
[ST15] Claudia Schulz and Francesca Toni. Logic Programming in
Assumption-Based Argumentation Revisited – Semantics and
Graphical Representation. In Blai Bonet and Sven Koenig, editors,
29th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI Press, pages
1569–1575, Austin, Texas, 2015.
[ST17] Claudia Schulz and Francesca Toni. Labellings for Assumption-
Based and Abstract Argumentation. International Journal of Ap-
proximate Reasoning, 84:110–149, 2017.
235
[Tar55] Alfred Tarski. A Lattice-theoretical Fixpoint Theorem and Its Ap-
plications. Pacific Journal of Mathematics, 5(2):285–309, 1955.
[TL14] Phan Minh Thang and H T Luong. Translating Preferred Subthe-
ories into Structured Argumentation. Journal of Logic and Compu-
tation, 24(4):831–850, 2014.
[Ton07] Francesca Toni. Assumption-Based Argumentation for Closed and
Consistent Defeasible Reasoning. In Ken Satoh, Akihiro Inokuchi,
Katashi Nagao, and Takahiro Kawamura, editors, JSAI 2007 Con-
ference and Workshops, volume 4914 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 390–402, Miyazaki, 2007. Springer.
[Ton08] Francesca Toni. Assumption-Based Argumentation for Epistemic
and Practical Reasoning. In Pompeu Casanovas, Giovanni Sartor,
Nuria Casellas, and Rossella Rubino, editors, Computable Models of
the Law, Languages, Dialogues, Games, Ontologies, volume 4884 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 185–202. Springer, 2008.
[Ton12] Francesca Toni. Reasoning on the Web with Assumption-Based Ar-
gumentation. In Thomas Eiter and Thomas Krennwallner, editors,
Reasoning Web. Semantic Technologies for Advanced Query Answer-
ing - 8th International Summer School, volume 7487 of Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, pages 370–386, Vienna, 2012. Springer.
[Ton13] Francesca Toni. A Generalised Framework for Dispute Derivations
in Assumption-Based Argumentation. Artificial Intelligence, 195(1-
2):1–43, 2013.
[Ton14] Francesca Toni. A Tutorial on Assumption-Based Argumentation.
Argument & Computation, 5(1):89–117, 2014.
[Tve75] Amos Tversky. A Critique of Expected Utility Theory: Descriptive
and Normative Considerations. Erkenntnis, 9(2):163–173, 1975.
[Ver96] Bart Verheij. Two approaches to dialectical argumentation: admis-
sible sets and argumentation stages. In J. J. Meyer and L. van der
Gaag, editors, 8th Dutch Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages
357–368, Utrecht, 1996. Utrecht University.
[Wak14] Toshiko Wakaki. Assumption-Based Argumentation Equipped with
Preferences. In Hoa Khanh Dam, Jeremy V Pitt, Yang Xu, Guido
Governatori, and Takayuki Ito, editors, Principles and Practice of
Multi-Agent Systems - 17th International Conference, volume 8861
of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 116–132, Gold Coast,
2014. Springer.
[Wak15] Toshiko Wakaki. Preference-Based Argumentation Built from Pri-
oritized Logic Programming. Journal of Logic and Computation,
25(2):251–301, 2015.
[WBC07] Adam Wyner and Trevor J M Bench-Capon. Argument Schemes
for Legal Case-based Reasoning. In JURIX, pages 139–149, Leiden,
2007.
236
[WS14] Claus-Peter Wirth and Frieder Stolzenburg. David Poole’s Speci-
ficity Revised. In Chitta Baral, Giuseppe De Giacomo, and Thomas
Eiter, editors, Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reason-
ing, 14th International Conference, Vienna, 2014. AAAI Press.
[YMR16] Anthony P Young, Sanjay Modgil, and Odinaldo Rodrigues. Pri-
oritised Default Logic as Rational Argumentation. In Catholijn M
Jonker, Stacy Marsella, John Thangarajah, and Karl Tuyls, editors,
16th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents & Mul-
tiagent Systems, pages 626–634, Singapore, 2016. ACM.
[ZF97] Yan Zhang and Norman Y Foo. Answer Sets for Prioritized Logic
Programs. In Jan Maluszynski, editor, International Symposium on
Logic Programming, pages 69–83, Port Jefferson, 1997. MIT Press.
237
